The larger truth at Notre Dame

On HotAir.com: The larger truth at Notre Dame

Live Free or Die

Mark Steyn: Live Free or Die

Feminism ... and the Feminist's Daughter

The article to which I'm linking is on the onlive version of the British tabloid, the Daily Mail. Keep that in mind.

Rebecca Walker: How my mother's fanatical views tore us apart

Give Me a Sign!

Saying to or demanding of God, "Give Me a Sign!" can be a dangerous thing, on multiple levels.


In a comment on "Vox Day's" blog, "Dr Kill" said this:

I think of myself as an open-minded skeptical libertarian atheist with 54 years of evidence-based observations of life.

Don't take this as blasphemy, but I will believe in God the instant He shows himself to me. I spent many days respectfully begging for a sign. Am I not as worthy as Paul? Does needing better or different evidence of His existence make my soul somehow less valuable?

I know a few true Xtian believers, and many Muslim believers. I admire their steadfastness, even as I remain personally uncommitted.

I lament the division this issue brings. I believe the posters here agree.

"Vox Day" responded:

How can it be blasphemy? If you don't believe, then you don't believe. That doesn't necessarily make you a fool, let alone a mocker. I don't think that worthiness has anything to do with it; Paul himself suggests otherwise. Regardless, I hope you get your sign one day.

Vox's response is just what I'd have said. Oh, sure, I might (or might not) have expanded upon this or that, but I cannot think of anything I'd say that would contradict what he has said. If I were minded to expand upon what "Vox Day" said here, I might go into some detail about how we can know via reason that God really does exist (as he does at other times ... one cannot, after all, say everything at all times).

I sense that Gentle Reader is discombobulated: "What! No rants about 'intellectual dishonesty?'"

Gentle Reader, you haven't been paying attention to what I say; to when, why, and how I say it.

I do not charge others with intellectual dishonest *simply* because they believe and/or assert things which I know to be incorrect or outright false. (Shoot! I have been known to turn that cannon on persons with whom I agree on almost everything.) Intellectual dishonest isn't about being wrong: it's about hypocrisy-of-the-mind; it's about assertion of a double-standard, one by which to evaluate those ideas of which one approves and another, stricter, standard by which to evaluate those ideas of which one disapproves.

All I know of this "Dr Kill" is what he has written there. Sure, Evangelical Atheists -- who *are* intellectually dishonest -- tend to use the term "Xtian" (usually non-capitalized) to refer to Christians; but so do others, including some Christians. Use of that term, in itself, tells us next to nothing about "Dr Kill's" commitment to reason.

The proper and moral and rational/reasonable stance to take is always to assume -- until reason and experience no longer allow the assumption as a rational option -- that while others may be in error, that error is honestly held. You know, just the same as we want others to assume of us.


Here is one man's story of when, being an atheist, he demanded a personal sign from God --
John C. Wright (2006): Why I am not a Deist.
John C. Wright (2007 and 2005): Total Conversion (more in-depth than the first item)

Certainly, a heart attack is a dangerous thing (whether or not sent as a sign from God). But, the deeper danger of demanding a sign for God is this -- "How will you respond to and deal with that sign, should you receive it?" Will you accept it as the sign you demanded, or will you blow it off? If you're not prepared to take God seriously, then you're well advised to not demand he show himself to you.

The Sheepcat

The Sheepcat is a blog I just 'discovered' via Denyse O'Leary's Post-Darwinist blog.

'Collision' Teaser

Douglas Wilson: 'Collision' Teaser

Apparently, they are both satisfied with the result --

Douglas Wilson: My Little Plug (for 'Collision')

Christopher Hitchens: Hitchens Review

A whole may never be greater than the sum of its parts

This item concerns the belief/assertion -- widespread and erroneous -- that "A whole may be greater than the sum of its parts;" that is, it concerns the notion(s) of 'emergence' and/or 'supervenience.' The context specifically concerns the assertion that 'consciousness' and 'self-conscioisness' (and ultimately 'mind' itself) is an emergent 'property' (or 'substance') of brains.


