Feser on Radical Skepticism

... and as relates to same-sex mirage --

Edward Feser (2015): Marriage and The Matrix

On Capital Punisment

Edward Feser and Joseph Bessette have new book on capital punishment. Edward Feser links to a review of it: Briggs on By Man Shall His Blood Be Shed

My comment --

All societies have the obligation to deliver justice to their members, and also to non-members who are presently within the ambit or jurisdiction of the society. No society has such an obligation toward persons who are not members of the society *and* who are outside its ambit or jurisdiction.

To *refuse* to execute the murderer -- to *refuse* to deliver justice to her (*) victim(s) -- is to give the murderer to power to declare, by the act of the murder, that justice for the victim(s) is not the responsibility of the society. That is, it is to declare that murdered persons were not *really* members of our society and were not really within the ambit or jurisdiction of our society.

Thus, blanket opposition to capital punishment is profoundly immoral. A society which refuses, as a matter of "principle", ever to execute anyone whom justice demands be executed, is a society that is profoundly unjust and immoral; such a society will inevitably *create* broad swathes of injustice.



(*) in case it's not clear, I used the grammatically incorrect "she" to mock the idiots who do it to promote "gender inclusive" leftist bullshit.

What is a lie?

This post is yet another installment in the series (who knew?) exploring honesty (and dishonesty) and the morality of lying. Previous posts are:
Truth and Honesty ... and Otherwise
Lying is not intrinsically immoral
Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II

For this post, we take as our text this recent post by Edward Feser: What counts as a lie?

... As typically defined by natural law theorists, a lie is willful speech or other communicative behavior contrary to one’s mind. That is to say, one lies when one wills to communicate the message that P when what one really thinks is not-P. But there are two crucial things to note about this definition. First, what counts as “communicating the message that P” depends in part on convention and circumstance, because the significance of words and communicative gestures is determined by convention and can vary with circumstances. Second, lying is not the same thing as deception. One can lie without deceiving someone, and one can deceive someone without lying. ...

Don't that just beat all?

Here, Mr Feser offers as definition of (the noun) 'lie' this description: "a lie is willful speech or other communicative behavior contrary to one’s mind." -- I mean, look at that: "... communicative behavior ..." I mean, of course I know that it has to be pure coincidence that "communicative behavior" is so similar to "communicative act," but still!

By the way, in lieu of the subject matter, "act" is much the better word to use than "behavior."

Now, this definition is still not very good, for it doesn't account for enough of the commonly-understood facts about lies [as see the Facts of which a definition of 'lying' must account section]. He seems, at least at first, to be no longer trying to restrict acts of lying to "speech and related behavior" [as see the section Feser's definition of 'lying'? section, where I had teased out his definition of 'lying' as: "deliberately doing the opposite of communicating (via speech and related behavior) what is on one's mind"]. I say "at first" because, continuing to read, it seems that Feser's understanding of the nature of lies continues mostly to restrict them to being instances of "speech and related behavior." That is, there is a great difference between acknowledging the fact that most, but not all, lies are communicated via verbal acts, and understanding the fact that lies are a particular class of communicative acts, rather than being a class of verbal acts.

The relationships between "communicative acts" and speech and lies are represented by this image -- All lies, but their natures, are "communicative acts," but not all acts of speech (or "verbal acts") are "communicative acts;" AND, not all lies are acts of speech.

[there is no telling when I will finish this post, as I am still working on the "Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II" post]

Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II

I've previously taken a stab at explaining the rationale which justifies the assertion that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." This post is the second part of a further explication of this reasoning (Part I is here), and especially in reference to Edward Feser's multiply-incoherent argument to the contrary.

Already, in Part I, I have successfully made the case that:
1) Mr Feser's argument to support the assertion that "lying is intrinsically immoral" falls apart in incoherence, for it contains (and relies upon) a self-contradiction;
2) The assertion that "lying is *not* intrinsically immoral" is rationally and logically supported by an examination/comprehension of the meaning of the English verb 'to lie'.

Therefore, I have already made a complete case justifying the belief in the truth of the assertion that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." Anything more is frosting, really.


You can't see what you won't look at

In the main thread, Mr Feser asserts in conclusion:

Finally, anyone who claims that it would not be even mildly immoral to lie to the murderer needs to provide some alternative account which both explains why lying is wrong in other cases but does not forbid it in the case at hand. And there are serious problems with such accounts. ...

In short, I would say that the natural law position that lying is intrinsically wrong has powerful arguments in its favor, and when rightly understood is not as counterintuitive as it might seem. ... Meanwhile, the alternative view has no good arguments in its favor, and is at best supported by culturally contingent and fallible intuitions. Thus, it poses no serious challenge to the natural law position. If there is a conflict between that position and our intuitions, it is the intuitions that have to go.

Well, Hell's Bells! After all, it's not as though Herr Doktor Professor is even willing to attend to such arguments, if they are made; or, when it gets down to it, even to allow them to be made in the first place.


Dude! That's the very thing at question

In the main thread, Mr Feser asserts:

Finally, anyone who claims that it would not be even mildly immoral to lie to the murderer needs to provide some alternative account which both explains why lying is wrong in other cases but does not forbid it in the case at hand. And there are serious problems with such accounts. For example, it is sometimes suggested that it is wrong to lie only when the person lied to has a right to know the truth, which the murderer at the door does not. One problem with this suggestion is that it fails to capture what is wrong with lying per se. For we can fail to respect someone’s right to know the truth even when we don’t lie - for example, when we simply keep silent when someone who has a right to certain information from us asks for it. The view would also have the absurd implication that we can freely tell falsehoods not only to murderers, but also to innocent people who happen not to have a right to know certain truths. For example, it would entail that when there are certain secrets that a government has a right to keep from its citizens (about sensitive military operations, say), the government may not only refrain from revealing them to the citizens, but even tell outright falsehoods instead. It would entail that parents could tell falsehoods to their children, rather than merely keeping silent, about matters they are too young to understand. It would entail that rather than merely keeping silent, we can tell falsehoods to other adults about private matters we have no obligation to inform them about. It would entail that God might tell us nothing but falsehoods, since we have no rights against Him - contrary to the Thomistic view (defended in the post just linked to) that God can only ever will what is good for us, despite His not being obligated to us in any way. (Which brings to mind a further consideration: If even God cannot lie - as St. Paul famously affirms in Titus 1:2 - then where do we get off thinking that we may sometimes do so? Job 13:7 indicates that it would be wrong to lie even for the purpose of defending God’s honor.)

Let's consider some of the logical fallacies (primarily question-begging) in just this short quotation --

"Finally, anyone who claims that it would not be even mildly immoral to lie to the murderer needs to provide some alternative account which both explains why lying is wrong in other cases but does not forbid it in the case at hand."

This is a non sequitur (probably related to the fact that he's extensively question-begging throughout the article), and it contains a subtle question-begging itself -- for, as a logical issue, it might be the case that no instance of lying is ever morally prohibited.

That lying is or is not intrinsically immoral is a wholly separate issue from distinguishing whether (and why) any specific instance of lying may be morally prohibited, or may be morally permissible ... or even may be morally requisite. -- There is, in this last statement, an oblique reference to a *major* incoherence in Feser's argument. I'll explain that in its own section.

"For example, it is sometimes suggested that it is wrong to lie only when the person lied to has a right to know the truth, which the murderer at the door does not."

Isn't it amazing, the reach of such a small word as 'only'?

Consider:

Matteo said:
I've never understood the problem here. Lying is withholding the truth from those who have a right to it. Murderers at the door and the Gestapo have no right to it, so no lying is involved.

Edward Feser said: Ilion, I know you can't read, as is evident from your remarks. But I thought Matteo could. I address that very dodge in the second to last paragraph of the post, Matteo, as you'll see if you go back and read it.

Now, in no wise has Matteo "suggested that it is wrong to lie *only* when the person lied to has a right to know the truth." Matteo's statement reflects the common misunderstanding that lying is inherently immoral (which view Feser is pushing), but he also understands that lying to the murderer at the door is not immoral (and may even be morally requisite) -- the problem starts, of course, with the fact that we use the single word, 'lie,' to denote all intentional miscommunication, coupled with the misunderstanding that a lie is always immoral.

