LaPlace iff Plato

Kristor: LaPlace iff Plato -- wherein Kristor argues that "Naturalistic explanations can work as descriptions of actual causal relations among reals only if nominalism is false. ... But the falsity of nominalism entails the reality of the Forms. It entails supernaturalism."

Or, to put it another way: naturalistic explanations can work as descriptions of actual causal relations [amongst natural entities] if-and-only-if [philosophical naturalism and materialism] is false.

To put this yet another way: "Methodological Naturalism is able (to be used) to make true statements about reality if-and-only-if Philosophical Naturalism is false"

While I doubt that Kristor had this similarity in mind, Gentle Reader may recall my observation that "Atheism is a wordlview that *matters* only if it is false."