I wish it to be clear that I scoff at the very notion and assertion that 'consciousness' (and 'mind' itself) is an emergent 'property' (or 'substance') of brains. I scoff at the very concept of 'emergence.' And I double up in laughter, metaphorically at any rate, when proponents of 'emergence' take umbrage at my scoffing and dust off their dignity (and education!) as the refutation of that scoffing. How dare I, a mere no one with no MA, much less a PhD, scoff at the risible notions that highly-educated philosophers take seriously! Is it not, Gentle Reader, just too much to be endured?


This will be, I hope, a continuation of an aborted discussion from William Vallicella's "Maverick Philosopher" blog. So, I need to supply the discussion to this point.


In his OP, William Vallicella said this:

We [Mr Vallicella and his friend, Peter Lupu] agreed that consciousness exists, that it cannot be intelligibly viewed as an illusion. We also agreed that it cannot be reduced to the physical. Thus we agreed that it can neither be eliminated nor identified with the physical. We also seemed to agree that identifications collapse into eliminations. And of course we also agreed that consciousness as we normally experience it is tied to a physical substratum. Our main disagreement concerned the nature of the tie. Peter thinks of consciousness as necessarily tied to its physical substratum so that a particular synchronic and diachronic unity of consciousness cannot exist apart from a living brain/body. If I understood Peter, his view is that consciousness and self-consciousness are emergent from matter but not reducible to it. So his position could be called nonreductive physicalism. The most interesting way to develop this would be in terms of the view that consciousness is not an emergent property but an emergent substance. Thus a person's consciousness would be a genuine individual unity with irreducible causal powers, but one which somehow emerges from its material base while remaining necessarily tied to it for its continuing existence. By contrast, I take seriously the possibility of a particular unity of consciousness existing apart from a material substratum. This possibility could be cashed out it dualist terms or in idealist terms. Either way, the necessary ontological dependence of mind on matter is denied.

Deogolwulf said this:

For what it is worth, I second Mr Bortignon’s recommendation of J.R. Lucas, who is an excellent but much-neglected philosopher. Deriving from Lucas and ultimately Gödel, a sketch of an argument ad absurdum against mechanism or computationalism can be given as follows:

I.The human mind is fallible and contains inconsistencies.
II.The human mind is a formal system like that of a machine.
Therefore,
III.The human mind is an inconsistent formal system.
IV.An inconsistent formal system is thoroughly inconsistent, that is to say, any proposition that can be stated in that system can be proven using its rules.
Therefore,
V.The human mind is thoroughly inconsistent, that is to say, any proposition that can be stated by it can be proven using its rules.
Therefore,
VI.The human mind can prove itself to be a consistent formal system.
And,
VII.Propositions (I)-(VI), and propositions in contradiction to them, can be proven by the human mind.
And,
VIII. The contradiction of (VII) can be proven thereby.
And,
IX. The contradiction of (VIII) can be proven thereby.
Ad infinitum.
Therefore,
X. The human mind, being thoroughly inconsistent, cannot recognise its own mistakes or recognise the truth of anything.

Since every reasonable man rejects (X) but accepts (I) and (IV), given an understanding of the world of humanity along with the validity of Gödel’s theorem, he must reject (II), given that the reasoning is valid.

[Deogolwulf's blog is here, by the way]
Now, Deogolwulf's comment isn't directly tied in to the subject of this post; but, it does supply some important context, and it's a very good argument in its own right. I wish my readers (all one of you) to not miss it.

Perhaps I should take a moment to point out that I'd have expressed premise #1 as "I.The human mind is fallible and [generates] inconsistencies." Though, at the same time, in the context of asserting premise #2 (and intermediate conclusion #3), Deogolwulf's wording and mine are identical in meaning.


Peter Lupu replied:

Deogolwulf,
Your proof assumes classical logic in which the consequence relation is *explosive*: i.e., from P and ~P any proposition Q (expressible within the formal system) follows. This feature of classical logic (and intuitionistic logic as well) seems to be counterintuitive because there may be systems that while contain a contradiction are, nonetheless, not trivial (i.e., everything follows within such a system). Paraconsistent logics are designed to formulate a consequence relation that is not explosive, thus allow for a system to contain a contradiction without rendering it trivial.

I think that the specific formulation of the view that consciousness does not exists in terms of illusion is vulnerable to the argument Bill outlined in his previous post. The concept of illusion presupposes consciousness; therefore, to say that consciousness is an illusion presupposes that consciousness exists and, hence, such an argument presupposes that which it explicitly denies. I think somewhat more complicated arguments along these lines may be proposed against other versions of the nada-consciousness view.