So, to resolve that seeming discrepancy, Matteo "suggested that [an act of intentional miscommunication is a] lie only when the person [to whom the miscommunication is directed] has a right to know the truth." In effect, Matteo is "suggesting" that there must be some word other than 'lie' that properly denotes an act of intentional mis-communication when the person to whom it is directed *ought* intentionally to be deceived.

Now, Matteo's definition of 'lie' (as given in the above quote) is not false; it's just incomplete; and he is misunderstanding lies to be always immoral. BUT, he is saying something very different from the strawman Feser "suggests" is the position logically opposite his own.

Matteo's attempted solution to the seeming conundrum was not a "dodge" ... and Herr Doktor Professor did not address it.

"One problem with this suggestion is that it fails to capture what is wrong with lying per se. For we can fail to respect someone’s right to know the truth even when we don’t lie - for example, when we simply keep silent when someone who has a right to certain information from us asks for it."

This set of statements includes question-begging -- for, whether "lying per se" is wrong just happens to be the point at issue.



" Mmm"

Seriously, Dude: how big is your barn (just how much straw do you have)?



" Mmm"


Just wait until 'Dick To The Dawk' learns of this surprising development!

[more to come; this will be a long post, and may take a couple of days to complete]

Lying is not intrinsically immoral

I've previously taken a stab at explaining the rationale which justifies the assertion that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." This post will be a further explication, and especially in reference to Edward Feser's multiply-incoherent argument to the contrary.

(As a note of explanation --

I have used the "modernism and post-modernism" tag because Feser is essentially saying that anyone who disagrees with his argument is a post-modernist. Yes, he doesn't explicitly say that, but that is the meaning of denigrating opposing views as merely expressions of "consequentialism."

And I've used the "nihilism" tag because the practical result of Feser's argument, when its logical implications are drawn out and understood, is to assert that morality is self-contradictory -- which is to deny that morality is *real* This would also merit the "modernism and post-modernism" tag.)


A difficulty with the word 'lie'

In my previous post on this general topic, my starting point was the observation that we don't have a word in English meaning something like "to intentionally deceive another in accord with the dictates of morality." And that, that being the case, we have a very hard thinking cogently about the fact (or claim, if one prefers that word at this point) that not all lying, without possible exception, is immoral.

But, we don't have such a word; we have only the single word 'lie,' which is commonly (though incorrectly) understood to mean something like "to intentionally deceive another contrary the dictates of morality."

Now, lying is generally immoral, but, as I mean to show, it is not always immoral.

One problem here -- the reason most people automatically or uncritically assent to the proposition that a lie is inherently immoral -- is that most people are still explicitly thinking about the word 'lie' with an understanding that was appropriate when they were two or four years old. At the same time, in practice, most people live their daily lives using a more nuanced understanding of 'lie' (and 'deception'); it's just that they haven't yet articulated, or seen articulated, the nuances. And that's a major reason Mr Feser's incoherent argument seems so convincing if one doesn't make the effort to dig into it.

As a side note: in contrast to the concepts properly linked to the words 'lie' and 'lying,' the concepts linked to the words 'honesty' and 'dishonesty' always imply a moral judgment.


Definition of 'lie'?

This is how my 1965 edition of 'Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language' defines the word 'lie': "v.i. 1. to make a statement or statements that one knows to be false, especially with intent to deceive. 2. to give a false impression. v.t. to bring, put, accomplish, etc. by lying: as, he lied himself into office. n. 1. a thing said or done in lying; falsehood. 2. anything that gives or is meant to give a false impression."

This is how my 1972 edition of '[the Merriam-Webster] Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary' defines the verb 'to lie': "v.i. 1. to make an untrue statement with intent to deceive. 2. to create a false or misleading impression ~ v.t. to affect by telling lies" and the noun 'lie': "n. 1a. an assertion of something known or believed by the speaker to be untrue with intent to deceive 1b. an untrue or inaccurate statement that may or may not be believed true by the speaker 2. something that misleads or deceives 3. a charge of lying"

This second definition lists the following verbs as synonyms, and differentiates them thusly: "Lie, Prevaricate, Equivocate, Palter, Fib mean to tell an untruth. 'Lie' is the direct term, imputing dishonesty; 'Prevaricate 'softens the bluntness of 'lie' by implying quibbling or confusing the issue; 'Equivocate' implies using words having more than one sense so as to seem to say one thing but intend another; 'Palter 'implies making unreliable statements of fact or intention or insincere promises; 'Fib' applies to a telling of an untruth that is trivial in substance or significance." And, of course, there are other synonyms, or related words, having to do with hiding truth or fostering false impressions; off the top of my head: dissemble, obfuscate.

Now, I'm certainly not going to claim that these are the final word on definitions -- for instance, the first definition doesn't account for the fact that if one makes a statement which one merely *believes* to be false, even if the statement is actually true, then one has lied -- but, these definitions mostly cover a proper usage of the word. Also, the second definition is better than the first.

Lying isn't about the state of one's knowledge, but rather concerns the state of one's belief and intention in performing a communicative act.

Notice: the above definitions (which I admit, or claim if one prefers that word, aren't complete) make no reference to whether the act of lying is immoral (the synonym list says that "Lie is the direct term, imputing dishonesty;" but 'impute' is not quite the same as 'imply'), but rather merely link lying to an intention to deceive or mislead. Notice, also, that these definitions do not limit either verb or noun to verbal acts, but rather include anything which is meant to give a false impression; that is, to deceive or mislead. [I'm making this point because Feser tries to draw a moral distinction between verbally made explicit deceptions (to which he wants to limit the applicability of the word 'lie' ... hmmm; even that's exactly the case, as he denies an intrinsic relationship between 'lie' and 'deceive'), and non-verbal or verbally made implicit deceptions.]

Does the word 'secretary' imply anything about the sex of secretaries? No, of course it doesn't. Yet, since most secretaries *are* women, one tends to think of secretaries as "she." In similar wise, most acts of deception *are* immoral, and so everyone tends to associate the word 'lie' with an immoral act. But, that particular association really doesn't hold.


Notice, too: I have actually already, in examining the "official" meaning or definition of the verb 'to lie' and noun 'lie,' made a full case that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." For, the verb merely denotes communicative acts intended to conceal some truth or other; for, it does not actually carry a moral judgment: it is descriptive, rather than prescriptive.


A better definition of 'lie'

Allow me to offer a better definition of 'lie/lying' than the above Webster's definitions -- The act of 'lying' is the deliberate making of claims/assertions that one believes to be false, especially when made with intent to deceive; OR any action performed with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

This (proposed) definition does not in any way contradict the above Webster's definitions. Rather, the Webster's definitions are incomplete, and this definition is more complete. Whether it is fully complete (it isn't) is a different question; what matters for this discussion is that it will help us to think more clearly about lying and deception.

Facts of which a definition of 'lying' must account
Now, we all know that lying has some sort of relationship to deception (Feser denies this, as I'll get into later). We know that one may lie to oneself, and one may lie to another; and one may lie even when one fails to deceive anyone. And, we know that one may lie by making a statement which one merely *believes* to be false, regardless of the objective truth of the statement. AND, we know (or, we ought to know) that one may make a statement, every word of which is literally true, and yet be "lying through one's teeth" -- this particular practice, by the way, is why Clinton was previously thought to be such a good (i.e. effective) liar. FURTHER, we *ought* to understand that an act of lying is not limited to the words we say, even if that is the most direct and most common means of lying.

Now, the above points are facts about what a lie is or what the act of lying is. Any proposed definition of the words ought to include or account for at least these points and certainly may not exclude any of them.

When we understand 'lying' as I have defined it here, we see my definition does cover all the above points and excludes none of them. Thus, though it is not a complete definition, it is a good one.

