Both 'theism' and 'atheism' are affirmations and denials about the nature of reality ... and about the nature of human beings.
[Between the two of them, they cover all possibilities for the nature of reality; there is no excluded middle, there is no alternative third option.]
'Theism' *affirms* that "the ground of all being" is an actually existing mind: a rational Who.
'Atheism' *denies* that "the ground of all being" is an actually existing mind, and contrarily affirms that "the ground of all being" is some set of mechanistically determined states: non-rational whats.
'Theism' does not deny that there are mechanistically determined states; what it denies is the assertion of 'atheism' that such states are the entirety of reality. Thus, 'theism' -- because it definitionally affirms that "the ground of all being" is a rational Who -- has no particular problem with the real existence of the billions of Whos who comprise the human race.
'Atheism' -- because it definitionally denies that "the ground of all being" is a rational Who -- not only cannot explain the reality of human minds, but logically must deny that they really exist at all. [To assert that mechanistically determined states comprise the entirety of reality *just is* to assert that there cannot exist any entities which are not mechanistically determined; that is, it *just is* to to deny that there can exist any beings who are free agents, who are minds.]
'Atheism' is irrational and absurd, and thus is immediately seen to be the false affirmation about the nature of reality.
And there is only one alternative to 'atheism': 'theism'.
Friday, August 30, 2019
The nature of reality
The following is a comment I posted to this thread --
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Thus is a comment I made in a recent thread at 'Shadow to Light' --
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Michael: "... the fact that none of us can purchase intellectual certainty."
Strictly speaking, that claim is false. Strictly speaking, that claim is self-refuting, for at face-value the claim is itself an assertion of "intellectual certainty".
That we cannot "purchase intellectual certainty" about *all* matters does not mean that we cannot "purchase intellectual certainty" about *some* matters.
Here are just a of the things of which a person can "purchase intellectual certainty" --
- That he himself is;
- That he himself can know some truths;
- That he himself can *know* that he knows truth;
- That he himself can reason truly/correctly;
- That he himself can *know* that he has reasoned truly/correctly;
- That he may be mistaken about what he believes to be truth;
- That he can *know* that he was previously mistaken about what he believed to be truth;
- That he may reason falsely/incorrectly;
- That he can *know* that he had previously reasoned falsely/incorrectly;
- That there exist real, universal, necessary, and transcendent moral obligations between persons;
- That these real moral obligations may be discovered and known;
- That the Creator-God is -- for the denial of the Creator *just is* the denial all the previous items;
- That the Creator is a Who, not a What -- for the denial of the Creator' personhood *just is* the denial all the previous items;
- That the God is *one/unity* -- for an assertion of a multiplicity of Creators-of-All-Else is a self-contradiction;
- That the God is *one/unity* ... and *yet* is a multiplicity of Persons -- for to deny this *just us* to assert that "moral obligations" are either arbitrary, or are grounded in the nature of contingent human persons; that is, it is to deny the universal, necessary, and transcendent nature of moral obligations;
Oddly enough, regarding the things of which a man may "purchase intellectual certainty", the great god 'Science!' is utterly mute (and moot).
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