Monday, August 2, 2010
William Lane Craig on five arguments that God is
William Lane Craig: Five arguments for God (a 30 page .PDF file), and touching upon how the "New Atheists" tend to ignore (or misrepresent) such arguments.
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
9 comments:
The article seems approachable for non-philosophers. I plan to read it over weekend but a small question to you:
Why does the First Cause has to be a person or a mind?
Gyan: "Why does the First Cause has to be a person or a mind?"
That's a good question ... and the exploration of which it is one purpose for which I started this blog in the first place.
In the post titled The First Question, I explain why "the First Cause" must be one or the other; "the First Cause" is, and must be, either a mind (a person) or a not-mind (a non-person).
In the posts You Cannot Reason and I'm not the only one, I sketch out the broad outlines of why it is and how we can know that "the First Cause" cannot be a not-mind; and therefore must be, and can be known to be, a mind.
In a recent comment to you in a different thread I indirectly touched upon why "the First Cause" must be a mind. (I've expanded upon the ideas in that post in two post on Edward Feser's blog, here and here)
In a nutshell -- The reason "the First Cause" must be a mind -- and the reason we can *know* that "the First Cause" is a mind -- is because there are minds in the world; namely, ourselves.
Well but the Argument from Reason is not a part of Five Classical Proofs, it it?
At least in the cited paper, the First Cause is too quickly defined as God. My question is whether the the Five Proofs show personhood of God in a self-contained way?
Gyan: "Well but the Argument from Reason is not a part of Five Classical Proofs, it it?"
The five surveyed in Craig's paper aren't exactly the same five as Aquinas' famous "Five Ways."
Gyan: "Well but ... "
When one says, "well, but," one is raising an objection. But, what possible objection can one raise to the fact that there are more than the five arguments Aquinas lists?
Also, it seems to me that the AfR is at least implied in Aquinas' fourth way (*). And, upon looking closer, it seems to me that the AfR is at least implied in a concatination of all five of Aquinas' five ways; that is, that it partakes of each of them in some degree.
(*) The "first way," the "argument from motion/change" -- that the movement (i.e. change) from potentiality to actuality cannot be effected by that which is potential, but only by that which is actual.
The "fourth way," the "argument from degree" -- the implications which follow from recognition of the gradiation from an imperfect to the perfect instantiation of various qualities or properties.
Gyan: "At least in the cited paper, the First Cause is too quickly defined as God."
I'll grant you that there is at least one place in the paper where Craig moves too quickly, without explicitly showing his steps. I don't positively recall that this movement you mention was where I raised my eyebrow (but I suspect that it was).
Gyan: "My question is whether the the Five Proofs show personhood of God in a self-contained way?"
I'm not quite sure what you mean by "in a self-contained way" ... and, more importantly, why it would be important that showing the personhood of God be "self-contained" in/among the "five ways."
Certainly, showing the personhood of God is vitally important ... but is there some requirement or duty that *only* Aquinas' "five ways" may speak to the questions about God?
Well I had supposed that Aquinas' Five Ways had demonstrated the existence of a personal God but now I delve deeper into the issue.
Personhood is not exactly the same as Mind since that certain Hindu notions of God postulate a impersonal Mind.
Do you think the classical proofs exclude the Hindu position?
Gyan: "Well I had supposed that Aquinas' Five Ways had demonstrated the existence of a personal God but now I delve deeper into the issue."
From "the second way" (the nature of efficient causation) and "the fourth way" (the "argument from degree"), and the reality of human personhood existing in the sensible world, it logically follows that "the First Cause" is personal. For, if "the First Cause" were not personal, then the personhood of human beings would be its own efficient cause. Which is impossible.
And, quoting "the fifth way" -- "... Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God."
Would it really be logical and rational to acknowledge that:
1) "the First Cause" exists;
2) "the First Cause" is intelligent;
3) "the First Cause" is knowledgeable;
4) "the First Cause" wills/intends this or that;
and yet assert that "the First Cause" is non-personal?
Gyan: "Personhood is not exactly the same as Mind since that certain Hindu notions of God postulate a impersonal Mind."
What do "certain Hindu notions" ... or postulates ... have to do with establishing the claim that there is a distinction, any more than Christian (or atheistic) notions or postulates do?
Based on our (admittedly imprecise) understanding of what minds are and what persons are, it appears to be the case that there is a logical distinction between the two. But, what if we're wrong? What if this apparent distinction is but a reflection of different ways of speaking/thinking about the same thing?
Further, non-human animals appear to "have minds" (the quote marks are because the common way of speaking about ourselves as "having" minds is incorrect and misleading; we do not "have" minds, we *are* minds). Non-human animals certainly appear to possess personalities -- yet, we do not believe that they possess personhood, we do not believe that they *are* persons.
So, it appears that we may even have evidence that there logically can exist minds which are not persons.
But, what if we're wrong? What if non-human animals are not, after all, minds; what if the appearance that they "have" minds is but an artifact of our imprecise understanding of what minds are. Or, what if non-human animals are, after all, persons?
Gyan: "Do you think the classical proofs exclude the Hindu position?"
If the Hindu position -- can one even sensibly speak of "the Hindu position"? -- is indeed that Brahman is not personal, then yes.
Don't mean to sidetrack the conversation:
Ilion: The "first way," the "argument from motion/change" -- that the movement (i.e. change) from potentiality to actuality cannot be effected by that which is potential, but only by that which is actual.
First thing that struck me was that macro evolutionary scenarios always argue for the potential of mutation and natural selection working engineering wonders. Not the modest changes we see in nature, when optimal designs go sub-optimal (or dysfunctional) - but actually forging the whole damned machine from an iron ingot, so to speak.
But like you say, in order to have any potentiality, one must have actuality. Evos postulate on what could potentially have happened, given the complexities of DNA and biochemistry. But they end up having to go even further with entertaining potentialities (and non-testable ones at that) when it comes to even getting the actual existence of DNA and life biochemistry going in the first place. Cart before the horse.
So, in effect, their "argument from motion/change" has to go in reverse, using imagination in what they wish could have happened so as to arrive at some kind of concrete reality - namely, DNA - to even get their further "potentialities" (macro evolution of all life) going.
And again, like you said, you have to have an actual to even entertain a potential.
Ilion asks:
"can one even sensibly speak of "the Hindu position"?"
I would argue you cannot. This is simply because there is no "Hinduism." Hinduism is a product of colonialism: both the colonialist tendency to lump all the non-Christian and non-Jewish sects together to the degree possible, and the reaction of the colonized to produce an alternative.
What is often considered "Hindu" thought is simply the thought of one sect/school of Indian philosophy (usually Advaita Vedanta), which is not universally held among the "theologians" such as they are (the various philosophical schools), much less the various sects.
Vaishnava (itself not a homogenous "sect") theology is usually closest to the Advaita School, but not conterminous. Saivites have their own theology and beliefs, and while Trika Saivite theology has some similarities its quite different. That's leaving aside Tantricism, and other sects.
Thanks, Calixto. That was my point ... though, as I don't know enough about the realtionships between the various religions and/or sects we Westerners lump as "Hinduism," I was compelled to keep my comment/question general.
Post a Comment