In understanding this definition, we see that we have a concise (and cogent) explanation for how it is that one may lie to oneself, just as one may lie to another; and that one may lie even when one fails utterly to deceive; and how it is that one may lie by making a statement which one merely *believes* to be false, even if the statement is objectively true. And, grasping this definition, we understand *why and how* it is that one may make a statement, every word of which is literally true, and yet lie; and we understand *why and how* it is that one may lie entirely non-verbally. Further, this definition also catches George Costanza's attempted dodge: "it's not a lie if you believe it."

Incompleteness of the above definition?
Consider:

Matteo said:
I've never understood the problem here. Lying is withholding the truth from those who have a right to it. Murderers at the door and the Gestapo have no right to it, so no lying is involved.

[The response to which, by the way, was not at all edifying.]

Now, Matteo's proffered definition of lying may be incomplete (it is), and it may reflect a misunderstanding (it does), but it is not wholly false; and it's a sight better than Feser's definition.

AND, isn't it obvious that in general withholding truth that one knows and which one has a duty to impart is lying? And, in case it's not obvious, at the bottom of this post I supplied both a real-life and a fictional illustration of the point.

As I've said, the definition of 'lying' I've offered above is good, or good enough for this discussion, but it's not complete. While my definition doesn't explicitly include a provision concerning the deliberate withholding of truth or information one has a duty to communicate, when one considers the definition carefully, one sees that that understanding is implicit in the definition; and so I am satisfied with it.


Feser's definition of 'lying'?

This is a bit tricky, because Mr Feser doesn't explicitly spell out his definition of 'lying' (or, if he has, it's in a comment in any of three or four threads, and I've missed it).

So, I'll try to piece together, as best I can, Feser's definition of 'lying' --

In the main thread: Of course, many find it counterintuitive to hold that there would be even a slight moral failing in telling such a lie. But the classical natural law theorist has given a reason for thinking there is. As Aquinas says, the basic trouble with lying is that it is a kind of perversity. It takes what has as its inherent, natural end the communication of what is really in one’s mind -- speech and related behavior -- and deliberately turns it to the opposite of that end.

This comment: If I answer the murderer by saying e.g. "I would be risking my own life by hiding a wanted man!" I have not spoken contrary to what is in my mind, which is what would be intrinsically immoral. It is true that he might be -- hopefully will be -- led to go away, but I did not lie to him, because I did not say something that is contrary to what I really think, which is what "lying" means (certainly it is what NL theorists mean by it). And one sign that I haven't lied is that the murderer could intelligbly say "Yeah, but you still haven't answered my question," which he could not intelligibly say if I had lied by saying "I have no idea where he is."

This comment: Natural law theorists typically distinguish lying and deception, because either can occur without the other. I can lie and know that you will not be deceived, and (as the example given earlier shows) I can deceive without lying. And it is only lying -- deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind -- that is claimed to be intrinsically wrong, while deception is wrong only depending on circumstances. That is why broad mental reservation, evasion, etc. can be OK in some circumstances, while lying never is.

This comment: The key difference is that lying involves acting directly and positively contrary to the natural end of one of our faculties, while deception does not. It's like the difference between contraception on the one hand and refraining from sex except during non-fertile periods on the other ...

According to Feser, 'lying' is deliberately doing the opposite of communicating (via speech and related behavior) what is on one's mind; it is "say[ing] something that is contrary to what [one] really think[s];" it is "deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind." Which is to say, 'lying' is an act of "deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind, or what one really thinks]," right?

Or, to put it another way, an act of lying, says Feser, is not an intent to deceive, but rather is solely an intent to communicate via speech (or "related behavior") that which one believes or knows to be false.

Now, wouldn't one reasonably consider an act of deception to be an act of deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind or what one really thinks]? Wouldn't one reasonably consider an act of evasion to be an act of deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind]? Wouldn't one reasonably consider an act of withholding information (whether or not one has a duty to reveal it) to be an act of deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind]? And so on?

If one has read and understood the entire essay in which Feser presents his argument, should not one see right here, in considering his "definition" of 'lying,' that his argument falls apart in incoherency? For, his primary claim is that all acts of lying are inherently immoral; and his secondary claim is that one rightfully may, in some circumstances, avoid the (always immoral) act of lying by engaging in deception, misdirection, evasion, equivocation, "broad mental reservation," distraction, remaining silent, and so on.

BUT, do not most of these proffered solutions to the dilemma actually fall within his definition of 'lying'? That is, is he not effectively saying that one may morally avoid lying (which is always immoral) by lying?

He'd accuse me of misrepresenting his position. But, I have not. He'd accuse me (and he has already) of engaging in question-begging ... when, in fact, his essay is full of question-begging and other logical fallacies. Seriously, one could fill pages exploring/pointing-out just the fallacies in that essay.


Suppose a mother asks her four children, "Who broke the lamp?" And, suppose one of them did it, and that all four know who did it. And, suppose that all four shrug their shoulders.

Have the children lied to their mother, have they attempted to deceive her? Of course they have! Yet, they haven't said a word.


Distinction between 'lying' and 'deceiving'?

At the time I noticed that Mr Feser had decided to make further dialog impossible (for, one cannot argue/discuss with an intellectually dishonest man), I had been composing a post, which has bearing upon what a lie is or is not, in response to something 'David' had written:

David said:
Kjetil Kringlebotten: I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ [...] Ilíon fails to make the crucial distinction between ‘lying’ and ‘deceit.’

Actually, Ilíon already explicitly made the parallel between killing/murder and moral-deceit/immoral-deceit. But he also made the (highly defensible) claim that both kinds of deceit are properly termed "lying" (when done intentionally, of course). The catch is that killing does not become murder by killing in a certain way; any particular action which kills someone could be at one time moral and the same action could be at another time murder - that is, the physical activity itself is not what determines the morality of the killing. However, this is the claim in the case of lying. It doesn't matter whom you deceive or why, only whether you use your tongue to do it. If you speak the lie, it's wrong. If you indicate the lie by signalling or arranging some objects, etc., then the same deception of the same person in the same situation is fine.

[and my un-posted response would have been]

Kjetil Kringlebotten: "I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ [...] Ilíon fails to make the crucial distinction between ‘lying’ and ‘deceit.’"

David: "Actually, Ilíon already explicitly made the parallel between killing/murder and moral-deceit/immoral-deceit. But he also made the (highly defensible) claim that both kinds of deceit are properly termed "lying" (when done intentionally, of course)."

Thank you for pointing that out. I had also linked to an essay on my little corner of the internet in which I seek to explore this distinction -- the essay itself is only a few weeks old, but I have been thinking about the issue for a very long time.

David: "The catch is that killing does not become murder by killing in a certain way; any particular action which kills someone could be at one time moral and the same action could be at another time murder - that is, the physical activity itself is not what determines the morality of the killing. However, this is the claim in the case of lying."

Great minds, and all that! I was going to make a very similar point -- killing another is not self-defense if accomplished by means of a knife but murder if accomplished by means of a gun and negligent homicide if accomplished by a shove off a cliff. Rather, it is the intent that distinguishes murder (unjustifiable homicide) from justifiable homicide.

Kjetil Kringlebotten: "I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ Killing is not always wrong, for example in self defense. Murder is always wrong. Same with deceit and lying. It's not always wrong to deceit someone (being silent, not telling everything, using sarcams, etc.), while it is wrong to lie."

David: "... that is, the physical activity itself is not what determines the morality of the killing. However, this is the claim in the case of lying. It doesn't matter whom you deceive or why, only whether you use your tongue to do it. If you speak the lie, it's wrong. If you indicate the lie by signalling or arranging some objects, etc., then the same deception of the same person in the same situation is fine."

[David is here addressing not just what Kjetil Kringlebotten has said, but also what Edward Feser has said.]

Yeppers.

It's a totally unsatisfactory position: most irrational. Further, the position treats (and depends upon treating) words as though they have inherent meaning; but they do not: all words, in all languages, are inherently and utterly meaningless. Words are symbols, which by convention stand for or represent something else, nothing more. [This is a whole other topic ... one which few people seem willing to grasp.]

The lie is not in the words one utters, but in the intent to deceive; the lie is not in the success of the deception, but wholly in the intent to deceive. Lying is, in fact, utterly independent of language and of words (whether spoken or written).

