Teletubbieworld

Shadow to Light: Neil deGrasse Tyson’s Argument From Evil: Toothless and Useless --

The modern day atheist movement has only one argument to support atheism – The Argument From Evil. ...

The Argument from Evil boils down to this: If there is a God, we should all be Teletubbie-like creatures living in a Teletubbie-like world. Since we are not Teletubbie-like creatures living in a Teletubbie-like world, there is no God.

... From my perspective, this world, with all its evil, is better that a Teletubbie-like world.

So we are left wondering – Is the Argument from Evil the atheist’s way of expressing his/her desire to be a Teletubbie?

1) Moral evil -- wickedness -- results from wicked choices that moral agents freely make. So, what the childish so-called atheists are childishly insisting is that either:
1a) no one be *free* to make wicked choices -- yet, when they're not railing against God for allowing other people to make wicked choices, they're railing against him for forbidding certain acts (especially odd or perverse uses of the sexual organs) as wicked choices;
1b) or, moral agents be free to make wicked choices, but that the choices must have no evil consequences -- in effect, they're demanding that God make the world be irrational, by severing the link between cause-and-effect;

2) Natural evil -- injurious events that "just happen", without a moral component -- results from the fact of change: it is logically impossible for God to make a world in which change occurs and yet no change has any consequence for any other element in the world. Sure, God could have created a static world -- a *dead* world -- but *we* couldn't live in it. So, with regard to natural evil, what the childish so-called atheists are childishly insisting is that either:
2a) God place us in a world in which nothing ever changes, that is, a *dead* world;
2b) or, God place us in a world in which change does occur, but that no change ever have unwelcome consequences -- in effect, they're demanding that God make the world be irrational, by severing the link between cause-and-effect.

So, what it comes down to is that the 'atheists' are insisting that God can create only a world in which either --
a) there are no moral agents -- i.e. a non-rational world;
b) there are no causes -- i.e. an irrational world, in which events occur but don't cause consequences;
c) there are no events at all -- i.e. a static or dead world;

The injustice of ... Heaven

Douglas Wilson: The One Who Bled --

...
If a judge sentences a man to hang, this is of course unjust if we leave out of the picture the crime that the man was convicted of. But what is our basis for leaving this out? That crime is only "irrelevant" if our dedicated aim is to condemn the judge.
...
If there are ten innocent citizens rounded up, and five of them are shot by a despot, there is a gross injustice. But if there are ten inmates on death row, and the governor pardons three of them, there is no injustice done at all to the remaining seven. The only question of possible injustice arises with regard to the three who were pardoned. In other words, the question of justice does not arise when we are talking about Hell. It does arise when we are talking about Heaven.

The question is not "how can a just God send people to Hell?" The question concerns how a just God can allow sinners into Heaven. A God-centered concern about justice would worry far more about Heaven than Hell. A self-flattering, man-centered approach would worry aloud, and does worry aloud, about the purported justice of Hell. But we needn't worry. The Scriptures teach plainly that at the point of judgment, every mouth will be stopped. The Bible tells us that when it comes down to it, there will be nothing to say. The debates will be over.

The real problem, the problem of justice and Heaven, is resolved in the cross. Christ died as a blood atonement so that God could be both just and the one who justifies. God could be just and send us all to Hell. He could be the one who justifies and let us all into Heaven on a boy-will-be-boys basis. But in order to be both just and the one who justifies, Christ had to bleed.

And that is our final theodicy. Christ is the one who bled.

As I have pointed out before, there is a tension -- and an opposition -- between justice and mercy; for mercy is a special case of injustice.

And, there can be no mercy if there is not first justice: judgment and condemnation.  So, mercy is both in some sense in contrast or opposition to justice and yet wholly dependent upon justice. It is not that mercy refuses to judge and condemn, but rather that mercy chooses to set aside the full weight of the deserved condemnation.

It is not mercy if the mugger spares your life, though it may be pity; for the mugger had no right nor authority in the first place to condemn you.

On the other hand, if you are a condemned murderer, and the governor spares your life, but does not spare the life of your more vicious accomplice, it is not he who received the injustice, for he deserved to die. Rather, is you who received what you did not deserve, for you too deserved to die -- it is not your vicious accomplice, but you, who received the injustice. Well, you and your your victims.

