Wicked!

An interesting tangental discussion arose in a different thread; I thought it deserves its own thread. So, in this post I'll duplicate the discussion to-date.

The topic here is the making of distinctions with respect to the two very different senses in which the word 'evil' is used ("natural evil" and "moral evil"), and whether 'evil,' in either sense, can rightly be said to exist.

A secondary topic which may or may not develop in this thread has to do with the idea that 'evil' in the world is a logical necessity of the world existing. A few weeks ago, I'd started, but never finished, a post on this matter (* see below); perhaps the idea can be explored in this thread.


Getting back to the primary topic of this thread, on a wholly different matter, I had written, rather in passing --

... I had intended to point out that his first sentence ("It is much easier to understand Christianity once one comes to an acceptance of the existence of evil.") is not literally true -- for, evil exists in much the same way that darkness exists: it doesn't. Darkness is the absence of light; evil is the absence of, or denial of, good (which is it depends upon the sense in which one uses the term 'evil').

Cathy initiated the discussion --

("It is much easier to understand Christianity once one comes to an acceptance of the existence of evil.") is not literally true -- for, evil exists in much the same way that darkness exists: it doesn't. Darkness is the absence of light; evil is the absence of, or denial of, good (which is it depends upon the sense in which one uses the term 'evil').

I know this is off the point at the moment, but I wonder if you'd be interested in coming back to this?

I replied --

Cathy: "I know this is off the point at the moment ..."

That's quite all right; discussing this is much more interesting than all that up there.


Ilíon: "I had intended to point out that his first sentence ("It is much easier to understand Christianity once one comes to an acceptance of the existence of evil.") is not literally true -- for, evil exists in much the same way that darkness exists: it doesn't. Darkness is the absence of light; evil is the absence of, or denial of, good (which is it depends upon the sense in which one uses the term 'evil')."

By the term 'good,' we mean two very different things (made clear by context):
1) that which is desirable (but having no direct moral content);
2) that which is moral.
The [first] usage is frequently referred to as "natural good;" the second [as] "moral good."

Consequently, by 'evil' we mean two very different things (made clear by context):
1) that which is undesirable (but having no direct moral content);
2) that which is immoral, which is to say, wicked.
The [first] usage is frequently referred to as "natural evil;" the second [as] "moral evil."

The word 'wicked' always means 'immoral,' it always indicates a moral judgment; but the word 'evil' may or may may not indicate a moral judgment. Consequently, it both amuses and annoys me how people toss around the word 'Evil' (especially when one can, so to speak, hear the capital 'E').

For instance, with respect to a "natural good:"
It is a good condition to be intelligent -- but the possession of intelligence is morally neutral; to be intelligent, even to be the most intelligent person in the world, says nothing about one's moral state. Likewise, it is an evil condition to lack intelligence (to use a word from above, to be 'stupid') -- but the lack of intelligence is morally neutral; to be stupid, if one is indeed stupid, says nothing about one's moral state, it is not to be a wicked person.


Ilíon: "... evil is the absence of, or denial of, good (which is it depends upon the sense in which one uses the term 'evil')."

If one is using the term 'evil' in the sense of "natural evil," then 'evil' is the absence of "natural good."

If one is using the term 'evil' in the sense of "moral evil," then 'evil' is the denial of, or repudiation of, "moral good."

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If one is using the term 'evil' in the sense of "natural evil," then 'evil' is the absence of "natural good."

For instance, to be alive -- to possess life, to exist -- is a "natural good;" the possession of all other "natural goods" depend upon the possession of this one. For, if one does not posssess life, or existence, one cannot possibly possess any other "natural good" which mat exist.

But, what when one dies? Does one now "posses death" or "possess non-existence" whereas one previously possessed life or existence? No, one hasn't traded an existing (and previously possessed) "natural good" for its opposing "natural evil." Rather, it is simply that one has lost the "natural good" which previosly one did possess.

All "natural evils" are like this: they are not things or states which exist literally, but rather are states of privation of some "natural good."

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If one is using the term 'evil' in the sense of "moral evil," then 'evil' is the denial of, or repudiation of, "moral good."

I would suppose that this is not where you wondered what I meant? But rather that this seems to you self-evident?

Cathy replied --

Hi, Ilion. I'm always fascinated by thinking about thinking, but it's always been in the context of being aware of one's psychological or emotional beliefs, perceptions and reactions. Can we start off by saying that if I'm just too far in the weeds, you recommend a good Introduction to Philosophy, (and by "good" I mean valid regarding information, and presented in a manner accessible to the unread), and we could come back later if you want to?

Regarding "natural good' and "natural evil", I'm following ok -- 'Natural evil" being what might be called "bad" or "ill", meaning undesirable.

But I did not realize until I read "...evil exists in much the same way that darkness exists: it doesn't. Darkness is the absence of light; evil is the absence of, or denial of, good ...", that I have always thought of moral evil as something more active than the absence of moral good. I mean, Evil-with-a-capital-E as being destructive of, rather than devoid of, Good. But this comes from a since-I-was-a-kid religious perspective, and I don't know whether I'm mixing apples and oranges.

I replied to Cathy --

Cathy: "Can we start off by saying that if I'm just too far in the weeds ..."

No shame in that.

And it's not as though I'm a heavy-hitter, either. I've just been thinking about these sorts of things for a long time, and thinking about what other people have said.