I said this:

Do not all assertions of 'emergence' or 'supervenience' depend upon and simply restate the assertion that "The whole may be greater than the sum of the parts?"

And, is not that assertion exactly to assert that "1 + 1 may = 4 (or some other non-2 sum) in some circumstances?"


A whole may never be greater that the sum of its parts. When we mistakenly believe that we have identified a whole greater than the sum of its parts, it will always be the case that we have missed something or misidentified something.

Peter Lupu replied:

Ilion,
While some conflate emergence and supervenience, I would rather find a way of distinguishing them, although that feat may not be easy.

I do not think that "the whole is greater than the parts" issue captures the issue of the emergence of consciousness. I am unsure what you mean by saying that the view that consciousness is emergent is analogous to that 1+1 may sometimes not equal 2? While the later is provably contradictory, I have not yet seen a similar proof that the former also leads to a contradiction.

Consciousness, the way I view it, emerges as a property or, going along with Bill's suggestion, as a substance under certain conditions which involve among other things a specific biological mechanism. Once it emerges, however, it features characteristics that are not reducible to the underlying physical conditions which gave rise to it. I think that emergence might be required in order to explain other phenomena as well.

Why do I hold (hope) that the emergence route is the most promising? Well, what are the alternatives? I reject reductive or eliminative materialism for some of the reasons Bill already articulated. I cannot see how Cartesian dualism solves the interaction problem. The interaction problem for me is much deeper and pervasive than merely to account for cases such as for instance how a conscious desire makes my arm go up. Actions, complicated activities (to be distinguished from mere isolated actions), long term planned and deliberately executed chunks of activities, behavior, and even routine and repeated behavior, among others, appear to be produced by antecedent causes that seamlessly integrate and combine conscious and as well as physical elements. We need an account of consciousness that can work seamlessly with underlying physical component, yet no be completely reducible to it. Emergence, I believe, is the only option that holds the promise to deliver this result.

I replied:

Peter Lupu: "I do not think that "the whole is greater than the parts" issue captures the issue of the emergence of consciousness."

But of course it does, no matter what one is asserting 'emerges.'

"Emergentists" claim that "as feature or property 'X' does not exist in any constituent part of this whole under consideration, yet does exist in the whole, it is the case that 'X' "emerges" from the whole." How is this not just a long-winded way of asserting that "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts," and perhaps of disguising just what one is asserting?

Consider one of the premier exemplars of 'emergence:' the wetness of water. No individual water molecule is wet, yet, supposedly, out of a mass of them "wetness" emerges. But the truth is that "wetness" is not a property of water, whether of individual molecules or en masse: "wetness" is a human perception of water in quantity (I suppose that the correct term is 'qualia').


Peter Lupu: "I am unsure what you mean by saying that the view that consciousness is emergent is analogous to that 1+1 may sometimes not equal 2? While the later is provably contradictory, I have not yet seen a similar proof that the former also leads to a contradiction."

I mean precisely that "a whole" cannot ever be "greater than the sum of its parts." I mean that the belief/assertion that "A whole may be greater than the sum of its parts" expresses a logical impossiblity, and is thus always a false assertion. I mean that everytime a person imagines he has identified "a whole" which is "greater than the sum of its parts," it is the case that he has overlooked something or misidentified something.

In short, I mean that the concept of "emergence" is nothing but irrational woo-woo; it's Magick (the spelling is to distinguish such a manner of thinking from the 'magic' of fairy-tales and fantasy novels). It is, amusingly, an example of the sort of thinking in which some 'atheists' like to accuse that Christians necessarily engage.


Peter Lupu: "... analogous to that 1+1 may sometimes not equal 2? While the later is provably contradictory, ..."

Does not that proof depend upon the very thing you appear to be disparaging in your response to Deolgolwulf -- classical logic and intuition? (I wonder, does "This feature of classical logic (and intuitionistic logic as well) seems to be counterintuitive because ..." strike you as a bit odd?)


Peter Lupu: "While the later is provably contradictory, I have not yet seen a similar proof that the former also leads to a contradiction."