Unless a person is morally perfect -- and we all know that none of us are -- than any talk of deserving "to go to Heaven" (as people put it), or being "good enough", is just so much wasted hot air. Not one of us deserves "to go to Heaven", nor ever can. The whole point of my parable of Noìli's Custom Ice Cream Shoppe is to mock any idea that anything other than absolute, total purity could ever be "good enough" to put God into one's moral obligation.

What you and I and everyone else deserves is not "to go to Heaven", but "to go to Hell".

And, if one doesn't love God in the first place, why in the hell would one want "to go to Heaven", anyway? Do you not realize how painful it would be for the man clutches his sin to his breast as being the most precious thing about himself to try to stand up in the presence of the wholly pure God? God in his purity is like a raging fire, and sin is utterly combustible.


Some 'atheists' like to pose the supposed stumper, "How can a loving God send anyone to Hell?" apparently imagining they have, at the very least, thereby shown Christianity to be self-contradictory concerning God's nature. Yet, put that same question in slightly different words -- "How can a loving God fail to force those who hate him and who suffer in his presence to be in his presence eternally?" The question is absurd; the 'atheist' hasn't uncovered any self-contradiction in Christianity, he has merely demonstrted his disinclination to think clearly.

Thus, the conundrum is not "How can a loving God send anyone to Hell?" Rather, it is "How can a just God allow anyone to enter Heaven?"

The resolution is that God is just and merciful. God does not want to "sent you to Hell", but we, who are impure and infected with capital-D death, cannot dwell in his presence, who is utter purity and Life itself, so long as we will not let go our sin, our impurity, our capital-D death.

If you want to Live, you must let go your Death.

I just don't have the energy

[the post is still in composition]

... to do more at the moment than roll my eyes --

Victor Reppert: Should God have to make everything clear?

One theme of atheists is that if God were to exist, he would make everything clear, and there would not be a multiplicity of religions. Why think a God, if God existed, would make everything clear. If everything were clear, we would have no real choices. There would be one choice, and all other choices would be punished, and everyone would know what that punishment was and do the right thing for selfish motives.

Addendum 2013/01/14:
So, what what is I was rolling my eyes over?

One might think me to be rolling my eyes over that particular "[o]ne theme of atheists[, which] is that if God were to exist, he would make everything clear, and there would not be a multiplicity of religions", but one would be mistaken.

Oh, don't get me wrong, that popular "theme" is bad enough, and it's frequently (perhaps even generally) offered not as an intellectually honest, albeit mistaken, objection to the claims and logic of Biblical religion, but as a red-herring, as a pointless rabbit-trail, as a distraction to avoid confronting the atheist's own illogic and irrationality. Yet, 'frequently', or even 'generally', does not equal 'always'.

No, I am rolling my eyes over Mr Reppert's response to that "theme" (which response seems to be very popular with "theists").

I see two main objections to such a response:

1) To the extent that the particular 'atheist' raised the original objection as an intellectually honest, albeit mistaken (and, in fact, illogical), argument against the claims and logic of Biblical religion, such a response is nothing more than a dodge.

2) To the extent that the particular 'atheist' raised the original objection as an intellectually dishonest argument against the claims and logic of Biblical religion, such a response is nothing more than a dodge.

Ah! But the dodges are quite different ... as I intend to explain with a later addendum to this post.

Addendum 2013/01/19:
1) To the extent that the particular 'atheist' raised the original objection as an intellectually honest, albeit mistaken (and, in fact, illogical), argument against the claims and logic of Biblical religion, such a response is nothing more than a dodge.

"One theme of atheists is that if God were to exist, he would make everything clear, and there would not be a multiplicity of religions. Why think a God, if God existed, would make everything clear. If everything were clear, we would have no real choices. There would be one choice, and all other choices would be punished, and everyone would know what that punishment was and do the right thing for selfish motives."

Assuming that the 'atheist' intends to be offering a logical and rational objection to "religion" (and one ought to operate by that assumption, so long as one can), if one sets out to answer his objection, then one has the obligation to take him, and his objection, seriously. But, since this objection is illogical, taking the 'atheist' seriously means trying to help him see (*) that his objection doesn't even apply, seeing as it is illogical. And, moreover, even if it weren't illogical, it doesn't even begin to touch the truth known via reason that atheism is false, can be shown and know to be false, and cannot be true (as see here, for example)