A 'deception' is the object or point of a lie, which is to bring about the inculcation in some mind (generally someone else's mind) of a belief that one believes, or has reason to believe, to be at variance with reality.

===
Amusing fallout
HERE is some amusing fallout of the distinction Mr Feser, et al., are seeking to draw between 'deception' and 'lying.'

Let's consider first how Mr Kringlebotten has expressed the distinction: "I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ Killing is not always wrong, for example in self defense. Murder is always wrong. Same with deceit and lying. It's not always wrong to deceit someone (being silent, not telling everything, using sarcams, etc.), while it is wrong to lie,"

SO: if lying is a subset of deception; that is, if lying is deception-which-is-immoral (*), whereas 'deception' covers more ground than 'lying,' then here is an amusing thing -- if one "lies" to another, yet fails the deceive him, then one hasn't lied at all! For, if 'lying' is a subset of 'deception,' then that which-fails-to-be-a-deception simply cannot be a lie.

My God! Everything since Eden has been one huge error (a "tragedy of errors"), and a rank injustice -- for, Adam's attempt to lie to God deceived no one, least of all God, and so it was no lie at all.

(*) however that is determined.


On the other hand, the distinction Mr Feser seeks to draw is more tricky, for his distinction denies any intrinsic relationship or connection between 'lying' and 'deception.'

here:
Natural law theorists typically distinguish lying and deception, because either can occur without the other. I can lie and know that you will not be deceived, and (as the example given earlier shows) I can deceive without lying. And it is only lying -- deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind -- that is claimed to be intrinsically wrong, while deception is wrong only depending on circumstances. That is why broad mental reservation, evasion, etc. can be OK in some circumstances, while lying never is.
--
here:
The key difference is that lying involves acting directly and positively contrary to the natural end of one of our faculties, while deception does not. It's like the difference between contraception on the one hand and refraining from sex except during non-fertile periods on the other ...

According to Mr Feser, the "key difference is that lying involves acting directly and positively contrary to the natural end of one of our faculties, while deception does not." Or, more simply, lying is "deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind." [One may notice that this distinction seems not to be all that clear; for: What is 'deception,' specifically, in contrast to 'lying,' such that deception is not intrinsically immoral?]

And, at the same time, while lying is not determined by result (hey, we agree on that!), it seemingly also is not determined by intent. For, if, as Feser asserts, one "can lie and know that [the other] will not be deceived," then one can hardly be said to have intended to deceive. Or, to get closer to the point, lying, says Feser, is not determined by an intent to deceive, but rather solely by an intent to speak that which one believes or knows to be false.


But, Mr Feser's distinction (see also his futher comments about "mental reservation" and use of ambiguous language as means to deceive while avoiding lying) leads us to the (seemingly) strange conclusion that Bill Clinton is not a serial liar. When Clinton told the entire nation, "I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky ...," he was attempting to deceive us, certainly, but he was not lying to us (see also, "It depends upon what the meaning of the word 'is' is ..."), for he was using ambiguous language and engaging in "mental reservation." He was, in fact, *not* "deliberately speaking contrary to [his] mind;" rather, he was deliberately speaking in such a way that he reasonably expected most people to misconstrue or misunderstand what he had said.

Now, perhaps it is the case, after all, that Clinton is not a liar, but is rather a very skillful truth-teller; but such a conclusion sure does seem highly counter-intuitive.

Problems with the above distinctions between 'lying' and 'deceiving'
In the comments to this essay, Michael Bauman asks:

Michael Bauman: "So now we're close to an earlier point: What if we called lies immoral and deceptions not, much like murder is immoral but killing is not."

Such a proposal is most like the distinction Kjetil Kringlebotten offered (as quoted above). And it may seem, on first glance, also to be consistent with the distinction that Edward Feser drew (such as his distinction is, as see above), though it isn't in fact.

Perhaps I misunderstand him, but I don't understand Mr Bauman to be offering this as the correct (or, at least, a working) distinction; rather, as such a distinction was offered in the threads at Feser's blog and the WWWW blog, I understand him to be asking if I have a critique for or against such a distinction.

Problems with Kjetil Kringlebotten's distinction
Taken at face value (and as per Kjetil Kringlebotten's offering), this distinction Mr Bauman asks about says that 'lying' and 'deceiving' (or, a 'lie' and a 'deception') are the same thing on the surface or in their externalities, but that there is some critical aspect (not explored in the distinction), whether of motivation or intent or something else entirely, which allows us properly to judge one act to be immoral and a similar act (identical except for the "something else") to be morally neutral or even morally positive. That sounds good, so far; especially as we all will naturally assume that that critical "something else" is intent.

To put it another way, just as 'murder' is a subset of 'killing' (or 'manslaughter'), this proposed distinction says that 'lying' is a subset of 'deceiving.'

Yet, this "subset theory" has a curious result: just as an attempted murder which fails to kill the target is not a homicide and therefore not a murder, so too, an attempting lying which fails to deceive the target audience is not a deception and therefore is not a lie. Though, perhaps, it only matters whether *someone,* and not necessarily the (entire) intended target, is deceived ... which leads to the curiosity that one single act may both be and not be a lie: for, it deceived Person A but did not deceive Person B.

Thus, if one accepts this distinction as valid, then one can't know whether a person (whether oneself or another) has *actually* lied unless one knows whether the attempted lie successfully deceived anyone. And, one is forced (by the logic of it) to assert that one single act may both be and not be a lie.

So, such a "subset theory" for distinguishing a 'lie' from a 'deception' has a curious logical implication of asserting that the morality or immorality of an act (or, if not all acts, then at least some acts, namely "lies" and lies) lies in, or is determined by, the result of the act, not in the act itself or the intention with which the act was performed. And, one is forced (by the logic of it) to assert that one single act may both be and not be immoral, simultaneously.

But, that is way past "curious;" that is absurd: the proposed distinction, though it sounded good and reasonable and sensible at first, is seen to be absurd when we critically examine it.

Problems with Edward Feser's distinction (and definition)
Mr Feser's proposed distinction acknowledges the truth that 'lying' and 'deceiving' (or, a 'lie' and a 'deception') are *not* the same thing -- and then it immediately wildly veers off into an opposite direction by asserting the absurdity that there is no intrinsic relationship between the two; to wit: "Natural law theorists typically distinguish lying and deception, because either can occur without the other. I can lie and know that you will not be deceived, and (as the example given earlier shows) I can deceive without lying."

Yet, at the same time (even as he acknowledges that they are different things), 'deception' seems to nestle within his definition of 'lying.'


Mr Feser defines 'lying' as deliberately doing the opposite of communicating (via speech and related behavior) what is on one's mind, or "say[ing] something that is contrary to what [one] really think[s]," or "deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind." Which is to say, he defines 'lying' as an act of "deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind, or what one really thinks]."

Now, that definition is incomplete (but then, so is the one I offered, and so is the one from Webster's). But, is his definition even adequate? Does it not fail to capture a minimally robust understanding of the word's meaning? Does he not explicitly deny that some things which we know to be lies are lies (for instance, withholding information/truth which one has a duty to impart or divulge)?


Suppose a mother asks her four children, "Who broke the lamp?" And, suppose one of them did it, and that all four know who did it. And, suppose that all four shrug their shoulders.

Have the children lied to their mother? Of course they have! Yet, they haven't said a word. They have attempted to deceive their mother (knowing full well that she will not be deceived by their answer!) by means of several of the strategies Mr Feser says may sometimes permit one to morally deceive without lying.

On what grounds do we say that the children have lied to their mother and have attempted to deceive her? On the grounds that they non-verbally told her that they didn't know the answer to her question.

Is the lie the children told their mother morally permissible? No, it is not.

On what grounds do we say that the lie is not morally permissible? On the grounds that they have a duty to truthfully answer their mother's question. But, Mr Feser explicitly denies that such a duty is relevant to the question of whether a lie is permissible.