Should we believe to be true anything which has not been proven false? (And who is setting the criterion of 'proof?' What makes that fellow over there the authority over what I, or you, should believe?)

Where have we ever seen a whole which is greater than the sum of its parts? Many people believe this and assert this, but where have we ever seen such a thing?

=========
Does not all our (individually and collectively) knowledge rest upon that which we know intuitionally, which is to say, non-rationally -- which is to say, that which we know to be true *simply* because we know it to be true? Yes, it does.

Now, of course, one realizes that we may be mistaken about some belief being known intuitionally. Nevertheless -- since intuitional knowledge is the basis of *all* our knowledge -- the burden of proof lies with the one who seeks to deny an intuition.

That "the whole may not be greater than the sum of its parts" *appears* to be self-evidently true (i.e. it appears to be something we know intuitionally). That is what "emergentists" are up against; until they show that this is not really true then no rational man should take 'emergence' seriously.

Peter Lupu replied:

Ilion,
1) You maintain the following two theses:

(a) The emergence-thesis is identical to the thesis that “the whole is greater than its parts”;
(b) The thesis that the whole is greater than its parts is logically impossible, always false, etc:

“I mean precisely that "a whole" cannot ever be "greater than the sum of its parts." I mean that the belief/assertion that "A whole may be greater than the sum of its parts" expresses a logical impossiblity, and is thus always a false assertion. I mean that everytime a person imagines he has identified "a whole" which is "greater than the sum of its parts," it is the case that he has overlooked something or misidentified something.”

Therefore,
(c) The emergence-thesis is “logically impossible”, “always false”, and every time a person entertains the emergence thesis, they “overlooked something or misidentified something.”

2) I do not know what you mean by “greater” in the thesis “the whole is greater than its parts”. So perhaps you will be kind enough to explicate the meaning of this term in the whole/part thesis. It seems to me that there are obvious examples where a whole can be coherently, legitimately, and by necessity be said to be greater (in a reasonable interpretation of this relationship) than the parts. e.g.,
(i) Consider my house. Suppose I dismantle my house brick by brick, 2 x 4 by 2 x 4, every nail, screw, etc., and place all of these parts in one big pile exactly where my house used to be. Now, surely my house has properties that the pile does not: e.g., while the house protects me from rain, sun, wind and so forth, the pile does nothing of the sort. So there is a clear sense in which my house is greater than merely the totality of its parts.

(ii) Consider objects a, b, c, d. Suppose S is a set such that S = {a, b, c, d}. Now, S has properties that none of its members has: e.g., while S has the property of having object a as a member, none of the objects a, b, c, d, has this property. Moreover, suppose S is an ordered set S = . Then S has the property of having object a as its first member. But neither any of its members has the property of having object a as the first member nor does the mere collection of these objects.

(iii) Consider any population: e.g., the population of US citizens. The mean income of this population is say $X. None of the elements of this population has the property of having the mean income of $X. In fact, it is quite possible that no US citizen earns $X. So the whole has a property that none of its members has.

(iv) A painting can be beautiful, but its parts may not be. In fact it could be that only this particular configuration of parts yields the beauty this painting has. So none of the parts nor a pile of the parts has the property of being beautiful.
Etc.,

3) Therefore, unless you explain in what sense you deny the logical possibility that the whole is greater than its parts, your thesis (b) is trivially false. As for thesis (a), we cannot evaluate it unless we know more what is meant by thesis (a).

4) As for the wetness example. If wetness is not a property of any molecule of water or a mass of water but rather it is, in your words “… a human perception of water in quantity (I suppose that the correct term is 'qualia')” then it is not an example of emergence or of the whole/parts case and we need not worry about it.

5) You say: “In short, I mean that the concept of "emergence" is nothing but irrational woo-woo; it's Magick (the spelling is to distinguish such a manner of thinking from the 'magic' of fairy-tales and fantasy novels). It is, amusingly, an example of the sort of thinking in which some 'atheists' like to accuse that Christians necessarily engage.”

I understand that you hold the view that emergence is nothing but “woo-woo” “Magick” etc., very intensely and with a firm conviction. But, could you be kind enough and *prove* these claims or *demonstrate them by some arguments* rather than just announce them so that all of us including myself can benefit from the certainty you seem to have regarding these views?

