Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II

I've previously taken a stab at explaining the rationale which justifies the assertion that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." This post is the second part of a further explication of this reasoning (Part I is here), and especially in reference to Edward Feser's multiply-incoherent argument to the contrary.

Already, in Part I, I have successfully made the case that:
1) Mr Feser's argument to support the assertion that "lying is intrinsically immoral" falls apart in incoherence, for it contains (and relies upon) a self-contradiction;
2) The assertion that "lying is *not* intrinsically immoral" is rationally and logically supported by an examination/comprehension of the meaning of the English verb 'to lie'.

Therefore, I have already made a complete case justifying the belief in the truth of the assertion that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." Anything more is frosting, really.


You can't see what you won't look at

In the main thread, Mr Feser asserts in conclusion:

Finally, anyone who claims that it would not be even mildly immoral to lie to the murderer needs to provide some alternative account which both explains why lying is wrong in other cases but does not forbid it in the case at hand. And there are serious problems with such accounts. ...

In short, I would say that the natural law position that lying is intrinsically wrong has powerful arguments in its favor, and when rightly understood is not as counterintuitive as it might seem. ... Meanwhile, the alternative view has no good arguments in its favor, and is at best supported by culturally contingent and fallible intuitions. Thus, it poses no serious challenge to the natural law position. If there is a conflict between that position and our intuitions, it is the intuitions that have to go.

Well, Hell's Bells! After all, it's not as though Herr Doktor Professor is even willing to attend to such arguments, if they are made; or, when it gets down to it, even to allow them to be made in the first place.


Dude! That's the very thing at question

In the main thread, Mr Feser asserts:

Finally, anyone who claims that it would not be even mildly immoral to lie to the murderer needs to provide some alternative account which both explains why lying is wrong in other cases but does not forbid it in the case at hand. And there are serious problems with such accounts. For example, it is sometimes suggested that it is wrong to lie only when the person lied to has a right to know the truth, which the murderer at the door does not. One problem with this suggestion is that it fails to capture what is wrong with lying per se. For we can fail to respect someone’s right to know the truth even when we don’t lie - for example, when we simply keep silent when someone who has a right to certain information from us asks for it. The view would also have the absurd implication that we can freely tell falsehoods not only to murderers, but also to innocent people who happen not to have a right to know certain truths. For example, it would entail that when there are certain secrets that a government has a right to keep from its citizens (about sensitive military operations, say), the government may not only refrain from revealing them to the citizens, but even tell outright falsehoods instead. It would entail that parents could tell falsehoods to their children, rather than merely keeping silent, about matters they are too young to understand. It would entail that rather than merely keeping silent, we can tell falsehoods to other adults about private matters we have no obligation to inform them about. It would entail that God might tell us nothing but falsehoods, since we have no rights against Him - contrary to the Thomistic view (defended in the post just linked to) that God can only ever will what is good for us, despite His not being obligated to us in any way. (Which brings to mind a further consideration: If even God cannot lie - as St. Paul famously affirms in Titus 1:2 - then where do we get off thinking that we may sometimes do so? Job 13:7 indicates that it would be wrong to lie even for the purpose of defending God’s honor.)

Let's consider some of the logical fallacies (primarily question-begging) in just this short quotation --

"Finally, anyone who claims that it would not be even mildly immoral to lie to the murderer needs to provide some alternative account which both explains why lying is wrong in other cases but does not forbid it in the case at hand."

This is a non sequitur (probably related to the fact that he's extensively question-begging throughout the article), and it contains a subtle question-begging itself -- for, as a logical issue, it might be the case that no instance of lying is ever morally prohibited.

That lying is or is not intrinsically immoral is a wholly separate issue from distinguishing whether (and why) any specific instance of lying may be morally prohibited, or may be morally permissible ... or even may be morally requisite. -- There is, in this last statement, an oblique reference to a *major* incoherence in Feser's argument. I'll explain that in its own section.

"For example, it is sometimes suggested that it is wrong to lie only when the person lied to has a right to know the truth, which the murderer at the door does not."

Isn't it amazing, the reach of such a small word as 'only'?

Consider:

Matteo said:
I've never understood the problem here. Lying is withholding the truth from those who have a right to it. Murderers at the door and the Gestapo have no right to it, so no lying is involved.

Edward Feser said: Ilion, I know you can't read, as is evident from your remarks. But I thought Matteo could. I address that very dodge in the second to last paragraph of the post, Matteo, as you'll see if you go back and read it.

Now, in no wise has Matteo "suggested that it is wrong to lie *only* when the person lied to has a right to know the truth." Matteo's statement reflects the common misunderstanding that lying is inherently immoral (which view Feser is pushing), but he also understands that lying to the murderer at the door is not immoral (and may even be morally requisite) -- the problem starts, of course, with the fact that we use the single word, 'lie,' to denote all intentional miscommunication, coupled with the misunderstanding that a lie is always immoral.

So, to resolve that seeming discrepancy, Matteo "suggested that [an act of intentional miscommunication is a] lie only when the person [to whom the miscommunication is directed] has a right to know the truth." In effect, Matteo is "suggesting" that there must be some word other than 'lie' that properly denotes an act of intentional mis-communication when the person to whom it is directed *ought* intentionally to be deceived.

Now, Matteo's definition of 'lie' (as given in the above quote) is not false; it's just incomplete; and he is misunderstanding lies to be always immoral. BUT, he is saying something very different from the strawman Feser "suggests" is the position logically opposite his own.

Matteo's attempted solution to the seeming conundrum was not a "dodge" ... and Herr Doktor Professor did not address it.

"One problem with this suggestion is that it fails to capture what is wrong with lying per se. For we can fail to respect someone’s right to know the truth even when we don’t lie - for example, when we simply keep silent when someone who has a right to certain information from us asks for it."

This set of statements includes question-begging -- for, whether "lying per se" is wrong just happens to be the point at issue.



" Mmm"

Seriously, Dude: how big is your barn (just how much straw do you have)?



" Mmm"


Just wait until 'Dick To The Dawk' learns of this surprising development!

[more to come; this will be a long post, and may take a couple of days to complete]