The correct distinction between 'lying' and 'deceiving'
A 'lie' and a 'deception' (or, the acts or states of 'lying' or 'deceiving') are indeed two different things, but they're also intrinsically related one to the other. So, on just this dual-point alone, both Mr Kringlebotten's and Mr Feser's distinctions are false; it's not merely that their distinctions are incomplete, it's that both are false in at least one important way.

A 'lie' (noun) is a deliberately made claim or assertion, believed by its speaker to be false, especially when made with intent to deceive; OR any action [whether verbal or non-verbal] performed with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief (whether in one's own mind or another's) that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

'To lie' (verb, intransitive) is to deliberately make a claim or asserton, believing it to be false, especially when making it with intent to deceive; OR to perform an act with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief (whether in one's own mind or another's) that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

A 'deception' (noun) is the object or intended result of a lie; the intentional reinforcement or inculcation in some mind (generally someone else's mind) of a belief that one believes, or has reason to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false, or at variance with reality.

'To deceive' (verb) is to intentionally reinforce or inculcate in some mind (generally someone else's mind) a belief that one believes, or has reason to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false, or at variance with reality.

To misunderstand or be ignorant of some truth, or to have some false belief, is not ipso facto to be deceived -- one can be deceived only if one's false belief is the result of someone's intention that one believe falsely.

Notice: 'to lie' denotes action performed with the intent of asserting a falsehood or of deceiving another, but 'to deceive' denotes only a successful act of deception -- (generally) a lie is the means of deceiving. So, yes, [quoting Feser] one "can lie and know that [the other] will not be deceived;" but, contrary to his further claim, one *cannot* "deceive without lying."

Notice also: these distinctions do not address moral questions. That's because it's not the case that lying is to deceiving as murder is to killing. Rather, it's that lying is to communicating as non-negligent homicide is to interpersonal-interaction; and deceiving is to communicating as successfully committing a non-negligent homicide is to interpersonal-interaction. Not all non-negligent homicides are murders -- when dealing with a homicide, the first question is not, "was it murder?" but rather, "was it intentional?"


Summary to this point

As this post is already huge, I'm going to have to continue with a second post. I'll summarize what we have so far --

1) The verb 'to lie' is the "generic" or "high-level" word to denote communicative acts intended to mislead, confuse, misinform, deceive, and so on. The verb merely denotes communicative acts intended to conceal some truth (or purported truth) or other, generally by means of fostering an alternate belief that an untruth (or purported untruth) is the actual case.

While such acts as truth-concealing, misleading, confusing, misinforming, deceiving, and so forth are generally, or at least frequently, immoral, they are not always immoral (and to this Feser agrees).

Now, since acts of this nature are precisely what 'to lie' denotes, and since such acts are not intrinsically immoral, it *cannot* be the case that lying is intrinsically immoral. For, to claim that lying is intrinsically immoral, while asserting that the sorts of acts which constitue lying are not necessarily immoral, is to assert that lying both is and is not intrinsically immoral.

ERGO, Mr Feser is in error (and is incoherent, to boot) when he asserts that "lying intrinsically immoral." He did not claim that lying is generally immoral (and who could disagree?). Rather, he claims that without exception lying is immoral, while also claiming that the sorts of acts which constitue lying are not necessarily immoral.

2) I examined two dictionary definitions of verb 'to lie' and the noun 'lie;' and I offered what I think is a better (because more complete) definition of the verb, and which is consistent with the dictionary definitions -- The act of 'lying' is the deliberate making of claims/assertions that one believes to be false, especially when made with intent to deceive; OR any action performed with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

3) I have shown that Mr Feser's definition of the verb 'to lie' is not just incomplete, but is wholly inadequate -- and also incoherent. For he also explicitly asserts that certain sorts of communicative acts (such as truth-concealing, misleading, confusing, misinforming, deceiving) which clearly fall within the ambit of his definition of 'lying' are not examples of lying.

4) I have examined (and shown inadequate or false) the distinction Mr Feser draws between 'lying' and 'deception;' and have offered a correct distinction.


Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II

It pains me to say this

It pains me to say this, it pains me to know this: but the sad truth is that Edward Feser is a fool (i.e. he is intellectually dishonest).

The straw that breaks the camel's back, the action/behavior which makes it rationally impossible for me to avoid the (sad) conclusion that Mr Feser is intellectually dishonest, is this:

I will continue, for now anyway, to tolerate your obnoxiousness, as well as your habit of misrepresenting both my views and my attitude toward critics. But I can no longer tolerate the frequency and length of your comments. Stop posting so frequently and at such length. Say what you want -- I rarely read 'em anyway -- but if I keep seeing post after post after post, and if I keep seeing absurdly long comments, I'll start deleting.

"I rarely read 'em anyway" -- now there's a shocker! His loss, really, for I am almost never wrong when I express an opinion (and that is because I almost never just spout off; if I express an opinion, I have generally thought carefully about the matter).

He also doesn't *attend* when he does pretend to read, for:

1) I'm not obnoxious; I'm in fact, very much like he is: I speak bluntly and directly, as a man does, and I have no use for the passive-aggressive mode of men-pretending-to-be-women speech and behavior which seems to be de riguer amongst academics;

2) I was not misrepresenting his views -- I was opposing them. And, incidentally, mopping the floor with them. I was showing anyone willing to pay attention and think for himself, rather than kow-tow to someone's aura and prestige, that his argument is incoherent, on multiple levels. And I was presenting a coherent alternative, or at least the initial steps to a coherent alternative;

3) Clearly -- as witness his reaction to sustained and cogent criticism -- I am not misrepresenting his attitude toward critics;

4) The "frequency and length of [my] comments" were directly related to the fact that I was critiquing the points of his shitty argument; so yeah! I can see where he'd justifiably be upset by my previous response dealing with his whinging about the "frequency and length of [my] comments." That was sarcasm, by the way, just in case it wasn't clear;

5) OBVIOUSLY, instead of taking him seriously enough to attempt to show him the error and incoherence of his shitty argument (and I didn't even call it that, even though it is), such that to answer the points of it I posted "absurdly long comments," I should have just said: "You're wrong!" (or, possibly, "What an amusingly shitty argument"), and then he'd have seen the error of his ways.


Concerning his claim that I have a "habit of misrepresenting both [his] views and [his] attitude toward critics," this is my post which was for him that proverbial straw, or at least excuse:

[this post and the next are diversions from the main topic, so as to deal with some snark]
...
E.Feser: (a free-paraphrase of multiple comments) "[Whine, whine, whine! Why are you bothering me? I don't have time (or interest) to *attend* to the argument you're making. Besides, you're saying too much!]"

*slapping forehead* Who knew! So, what I was supposed to do is simply assert, "You're wrong!" and you'd have (recognized and) admitted your error?

You have presented a lengthy argument to support a set of conclusions. The argument is flawed, and some of the conclusions are unsound. And we all recognize that -- including you, yourself, which is why you are forced to make unprincipled exceptions to it and to further assert that the purported inherent sinfulness of lying is (sometimes, or even often) trivial, and therefore that lying -- sinning -- is sometimes permissible on grounds of triviality.

I am presenting an argument to attempt to rationally explain the flaws we all recognize in your argument and conclusions (and, by the way, mopping the floor with your argument). It is, perforce, going to be at least as lengthy as your argument.

I am taking you seriously enough to attend to your flawed argument and rebut it, rather than simply dismissing it.

Now, you could respond by saying something like, "I'm busy, and so unable to respond to your criticisms" You could respond by saying nothing and letting the two arguments arguments address one another.

Instead, you chose to respond in a most juvenile manner; which response, among other things, seeks to harness group-and-personal politics, and "authority," to discourage anyone else from even attempting to attend to the argument I'm making. As I said to my advisors, your behavior speaks for itself.

===
And, there is another point.

The young man I mentioned, the "lurker" who contacted me, seems to be in an intellectual pickle. On the one hand, his reason tells him that I am correct that lying (which simply another word for deception) is not intrinsically sinful; his priest tells him that that is correct. On the other hand, he fears that official Catholic doctrine, to the extent that there is an offical doctrine on this particular point, will be in agreement with your argument.