6) Regarding the venerable matter of 1 + 1 = 2?
“Does not that proof depend upon the very thing you appear to be disparaging in your response to Deolgolwulf -- classical logic and intuition? (I wonder, does "This feature of classical logic (and intuitionistic logic as well) seems to be counterintuitive because ..." strike you as a bit odd?)”
I am having trouble understanding what you are trying to say here, so let me simply clarify my previous comments on the subject. One of Deolgolwulf’s premises is this:
IV.An inconsistent formal system is thoroughly inconsistent, that is to say, any proposition that can be stated in that system can be proven using its rules.
The idea that an inconsistent formal system; i.e., one in which (P & ~P) is provable, entails every proposition Q (no matter what Q is) depends upon a certain interpretation of the consequence relation; namely, that it is explosive. Now, I do not “disparage” classical, intuitionistic logics nor even the consequence relation being explosive. I merely point out an obvious fact, one which no one so far as I know denies: the fact that an inconsistent system (in the above sense) entails every proposition whatsoever and therefore becomes trivially useless is simply counterintuitive. This fact that I have just stated has absolutely nothing to do with the proof of the proposition that 1 +1 = 2 in classical or intuitionistic or any logic nor does such a proof depend upon a consequence relation being explosive or not being explosive. If mathematics is consistent, then the proof of this proposition is simple and requires very few premises. So going back to Deolgolwulf’s premise (IV) one could legitimately deny this premise on the grounds that it presupposes an explosive consequence relation that is counterintuitive but essential to his argument. That is all I have said. On the other hand, I have no clue what you were trying to say.

7) You say:
(i) “Should we believe to be true anything which has not been proven false? (And who is setting the criterion of 'proof?' What makes that fellow over there the authority over what I, or you, should believe?)”
and also
(ii) “That "the whole may not be greater than the sum of its parts" *appears* to be self-evidently true (i.e. it appears to be something we know intuitionally). That is what "emergentists" are up against; until they show that this is not really true then no rational man should take 'emergence' seriously.”
So in (i) you appear to be saying that proof should not be a necessary condition of belief (and also that we lack agreement as to which proofs are to be accepted) and in (ii) you are saying that (and I paraphrase) until the proponents of emergentism prove that it is not identical to the whole/parts thesis or that if it is, the later is coherent, “no rational man should take 'emergence' seriously.”i.e., proof is a necessary condition of belief. Which one you hold?

As perhaps explained elsewhere, my participation ended after that.

Edward said this in response to the above:

The nature of a house, at least from a materialist perspective) is purely material. How, then, can it not be reducible to its material parts? Let's say that we did take apart a house piece by piece and throw the pieces into a pile. We then call the collection of pieces a 'garbage pile.' Is the garbage pile greater than the sum of its parts, meaning every individual piece of the house? Since I am not a materialist, I would say that a house cannot be reduced to its material cause because a house also has a formal, efficient, and final cause as well. From the materialist perspective, though, it seems as if a house must always be merely the collection of the parts of a house, just arranged in a way that conforms to the definition of 'house.' This does not entail anything qualitatively different from the collection of the individual parts of the house, though. As long as you reject any immaterial cause, all of the properties that distinguish a house from a pile of house-parts must always be material, so matter + matter = matter. How can you ever get something that is essentially non-material from the material?

Joseph A responded and added:

Edward,
It's an emergent property, of course!

More seriously, I think I understand what you're saying. I suppose one reply would be that those distinctions you mentioned are at best useful fictions. On the other hand, how useful does a fiction have to be before you start considering that it might be real?

Peter Lupu replied:

Edward,
I wish to remind you that the question was whether the whole is *greater* than or is it identical to the *sum* of its parts. The example of the house parts then seems to be a counterexample to the *sum* claim. So is the example of a set, and ordered set, and so on.

Now, if someone wishes to change the thesis in some way and claim that the whole is identical to the parts relative to some other property, not merely with respect to a sum, then we can evaluate the new proposition accordingly. I have simply argued that a house has properties that a pile of its parts does not. Therefore, the house cannot be identical to or be merely the collection or sum of the parts. I don't think that there can be a dispute about this. Whether the properties which the house has and the house-pile lacks are themselves physical or are reducible to such and so forth was not part of my argument. That is a separate question that I did not address in discussing the whole/part issue.