Non-exhaustively, and in no particular order, here are some of the ways in which this popular objection is illogical:
1) The premise that "if God were to exist, he would make everything clear" is easliy deniable. It certainly isn't a self-evident truth; it's really just an unsupported, and unsupportable, assertion. Thus, from the very start, the argument certainly appears to be unsound. And do note, the burden of proof does not lie with the denier of this proposition, but with its asserter.
2) While it is never explicitly stated, a twin assertion/premise almost always being made with the assertion that "if God were to exist,he would make everything clear" is that God would have the moral obligation to "make everything clear." Again, this is easily deniable; it isn't a self-evident truth, and there is no valid reason ever offered for believing it true.
3) There is a triplet assertion/premise, never explicitly stated: "if God were to exist,he *could* make everything clear" Such an assertion denies human freedom; in this case, the freedom to ignore or deny what has been shown to be true. But, we all know -- including those who explicitly deny it -- that we *are* free, including that we are free to deny what we know to be true: we are free to lie, not only to others, but to ourselves.
4) The inference as stated is also easily deniable, and further, we all know from experience that it is false (and illogical, as the implication does not follow from the conditional): "[if God were to make everything clear,] there would not be a multiplicity of religions" For, to assert such a thing is to assert that we are not (nor could be) free to ignore or deny what is clearly true (as see #3 above). But, as I said, we all know that anyone is free to ignore or deny what is clearly true and what he knows to be true.

To lay out the argument contained in that "theme", it is something like this:
(Premise #1):___________"if God were to exist,he would make everything clear"
(Inference/Premise #2):___"if God were to exist,he could make everything clear"
(Inference/Premise #3):___"if God were to exist,he should make everything clear"
(Inference/Premise #4):___"if God were to make everything clear, there would not be a multiplicity of religions"
(Observation #1):________"There *is* a multiplicity of religions"
(Conclusion):___________"God does not exist."

Alternately -- and this is the version I think is far more commonly intended -- the 'atheist' may mean to argue something like this:
(Hidden Assumption #1):___"if God were to exist,he should make everything clear"
(Hidden Assumption #2):___"if God were to exist,he could make everything clear"
(Explicit Premise #3):___"if God were to exist,he would make everything clear"
(Inference/Premise #4):___"if God were to make everything clear, there would not be a multiplicity of religions"
(Observation #1):________"There *is* a multiplicity of religions"
(Conclusion):___________"God does not exist."

Or, to simplify both versions -- while still making exactly the same argument -- it can be stated thusly:
(Premise #1):___________"if God were to exist, there would not be a multiplicity of religions"
(Observation #1):________"There *is* a multiplicity of religions"
(Conclusion):___________"God does not exist."

As I've already explained, the inference contained in the first premise does not follow from anything. It's unsupported and unsupportable; it ignores human freedom and human susceptibility to error. The argument is not only unsound, it is invalid.

To look at this in a slightly different way, what the 'atheist' is *really* saying is: "IF God existed, THEN he woud not allow me to deny that he exists. SINCE I do deny that God exists, THEREFORE God does not exist."

This is not not just illogical, it's irrational.

And, to look at this in yet a slightly different way, and to state something I long ago noticed about 'atheists', they are demanding that God force himself upon them. Which is to say, 'atheists' demand that God must prove himself to them by being a cosmic rapist; whereas Christianity avows that God is a cosmic lover, that he does not force himself upon anyone but makes himself plain to anyone willing to know him.


Then, there is the fact, which should never be overlooked, that reason alone demonstrates to us that atheism is false. For, reason alone demonstrates to us that to assert atheism is also to assert that we cannot reason -- this absurd second assertion is a logically inescapable entailment of the first assertion. Therefore, since the second assertion is absurd and is a logical entailment of the first assertion, reason alone demonstrates to us that the first assertion is itself absurd. Do note, the argument to which I linked assumes atheistic presuppositions and then still shows -- on those very presuppositions -- that there is, after all, a Creator-God, who is personal and transcendant of time-and-space.



But, Mr Reppert's response, however popular it is with some Christians and Jews, does not take the 'atheist' and his objection seriously. It dodges the question the 'atheist' thinks he's asking, and it dodges the real task of attempting to help him see that he isn't reasoning correctly.

And the very feeble motion this response makes toward flagging the illogic of the objection is itself illogical. For, Reppert didn't actually point out that the dual proposition that "if God were to exist, he would make everything clear, and there would not be a multiplicity of religions" doesn't follow from anything and disregards human freedom to ignore any evidence at all; he rather offered a false, and illogical, proposition as argument against the former proposition: "If everything were clear, we would have no real choices" -- which false proposition *also* happens to be a common "theme of atheists".