Cathy: "... you recommend a good Introduction to Philosophy, (and by "good" I mean valid regarding information, and presented in a manner accessible to the unread), and we could come back later if you want to?"

I have no idea a good introductory book to suggest. But, as much C.S.Lewis as you can get your hands on. I mean, the "serious" stuff, rather than the novels (and by that I mean only that the novels are too indirect with respect to the question you've asked).

Cathy: "... (and by "good" I mean valid regarding information, and presented in a manner accessible to the unread) ..."

That's one of my peeves with philosophers and theologians as general classes; most of them are just useless. Who gives a damn that they can impress one another building elaborate houses of cards if they have nothing to say to the rest of us?

Cathy: "... that I have always thought of moral evil as something more active than the absence of moral good."

Well, no, that's not quite what I meant. That's why I said: "evil is the absence of, or denial of, good (which is it depends upon the sense in which one uses the term 'evil')." My statement was meant to compact both uses, and the distinction, into one sentence.

We use the terms 'good' and 'evil' in two slightly different, and yet related, ways, probably going back to early Greek philosophers 2500 years ago -- something along the lines of: companionship is desirable; lack of companionship is undesirable; to possess wisdom is desirable and seems to be more than simpy desirable, for the goodness of possessing wisdom seems imperative, seems to be something we *ought* to seek; to spurn wisdom is undesirable and worse, for if one *ought* to seek wisdom, then to spurn wisdom is worse than simply lacking it. So, the good of possessing companionship seems to be different from the good of possessing wisdom.

What I said in the initial statement is easier to see with respect to natural evils that with respect to moral evils. It holds in both cases, it just may take more concentration to grasp it with respect to moral evils.

Natural evil is the absence of natural good; moral evil is the turning away from, the repudiation of, the denial of, moral good. Natural good (and natural evil) can be seen as "that just happens;" moral good (and moral evil) results from agents freely acting. So, in that regard, yes, moral evil is indeed "something more active than the absence of moral good," for it's a choice.

And yes, one is certainly correct to see "Evil-with-a-capital-E as being destructive of, rather than devoid of, Good." It's similar to a (very virulent) biological parasite.

But, moral evils don't exist in their own right. Moral evils "exist" and have meaning only in reference to, only as the repudiation of, moral goods. If there were no moral goods at all, there could be no moral evils; but if no agents were morally evil, agents could still be morally good. They just might not appreciate it.

Also --

Cathy: I 'm pretty sure I have a thought trying to form. :) But in the meantime, thanks, and have a good night.

Ilíon: Well, I may be expressing myself poorly.

Or, I may be mistaken (but, of course, I don't think I am, else I'd not have said what I said).

The Deuce (whose LiveJournal is here) wrote --

I think it's harder to make the case that moral evil doesn't really exist than that natural evil doesn't.

As you pointed out, natural evil is an absence of natural good, and it's at least awkward to say that an absence - a lack of presence or existence of something - itself exists or is present.

But moral evil is a rebellion against good. And rebellion, it seems to me, is a real existing thing.

Cathy wrote --

Well, first off, i realized I'm not clear on the definitions of the critical terms.

For example, in the context of murder as a "moral evil" , is the "evil"
the intent to murder,
the act of murdering,
the effect (death of the victim) ?

Second, I was trying to think of an example where there can be good, absence-of-good, and evil; my question being Isn't evil different than absence of good.

Say there are cash boxes for voluntary donations to a demonstrably worthy cause of a reliable agency, and that all Persons are comparably circumstanced.
. Person A places a donation into a box -- intent/act/effect are good
. Person B steals a cash box -- intent/act/effect are evil
. Person C does nothing --
Is this 'evil' since it is absent of good? Is there a "moral neutral" category? (Unless Person C chose not to steal a box, in which case, is doing nothing "good"?)

Or, is the Person B scenario simply more evil, because there are [multiple] evils , both the not-helping absence of good, and the not-respecting-other-people's-property absence of good?

If you decide you don't want to play anymore, I will totally understand!

(I have to assume it's a good thing (for society in general) that my library is fresh out of C.S. Lewis. *sigh* Back to Amazon.)

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(*) The post I had started on the idea that 'evil' in the world is a logical necessity of the creation and existence of the world got this far:

That there is 'evil' in the world is a logical necessity of the creation of the world.

That statement, while perhaps I may in the future formulate it better, is not difficult to understand ... once Gentle Reader gets past certain common, but incorrect, usages of certain terms.

For instance, the unqualified term 'evil' does not really refer to "moral badness," much less does it mean "maximal moral badness" (à la Stalin, Mao, and Hitler), the proper term for "moral badness/deficiency" is 'wickedness.' The term 'evil,' unqualified, is about lack or deficiency or undesirability, it is not about morality. Specifically, the term 'evil' refers to a lack or deficiency of 'the good' (which unqualified is also not about morality).

Similarly, the term 'perfection' is not about "maximal moral goodness," but rather it refers to wholeness, fullness and completion, to totality. The proper meaning of 'perfection' can be seen in the stock phrase "a perfect stranger" -- the stranger is not 'perfect' because he's morally good, he may in fact be wicked, but rather he is said to be a 'perfect' stranger because he is thought to be wholly unknown.

The idea I meant to pursue has to do with God's perfection (fullness/compleness) of goodness, and that the Creation, being "not-God," definitionally cannot be perfectly good. That is, even without considering the moral evil which results from agents choosing to spurn 'the good,' the world necessarily contains some lack of or privation of (natural) goodness.