Lying is not intrinsically immoral

I've previously taken a stab at explaining the rationale which justifies the assertion that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." This post will be a further explication, and especially in reference to Edward Feser's multiply-incoherent argument to the contrary.

(As a note of explanation --

I have used the "modernism and post-modernism" tag because Feser is essentially saying that anyone who disagrees with his argument is a post-modernist. Yes, he doesn't explicitly say that, but that is the meaning of denigrating opposing views as merely expressions of "consequentialism."

And I've used the "nihilism" tag because the practical result of Feser's argument, when its logical implications are drawn out and understood, is to assert that morality is self-contradictory -- which is to deny that morality is *real* This would also merit the "modernism and post-modernism" tag.)


A difficulty with the word 'lie'

In my previous post on this general topic, my starting point was the observation that we don't have a word in English meaning something like "to intentionally deceive another in accord with the dictates of morality." And that, that being the case, we have a very hard thinking cogently about the fact (or claim, if one prefers that word at this point) that not all lying, without possible exception, is immoral.

But, we don't have such a word; we have only the single word 'lie,' which is commonly (though incorrectly) understood to mean something like "to intentionally deceive another contrary the dictates of morality."

Now, lying is generally immoral, but, as I mean to show, it is not always immoral.

One problem here -- the reason most people automatically or uncritically assent to the proposition that a lie is inherently immoral -- is that most people are still explicitly thinking about the word 'lie' with an understanding that was appropriate when they were two or four years old. At the same time, in practice, most people live their daily lives using a more nuanced understanding of 'lie' (and 'deception'); it's just that they haven't yet articulated, or seen articulated, the nuances. And that's a major reason Mr Feser's incoherent argument seems so convincing if one doesn't make the effort to dig into it.

As a side note: in contrast to the concepts properly linked to the words 'lie' and 'lying,' the concepts linked to the words 'honesty' and 'dishonesty' always imply a moral judgment.


Definition of 'lie'?

This is how my 1965 edition of 'Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language' defines the word 'lie': "v.i. 1. to make a statement or statements that one knows to be false, especially with intent to deceive. 2. to give a false impression. v.t. to bring, put, accomplish, etc. by lying: as, he lied himself into office. n. 1. a thing said or done in lying; falsehood. 2. anything that gives or is meant to give a false impression."

This is how my 1972 edition of '[the Merriam-Webster] Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary' defines the verb 'to lie': "v.i. 1. to make an untrue statement with intent to deceive. 2. to create a false or misleading impression ~ v.t. to affect by telling lies" and the noun 'lie': "n. 1a. an assertion of something known or believed by the speaker to be untrue with intent to deceive 1b. an untrue or inaccurate statement that may or may not be believed true by the speaker 2. something that misleads or deceives 3. a charge of lying"

This second definition lists the following verbs as synonyms, and differentiates them thusly: "Lie, Prevaricate, Equivocate, Palter, Fib mean to tell an untruth. 'Lie' is the direct term, imputing dishonesty; 'Prevaricate 'softens the bluntness of 'lie' by implying quibbling or confusing the issue; 'Equivocate' implies using words having more than one sense so as to seem to say one thing but intend another; 'Palter 'implies making unreliable statements of fact or intention or insincere promises; 'Fib' applies to a telling of an untruth that is trivial in substance or significance." And, of course, there are other synonyms, or related words, having to do with hiding truth or fostering false impressions; off the top of my head: dissemble, obfuscate.

Now, I'm certainly not going to claim that these are the final word on definitions -- for instance, the first definition doesn't account for the fact that if one makes a statement which one merely *believes* to be false, even if the statement is actually true, then one has lied -- but, these definitions mostly cover a proper usage of the word. Also, the second definition is better than the first.

Lying isn't about the state of one's knowledge, but rather concerns the state of one's belief and intention in performing a communicative act.

Notice: the above definitions (which I admit, or claim if one prefers that word, aren't complete) make no reference to whether the act of lying is immoral (the synonym list says that "Lie is the direct term, imputing dishonesty;" but 'impute' is not quite the same as 'imply'), but rather merely link lying to an intention to deceive or mislead. Notice, also, that these definitions do not limit either verb or noun to verbal acts, but rather include anything which is meant to give a false impression; that is, to deceive or mislead. [I'm making this point because Feser tries to draw a moral distinction between verbally made explicit deceptions (to which he wants to limit the applicability of the word 'lie' ... hmmm; even that's exactly the case, as he denies an intrinsic relationship between 'lie' and 'deceive'), and non-verbal or verbally made implicit deceptions.]