(*) His reaction to *that* may well help one determine whether the assumption that he intended a logical and rational objection to "religion" is a valid, much less defensible, assumption, after all.


2) To the extent that the particular 'atheist' raised the original objection as an intellectually dishonest argument against the claims and logic of Biblical religion, such a response is nothing more than a dodge.

"One theme of atheists is that if God were to exist, he would make everything clear, and there would not be a multiplicity of religions. Why think a God, if God existed, would make everything clear. If everything were clear, we would have no real choices. There would be one choice, and all other choices would be punished, and everyone would know what that punishment was and do the right thing for selfish motives."

Look at the heart of Mr Reppert's response to this common "theme", as he put it, of 'atheists' -- "If everything were clear, we would have no real choices." This "answer" doesn't even approach being the truth of the matter -- choice isn't a function of, or result of, ignorance, but of freedom, of agency. Likewise, the number of potential choices available to an agent at any particular nexus is not a function of his knowledge or ignorance (that he may know of all the potential choices he might make is a different matter).

Consider: were someone to ask you, "What does one plus one make?" -- it is not the case that there is only one answer you could possibly choose to give as response to the question. There is only one correct answer to the question, and we all know what that correct answer is, but there are literally an infinity of infinities of responses you could freely choose to make. You know the one, single correct answer to the question; but, being an agent, being free to choose or not choose any available option, you are not constrained to give that one, single correct answer to the question.

To put it bluntly, just as you can choose to guess when you do not know the correct answer, you can choose to lie when you do know the correct anwer.

This is false: utterly false, and false on multiple levels.

There's a first

This is something you don't see every day (and something I don't think I've ever seen) -- BenYachov arguing rationally

(h/t to Victor Reppert)

The Problem of Evil

I haven't yet read/digested it myself, but I can tell already that it's deep and insightful (and carefully explicates things I also have said, in brief, about the so-called "problem of evil") --
Kristor: The Problem of Evil

Sometimes ... (again)

Previously, I had linked to a quotation of G.K.Chesterton, of which I said: "For all his brilliance, sometimes G.K. Chesterton could be outright childish, in the negative sense, which is an intellectual failure, or even damned foolish, which is a moral failure."

For balance, I offer Genter Reader another glimpse of Chesterton, in which his unalloyed brilliance shines: "The truth is, that all genuine appreciation rests on a certain mystery of humility and almost of darkness. The man who said, ‘Blessed is he that expecteth nothing, for he shall not be disappointed,’ put the eulogy quite inadequately and even falsely. The truth [is] ‘Blessed is he that expecteth nothing, for he shall be gloriously surprised.’ The man who expects nothing sees redder roses than common men can see, and greener grass, and a more startling sun. Blessed is he that expecteth nothing, for he shall possess the cities and the mountains; blessed is the meek, for he shall inherit the earth. Until we realize that things might not be we cannot realize that things are. Until we see the background of darkness we cannot admire the light as a single and created thing. As soon as we have seen that darkness, all light is lightening, sudden, blinding, and divine. Until we picture nonentity we underrate the victory of God, and can realize none of the trophies of His ancient war. It is one of the million wild jests of truth that we know nothing until we know nothing."

As is frequently the case with human beings, in which our virtues and vices are often two sides of the same coin, both the first quoted silliness (or even foolishness) and this profound insight are rooted in Chesterton's affinity for 'paradoxen' ;)

Truth and Honesty ... and Otherwise

What is a lie? Is it really always a lie to knowingly speak untruth? I mean, really?

My thesis in this little essay is that most of us have a childish (and not in a good sense) understanding of what a lie is, and what it means to lie. And, it surely doesn't help that, at least in English, we don't have a positive word meaning something like "to intentionally deceive another in accord with the dictates of morality."

To look at the question of language in another way, if 'to lie' really does mean something like "to intentionally deceive another in discord with the dictates of morality," then it seems to me that it cannot be the case that the person who "lies" to the Nazis about the Jews he has hidden in the cellar has actually lied. And yet, we are forced to use the same word for deceiving others when we should not, and when we should ... leading to confusion for all, and distress, often intense, for the unsophisticated or literal-minded.

I've tried to discuss this before, on someone else's blog ... and caused distress to the, hmmm, unsophisticated or literal-minded. But, as this is my blog, perhaps here I may be better able to ease the distress of anyone who may be distressed on reading these thoughts.