You ask whether a garbage-pile is greater than the sum of its parts. I don't know: perhaps it is, perhaps it is not. But, either way it would not have a bearing upon my example. Why? Because I was giving the house example as a counterexample against the following general thesis:
(T) All wholes are identical to the sum of their parts.

In order to refute (T) all I need is one case in which a whole is not identical to the sum of its parts. I have proposed such an example. Whether the garbage-pile does or does not constitute another counterexample has no bearing upon whether the example I did give is a counterexample.

Edward replied:

Is there a difference between the whole being reducible to its parts and the whole being identical to its parts? I think there is, and that is what I was addressing in the above example.

In no way at all whatsoever being 'confused' or 'dogmatic' or 'anti-Socratic' or 'unreasonable' or behaving in an 'absurd[ly] superior' manner as, well, I am and do, William Vallicella "settled" the matter:

Edward,
If a house is reducible to the mereological sum of its parts, then the house is identical to the sum. But surely this is false: the house has properties that the sum does not have. For example, the house provides shelter, the sum does not. It's as simple as that. A house is a physical thing composed of physical things but it is not reducible to the latter. So there is a clear sense in which it is an emergent entity. That in a nutshell is Peter's point against the silly assertion that a whole is never greater than the sum of its parts.

There is nothing to debate here. It is just a matter of seeing a fairly obvious point. Whether mind is emergent from its material substratum is of course eminently debatable!

Isn't it so good to know, and such a relief, that we peons can just take the word of our betters?



Please note, Gentle Reader, that I have not (yet) written a response to Mr Lupu's last posting. I also want to try to work into this some of the comments made others. Of course, now -- even aside from the task of encompassing all the above in my comments -- I have to decide whether to further extend this already lengthy OP or to make my comments and critiques of the above in the combox.

I'm a 'Punk'

It's official: I'm a 'punk!'


I had intended never to identify to you, Gentle Reader, just who is the person I had today decided is a fool. But, it seems, he demands something of the sort.

The man is a professional philosopher (*) whose blog I have been reading, off and on, for a number of years. I've learned a lot from him ... and until recently, have had nothing but respect for him and his ability to think clearly.

But, hey! I'm a "punk" who makes "scurrilous comment[s];" should I not act the part?

Fear not, Gentle Reader, I'm not going to have a personal grudge match pissing contest with this person. I know how boring, and how quickly, that would be to you; and frankly, even if I didn't care about the effect on you, it would quickly bore me also.

(*) Concerning philosophers in general -- many of them seem to go out of their way to make philosophy a worthless thing.


So, let's get this over with --
Recently, on Mr William Vallicella's "Maverick Philosopher" blog, I had said this:

Do not all assertions of 'emergence' or 'supervenience' depend upon and simply restate the assertion that "The whole may be greater than the sum of the parts?"

And, is not that assertion exactly to assert that "1 + 1 may = 4 (or some other non-2 sum) in some circumstances?"


A whole may never be greater that the sum of its parts. When we mistakenly believe that we have identified a whole greater than the sum of its parts, it will always be the case that we have missed something or misidentified something.

Now, a friend of Mr Vallicella (one Mr Peter Lupu, whom I first "met" that day and whom I hope will continue to discuss the matter with me here on my blog) decided that I don't know what I'm talking about and that he was going to correct me. And that's OK with me ... depending, of course, upon just how one sets about doing it.

So, Mr Lupu and I had a couple of exchanges; a mere start. When I quickly checked back to Mr Vallicella's blog this morning (well, by now it was yesterday morning) there was a very lengthy post to me from Mr Lupu. Now, understand, I do detect an air of "I'm gonna school you" in Mr Lupu's posts to me (and it may be more apparent to you in his after-the-fact post), but it's not nastily so, and believe I'm able to ignore it.

But, anyway, there was this long post which I didn't have time then to read, much less respond to ... and which is not a mere hand-waving and blowing-off of an idea which Mr Lupu rejects. Perhaps you don't realize, Gentle Reader, just how rare that is. So, I wanted to let Mr Lupu know how greatly I appreciate, even if we never agree, that he's engaging and not simply blowing off what I'd said. I posted this to Mr Lupu:

Mr Lupu,
First off, I want to tell you how much I appreciate that you are seriously grappling with this. I cannot begin to express how how greatly I appreciate that you are engaging an idea you reject. That you are arguing for a false, and necessarily false, belief (and that I don't expect that you will recognize the error today; perhaps in a few months you'll work your way through it) pales in light of the fact that you are arguing and thinking and seriously engaging the matter.