Does the word 'secretary' imply anything about the sex of secretaries? No, of course it doesn't. Yet, since most secretaries *are* women, one tends to think of secretaries as "she." In similar wise, most acts of deception *are* immoral, and so everyone tends to associate the word 'lie' with an immoral act. But, that particular association really doesn't hold.


Notice, too: I have actually already, in examining the "official" meaning or definition of the verb 'to lie' and noun 'lie,' made a full case that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." For, the verb merely denotes communicative acts intended to conceal some truth or other; for, it does not actually carry a moral judgment: it is descriptive, rather than prescriptive.


A better definition of 'lie'

Allow me to offer a better definition of 'lie/lying' than the above Webster's definitions -- The act of 'lying' is the deliberate making of claims/assertions that one believes to be false, especially when made with intent to deceive; OR any action performed with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

This (proposed) definition does not in any way contradict the above Webster's definitions. Rather, the Webster's definitions are incomplete, and this definition is more complete. Whether it is fully complete (it isn't) is a different question; what matters for this discussion is that it will help us to think more clearly about lying and deception.

Facts of which a definition of 'lying' must account
Now, we all know that lying has some sort of relationship to deception (Feser denies this, as I'll get into later). We know that one may lie to oneself, and one may lie to another; and one may lie even when one fails to deceive anyone. And, we know that one may lie by making a statement which one merely *believes* to be false, regardless of the objective truth of the statement. AND, we know (or, we ought to know) that one may make a statement, every word of which is literally true, and yet be "lying through one's teeth" -- this particular practice, by the way, is why Clinton was previously thought to be such a good (i.e. effective) liar. FURTHER, we *ought* to understand that an act of lying is not limited to the words we say, even if that is the most direct and most common means of lying.

Now, the above points are facts about what a lie is or what the act of lying is. Any proposed definition of the words ought to include or account for at least these points and certainly may not exclude any of them.

When we understand 'lying' as I have defined it here, we see my definition does cover all the above points and excludes none of them. Thus, though it is not a complete definition, it is a good one.

In understanding this definition, we see that we have a concise (and cogent) explanation for how it is that one may lie to oneself, just as one may lie to another; and that one may lie even when one fails utterly to deceive; and how it is that one may lie by making a statement which one merely *believes* to be false, even if the statement is objectively true. And, grasping this definition, we understand *why and how* it is that one may make a statement, every word of which is literally true, and yet lie; and we understand *why and how* it is that one may lie entirely non-verbally. Further, this definition also catches George Costanza's attempted dodge: "it's not a lie if you believe it."

Incompleteness of the above definition?
Consider:

Matteo said:
I've never understood the problem here. Lying is withholding the truth from those who have a right to it. Murderers at the door and the Gestapo have no right to it, so no lying is involved.

[The response to which, by the way, was not at all edifying.]

Now, Matteo's proffered definition of lying may be incomplete (it is), and it may reflect a misunderstanding (it does), but it is not wholly false; and it's a sight better than Feser's definition.

AND, isn't it obvious that in general withholding truth that one knows and which one has a duty to impart is lying? And, in case it's not obvious, at the bottom of this post I supplied both a real-life and a fictional illustration of the point.

As I've said, the definition of 'lying' I've offered above is good, or good enough for this discussion, but it's not complete. While my definition doesn't explicitly include a provision concerning the deliberate withholding of truth or information one has a duty to communicate, when one considers the definition carefully, one sees that that understanding is implicit in the definition; and so I am satisfied with it.


Feser's definition of 'lying'?

This is a bit tricky, because Mr Feser doesn't explicitly spell out his definition of 'lying' (or, if he has, it's in a comment in any of three or four threads, and I've missed it).

So, I'll try to piece together, as best I can, Feser's definition of 'lying' --

In the main thread: Of course, many find it counterintuitive to hold that there would be even a slight moral failing in telling such a lie. But the classical natural law theorist has given a reason for thinking there is. As Aquinas says, the basic trouble with lying is that it is a kind of perversity. It takes what has as its inherent, natural end the communication of what is really in one’s mind -- speech and related behavior -- and deliberately turns it to the opposite of that end.

This comment: If I answer the murderer by saying e.g. "I would be risking my own life by hiding a wanted man!" I have not spoken contrary to what is in my mind, which is what would be intrinsically immoral. It is true that he might be -- hopefully will be -- led to go away, but I did not lie to him, because I did not say something that is contrary to what I really think, which is what "lying" means (certainly it is what NL theorists mean by it). And one sign that I haven't lied is that the murderer could intelligbly say "Yeah, but you still haven't answered my question," which he could not intelligibly say if I had lied by saying "I have no idea where he is."