How will he resolve that? I don't know. But one potential solution is to deny his own reason -- to lie to himself about what he believes to be true; and that never ends well. Another potential solution is to conclude that Catholicism is seriously misguided -- and, indeed, self-contradictory.

My argument offers a way out of that self-contradiction (at least, as applies to this particular question). And you don't even want to consider it.

===
Look, I *don't* want to conclude that you're intellectually dishonest. But, if you insist upon leaving me no other option, I will not shy from the conclusion.

Gentle Reader can decide for himself whether my paraphrase is an accurate representation of Mr Feser's responses (which is to say, non-responses) to the argument I was presenting. And, keep in mind his comment quoted above: "Say what you want -- I rarely read 'em anyway."

Now, let's look at one very mild, and not at all confrontational, criticism of his argument, and his reaction to it:

Matteo said:I've never understood the problem here. Lying is withholding the truth from those who have a right to it. Murderers at the door and the Gestapo have no right to it, so no lying is involved.

QED.

Edward Feser said: Ilion, I know you can't read, as is evident from your remarks. But I thought Matteo could. I address that very dodge in the second to last paragraph of the post, Matteo, as you'll see if you go back and read it.

Note the personal insult directed at me, and the related implied insult directed at Matteo.

Did Matteo warrant such behavior?

Did I warrant such behavior? That was Feser's "response" to the posts I had posted to that point, going through the points of his argument. Now, this particular (mostly one-sided) argument I'd been having with him goes back several days, into a prior essay he'd posted. Gentle Reader will search in vain in either thread for anything I had said that would give justification for this behavior.

Now, Mr Feser frequently cross-posts his essays between his personal blog and the 'What's Wrong With the World' blog. In this instance, Matteo posted his criticism there, too, and this was Feser's response:

Edward Feser said: Matteo,

QED in your dreams. I responded to just that dodge at some length in the second to last paragraph of the post. That is not what "lying" means -- otherwise saying absolutely nothing to someone who has a right to information from you would count as a lie -- and there are other problems too, as I note in the post. (It's a good idea to read things before you comment on them.)

There are a few things I want Gentle Reader to note; I mean, even aside from the snarky attitude toward Matteo:
1) Feser is, among other things, begging the question (in the post specifically directed to his argument, I intend to further explore, or at least point out, some logical fallacies he is making) when he says: "otherwise saying absolutely nothing to someone who has a right to information from you would count as a lie." Notice again what Matteo said: "Lying is withholding the truth from those who have a right to it." And Feser's "refutation" of Matteo's definition/understanding of the word amounts to, "that can't be true, because if it were true it would be true."
2) Matteo's proffered definition of lying may be incomplete (it is), and it may reflect a misunderstanding (it does), but it is not wholly false;
3) AND, in fact, sometimes "saying absolutely nothing to someone who has a right to information from you [does] count as a lie"

For a real-life example of 3), consider the traitor, Benedict Arnold; I'm sure no one asked him, "Benedict, are you a traitor to the revolutionary cause?" (he was a highly trusted officer, after all, who had seemingly proven himself worthy of trust). And you *know* that he didn't volunteer the information. Yet, did not George Washington have the right to the information, and didn't Arnold have the duty to supply it? (When Arnold changed his mind about the rightness, or was it winnability? of the Revolution, he *could* have resigned his commission, he *could* have declined to betray the trust others had put in him.) Was not Arnold's silence on this pertinent fact an active lie? Did not his silence on the fact that he was a traitor really amount to the claim, "I'm still faithfully with you in the cause"?

For a fictional example of 3), consider the program 'Stargate Universe' (which, by the way, is *way* better than the other programs of the Stargate franchise): recently, the character Dr Rush has figured out how to get into, and thus control, the automatic control-systems of the "Ancient" ship on which the show's characters are marooned way out in far-distant space. And he hasn't told anyone, and has no intention of doing so. He is thereby lying to his fellows, for getting control of the ship is one of their first orders of business. And, incidentally, his actions pursuant of keeping this secret have lead to the death of (yet another) crew member, and the loss of their working space-shuttle.

So, really? I've misrepresented Feser's attitude toward critics?

A Conversation with David

Recently, I received an email from 'David,' asking whether I'd be open to continuing a small discussion we'd had in a thread on Edward Feser's blog. So, this thread is intended to facilitate that. If Gentle Reader has a pertinent question or comment, I have no objection the posting of them.

The converstaion with David was about "wholes" and "parts" and the relationships thereof ... and thus, indirectly, about the concept of 'emergence, belovéd of materialists ... and about "scientific explanations" ... and thus, indirectly about reason and logic and intentionality and rationality.

The first two (lengthy) posts I duplicate below are my comments directed to Mr Feser's original post. I think they're indirectly applicable to the conversation with David.

Ilíon wrote (commenting on E.Feser's post) --

On 'the problem of intentionality' and concepts and symbols --

'Symbols' are inherently meaningless entities (a physical or a non-physical "object") which minds use to stand for (i.e. symbolize) other entities. Among the entities for which a 'symbol' may stand are:
1) other symbols;
2) numbers;
3) logical operations;
4) concepts;
5) states (physical or otherwise);
6) objects (physical or otherwise);
7) pretty much anything at all.

A symbol's meaning is entirely ascribed; a symbol has no meaning apart from that which one or more minds have determined to conventionally attribute or impute to it. A symbol's "meaning" is a pretense by one or more minds; the "pointing to" of a symbol is not in the symbol, it is rather in the mind or minds which are agreed to use that symbol to point to that other entity (which may itself be meaningless).

Thus, two Summerian merchants may use cross-hatchings pressed into clay to symbolize how many sacks of grain the one shall trade to the other for how many goats. Thus, two modern businessmen may use electro-magnetic patterns to represent how many dollars (which are themselves merely symbols) the one shall trade to the other for how many machine parts, and which precise type(s) those machine part are to be.


"As John Searle has put it, the robot’s symbolic representations - like words, sentences, and symbols in general - have only derived intentionality, while human thought has original or intrinsic intentionality."

To say that symbols have "derived intentionality" is imprecise and easily misleading; symbols have "ascribed (or imputed) intentionality" -- all intentionality of a symbol is extrinsically ascribed or imputed to it. By a mind.


"The electrical processes and physical parts of the system [i.e. of the robot] would have had no meaning at all otherwise [than by the design of its builders]. By contrast, the thoughts of the designers themselves have meaning without anyone having to impart it to them. As John Searle has put it, the robot’s symbolic representations - like words, sentences, and symbols in general - have only derived intentionality, while human thought has original or intrinsic intentionality."

A robot may be designed to be a symbol manipulating machine (*), but that's the most it can do: manipulate inherently meaningless objects -- and only so long as the rules by which the manipulations are to be performed can *also* be represented symbolically.

And, every symbol which the robot is capabale of manipulating may itself but symbolize some other symbol. That is, there is no requirement that a robot's symbols symbolize ("point to") any actual meaning or even any actual physical object. There is no meaning in the robot, anywhere -- and the robot understands nothing, and never can understand anything.

In contrast, a thought or concept is not a symbol, but rather is intrinsically meaningful, and cannot by used as a symbol (**).

Now, we obligately use symbols to communicate our concepts/thoughts one to another. This is probably at the root of the difficulty so many have with fully grasping the truth that symbols are utterly meaningless.


(*) And, it seems to me, a machine which cannot manipulate symbols cannot rightly be called a 'robot.'

(**) One may choose to use the symbols one normally uses to stand for some concept to stand for some other concept, but the one concept itself is not standing for the other concept.

Ilíon wrote (commenting on E.Feser's post) --

On 'the problem of rationality' --

"Rather, we are able to go from one thought to another in accordance with the laws of logic. Now, it might seem that the robot of our example, and computers generally, can do the same thing insofar as we can program them to carry out mathematical operations and the like. But of course, we have had to program them to do this. We have had to assign a certain interpretation to the otherwise meaningless symbolic representations we have decided to count as the “premises” and “conclusion” of a given inference the machine is to carry out, and we have had to design its internal processes in such a way that there is an isomorphism between them and the patterns of reasoning studied by logicians. But no one has to assign meaning to our mental processes in order for them to count as logical."