Recently, as a comment to me in the "Random Thoughts on 'Game'" thread, Athol Kay said:

Game is in essence "applied female psychology". There is unquestionably a dark side to it, but also a light side as well. ...

I mention this here because part of my response, should I ever get around to composing and posting it, would have been a small disquisition about the co-mingling of "dark sides" and "light sides." Something like:

I don't believe that "Game" *is* in essence "applied female psychology". But, let us suppose, at least, that it contains that. From my perspective, as a man who values truth and reason above all things, the "unquestionable dark side" of "Game" weighs heavier that this (supposed) "light side." That is, even with this (supposed) "light side," "Game" is a deception and wicked.

Now, the best lies (from the point of view of the liar) always contain truth; the more truth, the better the lie. And, the epitome of the art of lying would be to speak only what is true, and yet deceive one's marks.

I trust Gentle Reader can see that this is here because it is about the current topic.

For example, concerning what I say is the "epitome of the art of lying," that is what Bill Clinton aims for, or used to aim for; but he's just not nearly half so good as he imagines he is. The main reason Clinton was considered such a "good" liar when he was president is because half the country *wanted* to be lied to. We all saw, did we not, that the bloom was off *that* particular rose during the election of 2008? Clinton was no longer a "good" liar, not because of any change in the quality (nor likely quantity) of his lies, but because no one any longer wanted to believe *his* lies ... for, after all, there was a new kid in town.

Now, as I've already intimated, and as is part of the thesis here, I don't believe that it's merely the deception of a lie which makes it a lie. And, if it is true that the epitome of the art of lying would be to speak only what is true, and yet deceive one's marks, then it cannot be merely the untruth of a lie which makes it a lie. At the same time, Gentle Reader can take comfort, at least, that I do not seek to upset the understanding that lying requires intention; that is, to speak untruth that one honestly believes to be truth is not to lie.

So, if it's not necessarily the intentional falsity of a statement which makes it a lie, and if a literally true statement may in fact be a lie, and if it's not necessarily the intentional deception of a statement which makes it a lie, what is it that makes a lie a lie? The defining characteristic of lying, as the term is commonly understood, is the intention to deceive when one has the moral duty not to deceive -- that is why and how a true statement may be a lie and a false statement, knowingly made, may be a not-lie.


'The Anchoress,' in recently defending Christine O'Donnell (who is mentioned here only in passing), relates a story about Corrie ten Boom:

A decade ago, O’Donnell asserted that she would not lie to a Nazi about hiding Anne Frank in her attic. These rhetorical scenarios are amusing “gotchas” in casual discussion-panel debates, but O’Donnell’s soundbite has been found objectionable by some, precisely because it is a soundbite; as such, it encourages reactions rather than reasoned musings. First Things’ own Joe Carter writes: “As a virtue ethicist I believe it would be immoral to not lie in that situation . . . If your [sic] hiding some of the Chosen People from enemies who want to kill them, it’s your duty to lie to protect them.”

No less then the Jew-hiding heroine Corrie ten Boom might disagree. In her book The Hiding Place, ten Boom recounts an episode where Nazis sought her nephew, Peter, who had been hidden in a root cellar, a rug and table hastily placed over the trapdoor. When soldiers demanded to know Peter’s whereabouts, his young cousin Cocky replied, “Why, he is under the table.”

The soldiers peered under the table while the family suppressed nervous chuckles. Humiliated, the Nazis threatened the family, then left. As others chastised Cocky for putting Peter-and the whole family-at such risk, her mother defended her, saying, “God honors truth-telling with perfect protection!”

Simplistic, right? Some might say “fundamentalist” and “anti-intellectual” to boot. But the story bolsters O’Donnell’s position; it suggests that power resides in a complete abandonment and surrender to the will of God and his laws, a faithful reliance that says, “If God is truth, he will be found only within truth, and not in a lie.”

This is the sort of heart-over-head theology that invites mockery, even as it zeroes in on Christ’s urging toward “childlike faith.” Jesus enjoyed the sophisticated reasoning of Nicodemus, but he rewarded the Centurion whose servant was sick, and who approached him wholly on faith. Intellectual debate did not lessen his appreciation of simple trust. ...

First off, I'll freely admit (after all, it's not as though God doesn't already know) that I don't have the faith -- I don't have the depth of trust in God -- to do as young Cocky did and stop trying to control what I cannot control.