This comment: Natural law theorists typically distinguish lying and deception, because either can occur without the other. I can lie and know that you will not be deceived, and (as the example given earlier shows) I can deceive without lying. And it is only lying -- deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind -- that is claimed to be intrinsically wrong, while deception is wrong only depending on circumstances. That is why broad mental reservation, evasion, etc. can be OK in some circumstances, while lying never is.

This comment: The key difference is that lying involves acting directly and positively contrary to the natural end of one of our faculties, while deception does not. It's like the difference between contraception on the one hand and refraining from sex except during non-fertile periods on the other ...

According to Feser, 'lying' is deliberately doing the opposite of communicating (via speech and related behavior) what is on one's mind; it is "say[ing] something that is contrary to what [one] really think[s];" it is "deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind." Which is to say, 'lying' is an act of "deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind, or what one really thinks]," right?

Or, to put it another way, an act of lying, says Feser, is not an intent to deceive, but rather is solely an intent to communicate via speech (or "related behavior") that which one believes or knows to be false.

Now, wouldn't one reasonably consider an act of deception to be an act of deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind or what one really thinks]? Wouldn't one reasonably consider an act of evasion to be an act of deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind]? Wouldn't one reasonably consider an act of withholding information (whether or not one has a duty to reveal it) to be an act of deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind]? And so on?

If one has read and understood the entire essay in which Feser presents his argument, should not one see right here, in considering his "definition" of 'lying,' that his argument falls apart in incoherency? For, his primary claim is that all acts of lying are inherently immoral; and his secondary claim is that one rightfully may, in some circumstances, avoid the (always immoral) act of lying by engaging in deception, misdirection, evasion, equivocation, "broad mental reservation," distraction, remaining silent, and so on.

BUT, do not most of these proffered solutions to the dilemma actually fall within his definition of 'lying'? That is, is he not effectively saying that one may morally avoid lying (which is always immoral) by lying?

He'd accuse me of misrepresenting his position. But, I have not. He'd accuse me (and he has already) of engaging in question-begging ... when, in fact, his essay is full of question-begging and other logical fallacies. Seriously, one could fill pages exploring/pointing-out just the fallacies in that essay.


Suppose a mother asks her four children, "Who broke the lamp?" And, suppose one of them did it, and that all four know who did it. And, suppose that all four shrug their shoulders.

Have the children lied to their mother, have they attempted to deceive her? Of course they have! Yet, they haven't said a word.


Distinction between 'lying' and 'deceiving'?

At the time I noticed that Mr Feser had decided to make further dialog impossible (for, one cannot argue/discuss with an intellectually dishonest man), I had been composing a post, which has bearing upon what a lie is or is not, in response to something 'David' had written:

David said:
Kjetil Kringlebotten: I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ [...] Ilíon fails to make the crucial distinction between ‘lying’ and ‘deceit.’

Actually, Ilíon already explicitly made the parallel between killing/murder and moral-deceit/immoral-deceit. But he also made the (highly defensible) claim that both kinds of deceit are properly termed "lying" (when done intentionally, of course). The catch is that killing does not become murder by killing in a certain way; any particular action which kills someone could be at one time moral and the same action could be at another time murder - that is, the physical activity itself is not what determines the morality of the killing. However, this is the claim in the case of lying. It doesn't matter whom you deceive or why, only whether you use your tongue to do it. If you speak the lie, it's wrong. If you indicate the lie by signalling or arranging some objects, etc., then the same deception of the same person in the same situation is fine.

[and my un-posted response would have been]

Kjetil Kringlebotten: "I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ [...] Ilíon fails to make the crucial distinction between ‘lying’ and ‘deceit.’"

David: "Actually, Ilíon already explicitly made the parallel between killing/murder and moral-deceit/immoral-deceit. But he also made the (highly defensible) claim that both kinds of deceit are properly termed "lying" (when done intentionally, of course)."

Thank you for pointing that out. I had also linked to an essay on my little corner of the internet in which I seek to explore this distinction -- the essay itself is only a few weeks old, but I have been thinking about the issue for a very long time.

David: "The catch is that killing does not become murder by killing in a certain way; any particular action which kills someone could be at one time moral and the same action could be at another time murder - that is, the physical activity itself is not what determines the morality of the killing. However, this is the claim in the case of lying."