The reason we can design and program a robot/computer such that we can use it to simulate a logical inference is because we can use meaningless symbols to represent not only objects or states or concepts but also to represent logical operations. If the last were impossible, then computers would be impossible.

Yet, the computer is always and only a machine designed for the manipulation of utterly meaningless symbols. The computer does not, and cannot, ratiocinate; it manipulates symbols.

A computer is but a glorified abacus, and symbol manipulation is not thought -- the difference between a robot or computer (which is to say, in both cases, a computer program) and a mind is not a difference of degree, but of kind. Symbol manipulation may be (and frequently is) used by human minds as an aid to clarity of thought, but it is not itself thought.

A computer is but a glorified abacus -- and no one in his right mind ever imagines that an abacus could ever think, or that one could ever be a mind.

Why then does anyone (asserting himself to be thinking clearly) imagine that a computer program could think or could be a mind, if only it were complex enough and/or running on a fast enough machine? Does the design of the physical machine, such that electro-magnetic patterns are used to represent the material beads of an abacus change the nature of symbol manipulation? Does the design of the physical machine, such that no person must be detailed to manually flip the virtual beads change the nature of symbol manipulation? Does the design of the physical machine, such that the sub-machine which flips the virtual beads can do so millions of times per second change the nature of symbol manipulation?


"Of the three, the problem of rationality seems to get the least attention from contemporary philosophers. Fodor himself thinks that this problem is the one contemporary philosophers have most plausibly been able to solve in a way that vindicates materialism, and that they have done so (contrary to what my statement of the problem suggests) precisely by thinking of rational thought processes as computational processes over formal symbols encoded in the brain."

They "solve" the problem with respect to materialism, and in materialism's favor, by wholly misrepresenting the problem, and generally by improperly/falsely conflating symbol manipulation with thought.

Flipping physical beads on an abacus, or flipping virtual beads in a computer's CPU, or the changing of electro-chemical states in the brains of human beings or other animals is not itself thought and cannot "give rise" to thought. But, such physical/material state change is all that materialism has to work with to "explain" all that exists, including thought and concepts.

David wrote --

Ed,
I enjoyed reading the post. For an average guy, there is much to ponder. Hope you take questions from average guys. If not Ilion (“Troy?” Or “ I the Lion?”) seems like a smart guy.

I can bring images to my mind. I can literally see in my mind’s eye my wife when she is not here. I can see her fair skin, blonde hair, her blue eyes, and can concentrate on her high Nordic cheek bones. I can willfully change the image of her from 19 when I married her to today at 41. I can purposefully make the picture of her sitting and reading her Bible or laughing at the stories of my day in business.

What is that image and how does it fit into the categories you mentioned? I’m not asking how the image is produced, but what is that image itself? It seems beyond material, even though I need my physical brain to produce the image.

Edward Feser wrote --

Hello David,

What exactly the image is is a big topic. My only point was that while it seems obviously immaterial on a modern, mechanistic conception of matter -- it doesn't seem like a complex arrangement of colorless, odorless, tasteless particles; we don't observe anything like that when we look in a guy's brain; etc. -- when we reject that conception of matter and think in hylemorphic terms the issue just isn't so clear.

Part of the problem here is that we moderns have a natural tendency to think of a material substance as a collection of basic parts and to think of everything true of it as somehow a truth about the arrangement of those parts. Hence we think: "I don't see how the atoms, or molecules, or neurons, or whatever all add up to a mental image." But that's just the wrong way to think about the issue from the get go. Part of the point of hylemorphism is that we need to break free of this "how does the whole arise out of the parts?" way of thinking.

Related to this, I suspect that many people symathetically encountering A-T for the first time unreflectively tend to maintain an essentially atomist understanding of matter and then think of a "substantial form" as something that gets added to the atoms or whatever. The atoms (or whatever we think of the smallest elements as being) are somehow the most fundamental thing about a material substance ontologically speaking, and anything else ahs to be either constrcuted out of them or added on from outside. But that too completely misses the point. From a hylmorphic point of view, my having a mental image, like my having a stomach and eyeballs, is no less ontologically fundamental than my being made up of atoms. Hence however we characterize "matter," it has to be consistent with that fact.

The bottom line is: Materialists are not only wrong to say that amtter is all that exists. They also don't even understand what matter itself is in the first place. Unfortunately, most moderns work with an essentially materialist cocneption of matter, which means most modern dualists don't understand what matter is either. If we don't see that hylemorphism is a radical challenge to what moderns tend to take for granted, we haven't understood it.

David wrote --

Thanks Prof. Feser for taking the time to answer my question. Thanks also to Ilion (given name or fan of Homer?) for the dry humor and honest response.

I must admit I have a hard time seeing the world as not the sum of its parts. I worked my way through a BS in Chemistry at the CSUF (an average student) because I thought that was a good way to understand the world and a promising way to make a living. When I fix my car or repair my leaking plumbing I think in terms of parts. I think also about this in terms of my theology--God as a Trinity and having certain characteristics.

Can you give me some examples of systems that can't be understood best as the sum of its parts or are best understood without thinking about the parts that make them up?

Forgive me if I sound simple.

Ilíon wrote --

David: "I must admit I have a hard time seeing the world as not the sum of its parts. ..."

One of the parts of a thing -- and which nearly everyone seems to go out of his way to overlook -- is the design or plan or "organizing principle" of the thing. In more A-T terms, this would be its 'form.'

Relatedly, another ignored or overlooked part of a thing is the process (or 'work') by which the various component parts of the thing came to be organized in the particular relationships which hold between them. In more A-T terms, this would probably be its 'efficient cause.'

I think that that silly aphorism, "the whole is greater than the sum of the parts" is both a reflection of and a cause of or contributor to this habit of (and sometimes insistence upon) not seeing the immaterial parts of a physical thing.

For example, one may have all the material parts which might comprise a house or a car (or a single brick of that hypothetical house) and still not have a whole house or car (or brick). Or, one may have all the chemicals (down to the level of the exact individual atoms and molecules) which might (or formerly did) comprise an organism and still not have an organism, but rather herely a goo of chemicals (or a corpse).

One seemingly has all the parts comprising the thing -- to be precise, one has all the parts that are visible to a materialistic reductionist mindset -- and yet one does not have a whole house or car or brick or organism.

David wrote --

Thanks Ilion,

I think I understand your ideas. But, when I think of "parts" I also think of the properties they have. I put Sodium metal and Chlorine gas together in a flask and they order themselves as NaCl (table salt) because of the ionic properties of the atoms. So, the design principle was inherent in the properties that make the "parts."

This example doesn't work for a house which takes human forethought and effort to construct. Would you make a distinction between "natural" systems and "human" systems?

If I'm not using all the right terminology, just bear with me. I'm genuinely trying to understand.

Ilíon wrote --

David: "But, when I think of "parts" I also think of the properties they have. I put Sodium metal and Chlorine gas together in a flask and they order themselves as NaCl (table salt) because of the ionic properties of the atoms."

That's one explanation for the observed phenomenon; whether it's the truth of the matter ... well, God knows. We don't, and can't. Mind you, I'm not saying that it's not the truth of the matter, but only that we can't really know that it is the truth of the matter.

That's a weakness of scientific explanations; we rarely, if ever, know that a scientific explanation really is an explanation. And, we can't use science to separate the potentially true ones from the false ones.


Allow me an illustration --

I'm a computer programmer. I currently write PC programs using object-oriented languages; originally, I wrote mainframe programs using assembler. But, even then, there were multiple layers of abstraction between the work I did in writing programs (and in my understanding of what I was doing) and what *really* went on when one of my programs executed.

But, it's 2010 and I've moved on from those days. So, let us say that I have written some program you wish to use. I've given you a copy of it and I'm explaining to you how to use it.

So, I'll say something like, "When you click on this button, 'thus-and-such' will happen."