Few of our beliefs are held in isolation, they generally are intertwined with other beliefs. So, disgarding some individual belief, even one clearly false, is no simple thing -- one has to work through the process of disentangling it, which process frequently calls into question other beliefs.

I can't do this working-through-it for you (nor you for me, were it the case that I am in error) -- I can't tell you that you've had enough time to solve the question. It's your belief-complex; and you have to do the work, and see the connections, and do the disentangling and the rejecting or salvaging of other of your beliefs.

Which is to say, this belief you appear to hold (else, why are you denying its denial?) is in error, and you are resisting seeing the error -- and that's OK (depending upon how goes about that resistence, of course). We can't discard our beliefs simply because someone else says they're false; that would be irrational. Likewise, as a practical matter, we can't discard our beliefs simply because someone has presented an argument, even a very good argument, that a particular belief we hold is false and we presently are unable to see a counter-argument to that argument.

Rather, we must be convinced -- we must freely give assent -- before we can work through discarding the current belief or adopting a new belief.

-------
Perhaps coincidentally, this same general topic came up a few days ago on Victor Reppert's Dangerous Idea blog (in this thread).

What is different about the two exchanges, that of you and me, and that of me and the two persons at Mr Reppert's blog? They are in error and you are in error and I am not at all shy about asserting that. So what is different?

When I got back online that evening, there was waiting for me this message from Mr Vallicella:

Ilion,
Please leave no more comments on this site. You have just shown that you are unteachable. Peter Lupu very patiently went through your confused and dogmatic comments and made a reasonable response to them. But in your last response to him you simply ignore his points -- all of which are correct -- and instead adopt, quite absurdly, a superior tone, as if he is the one that needs to think harder when you are the one who needs to think harder.

So no more comments from you on pain of DELETE and BLOCK.

I wonder, does this make me a 'fascist'?

And I then said this to Mr Vallicella (no link, as he has deleted the post):

Well!

Mr Lupu, if you'd care to continue discussing this with me, please feel free to drop by here: http://iliocentrism.blogspot.com/
And, if you don't, that's OK, too. I'll be fine, either way.

I'll start a new item in a day or so dedicated to the subject and containing what we two have said so far.

........
Mr Vallicella,
You have just shown yourself to be an ignorant fool ... who can't be bothered even to attempt to comprehend what he reads (*).

I shall, of course, honor your demand. This is, after all, your blog.

At the same time, I shall, from time to time, on my own blog criticise some things you say, especially the foolish things. And you, having shown yourself to be a fool, can be counted upon to begin whinging that I have an obsession with you.

But in fact, if I do have an obsession, it is in the twin goals of calling people to reason properly and to stop being foolish.


(*) In truth, I had suspected for some time that you are a fool. And I became fairly certain of it the other day (see your superior and dogmatic performance here), but as of this I can't pretend otherwise. You are what you are.

Don't imagine, Gentle Reader, that I will claim I did not mean to yank Mr Vallicella chain -- yanking fools' chains is what I do. As I keep telling you, I am not "nice." I have no intention to be "nice." Ever.

After deleting the above (which, of course, one fully expects), Mr Vallicella said this:

[quoting someone else]

That's the essence of it. The trouble with punks like the one I just banned (and whose last scurrilous comment I deleted) is that they exemplify the anti-Socratic property. Socrates' wisdom consisted in a knowledge of his ignorance: he knew that he didn't know. The anti-Socratics 'know' what they don't know. Good examples are the followers of the Rand ideology as we saw back in January and February. People like this have no idea what philosophy is.

Wasn't that all so very interesting, Gentle Reader?

Not An Obsession

One of the reasons I finally decided to start my own blog, perhaps the decisive reason, furnishes the impetus and underlying subject matter for this particular item -- to have a more free hand at criticizing certain things that others say.