Great minds, and all that! I was going to make a very similar point -- killing another is not self-defense if accomplished by means of a knife but murder if accomplished by means of a gun and negligent homicide if accomplished by a shove off a cliff. Rather, it is the intent that distinguishes murder (unjustifiable homicide) from justifiable homicide.

Kjetil Kringlebotten: "I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ Killing is not always wrong, for example in self defense. Murder is always wrong. Same with deceit and lying. It's not always wrong to deceit someone (being silent, not telling everything, using sarcams, etc.), while it is wrong to lie."

David: "... that is, the physical activity itself is not what determines the morality of the killing. However, this is the claim in the case of lying. It doesn't matter whom you deceive or why, only whether you use your tongue to do it. If you speak the lie, it's wrong. If you indicate the lie by signalling or arranging some objects, etc., then the same deception of the same person in the same situation is fine."

[David is here addressing not just what Kjetil Kringlebotten has said, but also what Edward Feser has said.]

Yeppers.

It's a totally unsatisfactory position: most irrational. Further, the position treats (and depends upon treating) words as though they have inherent meaning; but they do not: all words, in all languages, are inherently and utterly meaningless. Words are symbols, which by convention stand for or represent something else, nothing more. [This is a whole other topic ... one which few people seem willing to grasp.]

The lie is not in the words one utters, but in the intent to deceive; the lie is not in the success of the deception, but wholly in the intent to deceive. Lying is, in fact, utterly independent of language and of words (whether spoken or written).

A 'deception' is the object or point of a lie, which is to bring about the inculcation in some mind (generally someone else's mind) of a belief that one believes, or has reason to believe, to be at variance with reality.

===
Amusing fallout
HERE is some amusing fallout of the distinction Mr Feser, et al., are seeking to draw between 'deception' and 'lying.'

Let's consider first how Mr Kringlebotten has expressed the distinction: "I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ Killing is not always wrong, for example in self defense. Murder is always wrong. Same with deceit and lying. It's not always wrong to deceit someone (being silent, not telling everything, using sarcams, etc.), while it is wrong to lie,"

SO: if lying is a subset of deception; that is, if lying is deception-which-is-immoral (*), whereas 'deception' covers more ground than 'lying,' then here is an amusing thing -- if one "lies" to another, yet fails the deceive him, then one hasn't lied at all! For, if 'lying' is a subset of 'deception,' then that which-fails-to-be-a-deception simply cannot be a lie.

My God! Everything since Eden has been one huge error (a "tragedy of errors"), and a rank injustice -- for, Adam's attempt to lie to God deceived no one, least of all God, and so it was no lie at all.

(*) however that is determined.


On the other hand, the distinction Mr Feser seeks to draw is more tricky, for his distinction denies any intrinsic relationship or connection between 'lying' and 'deception.'

here:
Natural law theorists typically distinguish lying and deception, because either can occur without the other. I can lie and know that you will not be deceived, and (as the example given earlier shows) I can deceive without lying. And it is only lying -- deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind -- that is claimed to be intrinsically wrong, while deception is wrong only depending on circumstances. That is why broad mental reservation, evasion, etc. can be OK in some circumstances, while lying never is.
--
here:
The key difference is that lying involves acting directly and positively contrary to the natural end of one of our faculties, while deception does not. It's like the difference between contraception on the one hand and refraining from sex except during non-fertile periods on the other ...

According to Mr Feser, the "key difference is that lying involves acting directly and positively contrary to the natural end of one of our faculties, while deception does not." Or, more simply, lying is "deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind." [One may notice that this distinction seems not to be all that clear; for: What is 'deception,' specifically, in contrast to 'lying,' such that deception is not intrinsically immoral?]

And, at the same time, while lying is not determined by result (hey, we agree on that!), it seemingly also is not determined by intent. For, if, as Feser asserts, one "can lie and know that [the other] will not be deceived," then one can hardly be said to have intended to deceive. Or, to get closer to the point, lying, says Feser, is not determined by an intent to deceive, but rather solely by an intent to speak that which one believes or knows to be false.


But, Mr Feser's distinction (see also his futher comments about "mental reservation" and use of ambiguous language as means to deceive while avoiding lying) leads us to the (seemingly) strange conclusion that Bill Clinton is not a serial liar. When Clinton told the entire nation, "I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky ...," he was attempting to deceive us, certainly, but he was not lying to us (see also, "It depends upon what the meaning of the word 'is' is ..."), for he was using ambiguous language and engaging in "mental reservation." He was, in fact, *not* "deliberately speaking contrary to [his] mind;" rather, he was deliberately speaking in such a way that he reasonably expected most people to misconstrue or misunderstand what he had said.