But, the truth of the matter is that that explanation has no relationship to what really happens, and it has little relationship or similarity to my own "internal" explanation of what happens. I, being the author of the program, and you, being the user of it, care about quite different abstractions or models of the program and what *really* goes on when it executes.

Suppose the buttons used in the program are instances of a button I custom wrote. There are a different ways I might have gone about doing this ... and you likely don't care. You likely don't care that I wrote the code for the button, and you're even less likely to care about the various ways I might have gone about doing so. But, suppose that you do care. How, merely by using the buttons, are you ever going to decide whether I created the button in this manner or that? The answer is, you can't differentiate unless you can swing some deeper level of analysis (say, getting a copy of the source code for the button).

Now, I didn't make a point of mentioning this to you ('cause I didn't deem it important to your use of the program), but you later notice that when you hover the mouse cursor over a button, its appearance changes; and, when you click a button, its appearance changes yet again.

Is this change of appearance of the buttons just "eye candy," or is it functional (and there are at least two modes in which this might be functional)? That is, is the change of appearance somehow necessary for the button to do what it does? Or, is it intended as a visual cue to the user, but strictly speaking is unnecessary to the program's functionality? Certainly, you might explain the behavior in any of these three ways, but which explanation is correct? And, how can you decide between them without, again, managing a deeper analysis than that available to you as a user of the program.


Now, in this program, some of the buttons perform one action when you click them and perform a different (though perhaps related) action when you hold down the shift-key and then click them.

Are these "shift-click" buttons instances of a second custom written button, or are they instances of the button I'd mentioned previously? From your perspective, they're a totally different type of button. But, are they really? And, how can you decide?

And, keep in mind, the descriptions I've been giving really have little, to no, relationship to what really goes on when the program is executed ... including something so basic as speaking of "clicking the button."


Scientific explanations of the world are analogous to the explanations of a program by its users. They may be descriptive, and they may be useful (one certainly hopes so), and some may be more useful than others. But, absent an ability to "get under the hood," so to speak, there is no way to know that they're the truth of the matter.


David: "This example doesn't work for a house which takes human forethought and effort to construct. Would you make a distinction between "natural" systems and "human" systems?"

It appears to us that natural systems or reactions (say, the formation of table salt, or the formation of ice crystals) "must happen" (or "just happen," as some materialists assert these days) given certain conditions. But, we can't know that to be the actual case; what we know is that we haven't observed otherwise and that it has been useful to us to assume it to be the case.

But, even if the reactions must happen ... why must they? Ultimately, is it really that the "rule" by which the reactions happen is itself something that just happened; or, ulimatly, is it that the "rule" really is a rule, that the rule was intended and was designed into the fabric of physical reality? That is, ultimately, are there only causes (as in cause-and-effect), or are there reasons (as in ground-and-consequent) for what happens?

On the Prop 8 decision

This an excellent essay by Edward Feser: Some thoughts on the Prop 8 decision

The meaning of the Passion

Edward Feser: The meaning of the Passion

And, as an added bonus, I have some related thoughts I wish to share with Gentle Reader --

These thoughts are something I've been thinking about for a while. I've expressed the basic idea somewhere or other, but not yet as fleshed-out as below.

In the comments section of Mr Feser's 'The meaning of the Passion' thread, 'Horatio' said:

The Res, whatever it is, is nothing like the Death of Socrates--indeed Feser suggests as much, by insisting on the miraculous nature.

Yet--if Christ is God (and capable of supernatural acts his entire life--as scripture makes clear--ie feeding 5000 with a few loaves, walking on water, etc), then He must be sort of...acting. He could at any time stop the proceedings. And He knows how it will turn out! He predicts the betrayal. In effect, He produced and starred in his own movie, and is playing ...everyone.
So He must be a bit of a masochist.

However the traditional catholic narrative insists on the pain, misery, suffering, etc.; the trad. catholics are the ones who humanize Christ (as the docetists realized--their messiah was no mere human....but the Word made flesh).....so who are the real blasphemers??

Responding to Horatio's post seemed to me an appropriate place to express these ideas:

Horatio: "Yet--if Christ is God ..., then He must be sort of...acting. He could at any time stop the proceedings. And He knows how it will turn out! He predicts the betrayal. In effect, He produced and starred in his own movie, and is playing ...everyone."

Horatio,
The Christ was not play-acting when he lived among us and allowed us to murder him.

And, as he was not play-acting, and as he really was tempted in all ways as other men are tempted, then he really might have sinned. For, if it were impossible that Jesus the Christ might have sinned, then it is meaningless to assert that he was tempted.

But, had he sinned, what would that mean? Why, it would mean the non-existence of all created things ... and of the Creator; for if “the ground of all being” is self-contradictory, then all being contradicts itself, denies itself, refutes itself. Christ was not play-acting; and there were real things at stake in the Incarnation.


Christ was not play-acting when he lived among us and allowed us to murder him. And, in fact, Christ has *always* -- and not merely when we murdered him -- made himself vulnerable to his creation. For Christ, by whom, and through whom, and for whom all that is created is created, continuously upholds the creation. All that exists exists because Christ participates in its existence (*). In creating/upholding the creation, Christ has always given himself into the hands of that creation; Christ has “always* placed himself at our (ahem) mercy -- we, who do not even have the standing to pass judgment, nor therefore to grant mercy, have *always* been given the ability to wound the Creator. And we have always done so; he has always been wounded for us, and by us.


(*) For, Christ is not "up there" ... watching our lives as though we were entertainment. He is, always, right here, living it with us. He lives it with us when we are betrayed ... and when we betray. Our sinfulness is so vile precisely because we drag The Holy One into the mud with us.


Horatio: "So He must be a bit of a masochist."

He has *always* loved you. He has always *known* you, and still he loves you. So, I guess, he must be a bit of a masochist.

The meaning of the Resurrection

Edward Feser: The meaning of the Resurrection

As with Christ’s Passion, people are always trying to attach to His Resurrection various counterfeit meanings. But it is, in this case, harder to do it with a straight face. Were you present at the crucifixion, you would have seen what on the surface required no supernatural explanation – a man nailed to a cross, as so many had been before by the Romans. Were you present at Christ’s tomb on that first Easter Sunday, you would have seen a corpse returned to life. “Keep hope alive!” “Jesus is still with us in our hearts!”“You can’t keep a good man down!” and all the other banalities liberal pastors will waste their congregations’ time with today rather fail to convey this central fact about the Resurrection. It was a divine suspension of the natural order, a miracle, or it was nothing. “If Christ is not raised,” St. Paul tells the Christian, “your faith is worthless.” And by “raised” he meant raised – reanimated, brought back from the dead – not eaten by wild dogs but remembered fondly, or whatever it is the John Dominic Crossans of the world want to put in place of what Christianity has always claimed. The Christian faith has, historically, laid everything on that line: Accept the Resurrection, and you must accept what Jesus Christ taught; reject it, and you must reject Him too as a fraud.

Thus, while the Resurrection is an affront to naturalism, it is not primarily that...
...
The Resurrected Christ will not be dialogued with. He will be worshipped, and obeyed, or He will simply be rejected as one would reject the ravings of a Jim Jones or David Koresh. Politely rejected, perhaps, at least this side of the grave; we can concede to the dialoguers their good manners. But rejected, and in no uncertain terms. “Let your Yes be Yes and your No, No.” Unless you are prepared to call Him your Risen Lord, seek no religious meaning in His life and teachings. Nor in His death; for the Passion is what it is only in light of the Resurrection. If we who did not know Him in the flesh worship at the foot of His cross, it is because we have worshipped first at His empty tomb.

Zombies!

An Anonymous poster on Edward Feser's blog made an amusing comment which I wish to share with Gentle Reader:

First, the context of the remark is that Mr Feser had linked to this ubiquitous video:

And Anonymous' comment was:

This gave me a great idea for a video game/movie/parody. People in a small town in the mountains of Pennsylvania must use their guns and religion to survive the zombie apocalypse. The zombies mutter slogans like "change" and "hope" and shamble about, but rather than eating a person's brains, they go for their pocketbook. Once deprived of their own money and reduced to living on federal aid, these people become zombies as well.