But, regardless of my so-small trust and willingness to fully cast myself upon God, as I don't believe that the dictates of morality require one to not attempt to deceive the Nazis, I don't believe that, were I in such a situation, the intentionally deceptive answer I'd likely have given would be a lie (that is, as 'lie' is commonly understood).

And, understand this, young Cocky did actually deceive -- and he intended to deceive -- the Nazi soldiers (and, of course, I fully believe that God aided in that deception; and, for that matter, that God put the words in his heart which he uttered). What he managed to pull off is the not-lie version of what I said above is the "epitome of the art of lying" -- he spoke the literal truth in all that he said, and thereby deceived (as he intended). He spoke the truth, but he did not speak *all* the truth: he failed to mention to the searching soldiers that while Peter was "under the table," he was *also* under the rug, and in the root cellar. And, speaking the (partial) truth, he said it in such a way so as to be disbelieved: he counted on the soldiers misunderstanding what he said, he counted on the soldiers believing that he was "lying" to them and therefore on them not believing what he said. And, I think his answer angered them, for they took the answer as mockery, and made them careless. Had no one said anything, I think the soldiers would have found Peter (this isiwhy I think God was guiding Cocky in what he said).


Allow me one more outrageous claim -- you *already* understand, and likely agree with, what I've said. You just haven't carefully thought about it and thus haven't articulated the fullness of your understanding of what lying is and is not.

The meaning of the Passion

Edward Feser: The meaning of the Passion

And, as an added bonus, I have some related thoughts I wish to share with Gentle Reader --

These thoughts are something I've been thinking about for a while. I've expressed the basic idea somewhere or other, but not yet as fleshed-out as below.

In the comments section of Mr Feser's 'The meaning of the Passion' thread, 'Horatio' said:

The Res, whatever it is, is nothing like the Death of Socrates--indeed Feser suggests as much, by insisting on the miraculous nature.

Yet--if Christ is God (and capable of supernatural acts his entire life--as scripture makes clear--ie feeding 5000 with a few loaves, walking on water, etc), then He must be sort of...acting. He could at any time stop the proceedings. And He knows how it will turn out! He predicts the betrayal. In effect, He produced and starred in his own movie, and is playing ...everyone.
So He must be a bit of a masochist.

However the traditional catholic narrative insists on the pain, misery, suffering, etc.; the trad. catholics are the ones who humanize Christ (as the docetists realized--their messiah was no mere human....but the Word made flesh).....so who are the real blasphemers??

Responding to Horatio's post seemed to me an appropriate place to express these ideas:

Horatio: "Yet--if Christ is God ..., then He must be sort of...acting. He could at any time stop the proceedings. And He knows how it will turn out! He predicts the betrayal. In effect, He produced and starred in his own movie, and is playing ...everyone."

Horatio,
The Christ was not play-acting when he lived among us and allowed us to murder him.

And, as he was not play-acting, and as he really was tempted in all ways as other men are tempted, then he really might have sinned. For, if it were impossible that Jesus the Christ might have sinned, then it is meaningless to assert that he was tempted.

But, had he sinned, what would that mean? Why, it would mean the non-existence of all created things ... and of the Creator; for if “the ground of all being” is self-contradictory, then all being contradicts itself, denies itself, refutes itself. Christ was not play-acting; and there were real things at stake in the Incarnation.


Christ was not play-acting when he lived among us and allowed us to murder him. And, in fact, Christ has *always* -- and not merely when we murdered him -- made himself vulnerable to his creation. For Christ, by whom, and through whom, and for whom all that is created is created, continuously upholds the creation. All that exists exists because Christ participates in its existence (*). In creating/upholding the creation, Christ has always given himself into the hands of that creation; Christ has “always* placed himself at our (ahem) mercy -- we, who do not even have the standing to pass judgment, nor therefore to grant mercy, have *always* been given the ability to wound the Creator. And we have always done so; he has always been wounded for us, and by us.


(*) For, Christ is not "up there" ... watching our lives as though we were entertainment. He is, always, right here, living it with us. He lives it with us when we are betrayed ... and when we betray. Our sinfulness is so vile precisely because we drag The Holy One into the mud with us.


Horatio: "So He must be a bit of a masochist."

He has *always* loved you. He has always *known* you, and still he loves you. So, I guess, he must be a bit of a masochist.