Now, perhaps it is the case, after all, that Clinton is not a liar, but is rather a very skillful truth-teller; but such a conclusion sure does seem highly counter-intuitive.

Problems with the above distinctions between 'lying' and 'deceiving'
In the comments to this essay, Michael Bauman asks:

Michael Bauman: "So now we're close to an earlier point: What if we called lies immoral and deceptions not, much like murder is immoral but killing is not."

Such a proposal is most like the distinction Kjetil Kringlebotten offered (as quoted above). And it may seem, on first glance, also to be consistent with the distinction that Edward Feser drew (such as his distinction is, as see above), though it isn't in fact.

Perhaps I misunderstand him, but I don't understand Mr Bauman to be offering this as the correct (or, at least, a working) distinction; rather, as such a distinction was offered in the threads at Feser's blog and the WWWW blog, I understand him to be asking if I have a critique for or against such a distinction.

Problems with Kjetil Kringlebotten's distinction
Taken at face value (and as per Kjetil Kringlebotten's offering), this distinction Mr Bauman asks about says that 'lying' and 'deceiving' (or, a 'lie' and a 'deception') are the same thing on the surface or in their externalities, but that there is some critical aspect (not explored in the distinction), whether of motivation or intent or something else entirely, which allows us properly to judge one act to be immoral and a similar act (identical except for the "something else") to be morally neutral or even morally positive. That sounds good, so far; especially as we all will naturally assume that that critical "something else" is intent.

To put it another way, just as 'murder' is a subset of 'killing' (or 'manslaughter'), this proposed distinction says that 'lying' is a subset of 'deceiving.'

Yet, this "subset theory" has a curious result: just as an attempted murder which fails to kill the target is not a homicide and therefore not a murder, so too, an attempting lying which fails to deceive the target audience is not a deception and therefore is not a lie. Though, perhaps, it only matters whether *someone,* and not necessarily the (entire) intended target, is deceived ... which leads to the curiosity that one single act may both be and not be a lie: for, it deceived Person A but did not deceive Person B.

Thus, if one accepts this distinction as valid, then one can't know whether a person (whether oneself or another) has *actually* lied unless one knows whether the attempted lie successfully deceived anyone. And, one is forced (by the logic of it) to assert that one single act may both be and not be a lie.

So, such a "subset theory" for distinguishing a 'lie' from a 'deception' has a curious logical implication of asserting that the morality or immorality of an act (or, if not all acts, then at least some acts, namely "lies" and lies) lies in, or is determined by, the result of the act, not in the act itself or the intention with which the act was performed. And, one is forced (by the logic of it) to assert that one single act may both be and not be immoral, simultaneously.

But, that is way past "curious;" that is absurd: the proposed distinction, though it sounded good and reasonable and sensible at first, is seen to be absurd when we critically examine it.

Problems with Edward Feser's distinction (and definition)
Mr Feser's proposed distinction acknowledges the truth that 'lying' and 'deceiving' (or, a 'lie' and a 'deception') are *not* the same thing -- and then it immediately wildly veers off into an opposite direction by asserting the absurdity that there is no intrinsic relationship between the two; to wit: "Natural law theorists typically distinguish lying and deception, because either can occur without the other. I can lie and know that you will not be deceived, and (as the example given earlier shows) I can deceive without lying."

Yet, at the same time (even as he acknowledges that they are different things), 'deception' seems to nestle within his definition of 'lying.'


Mr Feser defines 'lying' as deliberately doing the opposite of communicating (via speech and related behavior) what is on one's mind, or "say[ing] something that is contrary to what [one] really think[s]," or "deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind." Which is to say, he defines 'lying' as an act of "deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind, or what one really thinks]."

Now, that definition is incomplete (but then, so is the one I offered, and so is the one from Webster's). But, is his definition even adequate? Does it not fail to capture a minimally robust understanding of the word's meaning? Does he not explicitly deny that some things which we know to be lies are lies (for instance, withholding information/truth which one has a duty to impart or divulge)?


Suppose a mother asks her four children, "Who broke the lamp?" And, suppose one of them did it, and that all four know who did it. And, suppose that all four shrug their shoulders.

Have the children lied to their mother? Of course they have! Yet, they haven't said a word. They have attempted to deceive their mother (knowing full well that she will not be deceived by their answer!) by means of several of the strategies Mr Feser says may sometimes permit one to morally deceive without lying.