I'm not an essayist, I'm a critic. Certainly, I can write an essay. But, with my particular style -- which includes that I am undisciplined and have little inclination to change that -- my essays work better as criticisms than as off-the-cuff or out-of-the-blue essays.

My readers (all one of you) will surely have noticed that, as is common of blogs, this blog includes a list of links to other blogs and sites. One should not assume that I approve of or agree with everything written by those bloggers. Nor should one assume that I particularly like the individuals (though, in general, I do). For instance, one of those persons is an ass (if you knew the backstory and thought to use a stronger term, I'd not fight you on it), one is a jerk ... and one I have just decided is a fool.

One should understand that when I call another a fool, I am *not* calling him stupid; I am making a moral assertion, specifically, that the person is willfully choosing to reason improperly about something or other. Some readers will charge that I am inventing my own meaning for the word. Such persons are in error; for that has always been the primary meaning of the word and that is how it is primarily used even today. For that matter, when people call others 'stupid' or idiot' they are almost always using those words improperly; they are almost always using those words to mean what 'fool' means.


So, back to criticizing what others say: it can be as awkward to criticize what another has said in his own virtual home as in his actual home. This is because no one likes receiving criticism, especially pointed criticism which hits the mark; and many cannot abide it. Many persons react as though one's criticism were no different in kind from this masterpiece of misrepresentation. Such persons, when they don't simpy fly into an irrational rage, will frequently demand that one never again communicate with them. What is one to do but honor the demand?

Nevertheless, one may decide to continue reading that person, and one may upon occasion wish to comment. With one's own blog, one can.


So, what is the meaning of the title of this item? It is simply that I foresee myself commenting, at least occasionally, upon things said by the person I have just decided is a fool. As my faithful readers (all one of you) know, I am not at all a "nice" man -- I don't cloak the things I say in passive-aggressive "politeness" -- and it is always my intention to make pointed criticisms, and never simply to stroke another's ego.

So, in case I do actually post pointed criticisms of what this man may say, and should he ever deign to notice and at some point begin to whinge that I have an obsession about him, I'm stating right now that that is not the case. He has demanded that I never again post on his blog; I must honor that. But he does, from time to time, say things that I will want to dissect (motivating myself to do so is another matter).

Myrtle the Turtle

When I was five or six, in Kindergarten or first grade, there was a little girl named Myrtle. The other kids called her 'Myrtle the Turtle,' as small children are wont to do.

One fall day, walking home (*), I saw Myrtle also walking home on the opposite side of the street. Now, the thought came to me that I'd like to say "hi" to Myrtle. And what do you think came out of my mouth? Why, of course, it was, "Hi, Myrtle the Turtle!"

I saw at once that that was a serions error, but, of course, there was no unsaying it. I think Myrtle ran away; I don't know if we ever did actually talk to one another.

If it's any consolation to Myrtle, I think I never made quite that mistake again.


(*) This may come as a shock to younger folk, but in those far-off days no one thought a thing about a five-year-old twice daily walking by himself for a mile, and crossing important (though not 'major thoroughfare') streets.

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Is there a point or lesson we can learn from that little story? But, of course, and doubtless several. Here is the lesson I want to extract from the story.

To parents (and really any adults who care for and interact with children):

When a child does something wrong, even something which he *knows* to be wrong, and you follow your natural instinct, asking him, "Why did you do that?" and he answers (as they almost always do), "I don't know!" the odds are that he's telling you the truth: the child really doesn't know *why* he did the thing; he likely didn't think about it, but rather just did it, and thus there is no *reason* which he can give you for why he did it.

So, typically, what does the adult do upon receiving that answer? First, he refuses to accept it; then he starts badgering the child to get at "the real" answer. The child becomes desperate for the badgering to end, and so he latches onto any "reason" which he thinks the adult will accept as plausible. And, usually, the adult is by this time offering various potential "reasons." You've done it, you know what I'm talking about: "Was it this? Was it that?"

I have a suggestion. What not spare yourself and the child this frustrating and counter-productive little dance? Why not just skip asking in the first place the generally pointless question, "Why did you do that?"

Explain that and why it was wrong; make sure you're satisfied that the child understands the reasoning; banish the child to his room to contemplate the misdeed; do all sorts of things: but spare youself, and the child, the frustration of trying to dig for what likely doesn't exist.