On what grounds do we say that the children have lied to their mother and have attempted to deceive her? On the grounds that they non-verbally told her that they didn't know the answer to her question.

Is the lie the children told their mother morally permissible? No, it is not.

On what grounds do we say that the lie is not morally permissible? On the grounds that they have a duty to truthfully answer their mother's question. But, Mr Feser explicitly denies that such a duty is relevant to the question of whether a lie is permissible.


The correct distinction between 'lying' and 'deceiving'
A 'lie' and a 'deception' (or, the acts or states of 'lying' or 'deceiving') are indeed two different things, but they're also intrinsically related one to the other. So, on just this dual-point alone, both Mr Kringlebotten's and Mr Feser's distinctions are false; it's not merely that their distinctions are incomplete, it's that both are false in at least one important way.

A 'lie' (noun) is a deliberately made claim or assertion, believed by its speaker to be false, especially when made with intent to deceive; OR any action [whether verbal or non-verbal] performed with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief (whether in one's own mind or another's) that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

'To lie' (verb, intransitive) is to deliberately make a claim or asserton, believing it to be false, especially when making it with intent to deceive; OR to perform an act with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief (whether in one's own mind or another's) that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

A 'deception' (noun) is the object or intended result of a lie; the intentional reinforcement or inculcation in some mind (generally someone else's mind) of a belief that one believes, or has reason to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false, or at variance with reality.

'To deceive' (verb) is to intentionally reinforce or inculcate in some mind (generally someone else's mind) a belief that one believes, or has reason to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false, or at variance with reality.

To misunderstand or be ignorant of some truth, or to have some false belief, is not ipso facto to be deceived -- one can be deceived only if one's false belief is the result of someone's intention that one believe falsely.

Notice: 'to lie' denotes action performed with the intent of asserting a falsehood or of deceiving another, but 'to deceive' denotes only a successful act of deception -- (generally) a lie is the means of deceiving. So, yes, [quoting Feser] one "can lie and know that [the other] will not be deceived;" but, contrary to his further claim, one *cannot* "deceive without lying."

Notice also: these distinctions do not address moral questions. That's because it's not the case that lying is to deceiving as murder is to killing. Rather, it's that lying is to communicating as non-negligent homicide is to interpersonal-interaction; and deceiving is to communicating as successfully committing a non-negligent homicide is to interpersonal-interaction. Not all non-negligent homicides are murders -- when dealing with a homicide, the first question is not, "was it murder?" but rather, "was it intentional?"


Summary to this point

As this post is already huge, I'm going to have to continue with a second post. I'll summarize what we have so far --

1) The verb 'to lie' is the "generic" or "high-level" word to denote communicative acts intended to mislead, confuse, misinform, deceive, and so on. The verb merely denotes communicative acts intended to conceal some truth (or purported truth) or other, generally by means of fostering an alternate belief that an untruth (or purported untruth) is the actual case.

While such acts as truth-concealing, misleading, confusing, misinforming, deceiving, and so forth are generally, or at least frequently, immoral, they are not always immoral (and to this Feser agrees).

Now, since acts of this nature are precisely what 'to lie' denotes, and since such acts are not intrinsically immoral, it *cannot* be the case that lying is intrinsically immoral. For, to claim that lying is intrinsically immoral, while asserting that the sorts of acts which constitue lying are not necessarily immoral, is to assert that lying both is and is not intrinsically immoral.

ERGO, Mr Feser is in error (and is incoherent, to boot) when he asserts that "lying intrinsically immoral." He did not claim that lying is generally immoral (and who could disagree?). Rather, he claims that without exception lying is immoral, while also claiming that the sorts of acts which constitue lying are not necessarily immoral.

2) I examined two dictionary definitions of verb 'to lie' and the noun 'lie;' and I offered what I think is a better (because more complete) definition of the verb, and which is consistent with the dictionary definitions -- The act of 'lying' is the deliberate making of claims/assertions that one believes to be false, especially when made with intent to deceive; OR any action performed with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

3) I have shown that Mr Feser's definition of the verb 'to lie' is not just incomplete, but is wholly inadequate -- and also incoherent. For he also explicitly asserts that certain sorts of communicative acts (such as truth-concealing, misleading, confusing, misinforming, deceiving) which clearly fall within the ambit of his definition of 'lying' are not examples of lying.

4) I have examined (and shown inadequate or false) the distinction Mr Feser draws between 'lying' and 'deception;' and have offered a correct distinction.


Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II