You Can't Tell Them Apart

You can't tell them (my sisters) apart, so don't even try!


In this photo, we're in birth-order, not the "proper order" as mentioned previously, left to right: Troy, Gary, Karen, Sharon. This is at our "Uncle B's" place, he being one of our father's older brothers. It's chilly and I am not smirking (as has been suggested), I'm squinting -- bright sunlight is painful! As you can see, Karen agrees.

I have no idea what our ages are, but I'd guess 8/9, 6/7, 4/5 (my sister thinks the lower number, or younger; she's probably right).

"Uncle B" is/was L B Miller -- those are not initials, that's his name. His kids (he and Aunt Lou (Benson) had 9 kids: 3 sons and 6 daughters) always thought it was funny that we called him "Uncle B." I suppose it sounds like "Uncle Bea." Blame our mother for that. Damn Yankees!

It's rather an accident that we four even exist! Dad had come North to visit "Uncle B" (who had come North for factory work) for two weeks. For whatever reason, he got himself a short-term job while visiting, and just never returned to his "hard-scrabble" land in Missouri -- 40 acres in the Ozarks that had never been logged, except for one tree, the "tree rustler" of which was caught in the act and sent to prison, before Dad bought the land when he was 16. Then he met and married our mother, and here we are.


This is at "Dice St," showing the house. We're older here -- this is clearly after I was well into my "growth spirt" and the different parts of my body were growing at different rates. I was in constant pain for a number of years (fortunately, it was a low-grade, rather than excruciating, pain).

To tell you the truth, I'm not sure I can tell my sisters apart in this photo. And well, the quality of the photo isn't all that great. But, you can tell that Dad took it -- there is his ever-present shadow in the foreground. But, I *think* Karen is on the left and Sharon the right; meaning, they're not the in "correct" order. Those gunny-sack looking dresses they're wearing proabably are ;-). No, they're made of regular fabric. I think. Whichever, Grandma Brown (Dad's mother) made the dresses.

That is Grandma Brown (née Eunice Jay [or J. or J, I really don't know] Price) with us. She was 65 when I was born, so add maybe 10 years to that to get her age in this photo. She used to pat me on the shoulders, beaming, saying something like, "Oh, your hair is turning so dark! I hope it gets jet-black, like your Grandfather's." It never did get that dark ... and I suppose she was purposely ignoring (because my mother was one of those damned Yankees!) that my mother also had very dark hair (our mother's father was said to be 1/2 Indian, though that probably really meant that his mother was part Indian and part white by ancestry, but was born to one of the few registered "Indian" families left in Indiana).

I ask you, does she not look like a squaw? I asked her once, when I was young, whether she was part Indian; she strenuously denied it (when she was growing up, it wasn't "cool" to be Indian). Years later, at my mother's funeral, I asked my "Uncle B" whether she was part Indian and he said, "Yes, her people were Indian" (which, understanding what he said does not mean he was saying she was "full-blood" Indian). I don't know which nation her people were descended from, but I'll take a wild guess at Choctaw (based on nothing more than where in Tennessee her people lived). It's also through Grandma Brown that we have Jewish ancestry.

That grandfather with the jet-black hair was also part Indian (1/4 according to the family) ... which would be where the jet-black hair comes from. He was 50 when our father was born, and died when Dad was nine, that is, about 21 years before I was born. His name was was Joseph (1877-1936); his father (said to be 1/2 Cherokee) was James. I have no idea when or where James was born, just that he was "old" when he married my great-grandmother, Margaret Elizabeth James (I've also seen her name as "Margaret Isabella Elizabeth James"), and died either before or soon after Joseph was born. I've never seen this image before, but this photo is of great-grandmother "Maggie James" and our grandfather Joseph's youngest sister, "Aunt Zubie" (Zuba Sesile Ward). [ another photo edit: this is the only photo of her I'd seen before today]

Dad is/was Samuel Jefferson Richard Joseph. Technically, he was "Baby Boy," because our grandfather was angry that the clerk wouldn't put all that on the birth certificate, and so told the clerk to just leave it as it was. Fortunately for Dad, the county courthouse burned down and took the records with it.

Our father had an older full-brother named Jackson (I don't know the rest of it), who died as a young child; apparently killed by rats (one always thinks of rats as an urban, rather than rural, problem). As I recall it, Jackson was about two years older than Dad and died at age four.

[Sharon says Jackson lived from August 2, 1925 to September 1929. She thinks he got into some moonshine, which killed him; I don't recall anything like that. As I recall it, the family found him dead one morning; there were bite-marks on his face and it was "all black"]

Our grandparents divorced when Dad was very young (they were going to remarry, and Grandpa had the license, but then died of pheumonia contracted putting out a fire burning down his cabin; he was working as a logger at the time). Dad was aware of seeing hs father only once, when he was four, and Joseph took him to visit his grandmother, "Maggie James." Every time Dad talked about that, he'd mention how enchanted he had been by her "beautiful white hair." So, most of his life, he didn't even know what his father looked like. But, when he was in his sixties, someone who had known his father (I think it was the younger man who had shared the cabin with Joseph) sent Dad a photocopy of a photograph of him. Personally, I think my brother Gary looks a bit like him (I take more after Mom's people).

---
Edit, and shocker (in that I never expected there to be *any* relationship, as 'Ward' is so common a name):

I was Googling, to try to verify that I had the birth-name of great-grandmother "Maggie James" correct -- and also so that I could link to an photo of her I once found on the internet. Anyway, I happened to come across this page, according to which we *are* related to Nancy Ward; though, in our case the relationship is by marriage rather than direct descent. Specifically, some of our cousins are descended from Nancy Ward's Scots-Irish husband, Bryant Ward. Our grandfather's step-father, Charles Rufus Ward, was a great-grandson of that man Bryant Ward.

---
Edit2:
Sharon just sent me this photo of Grandma Brown, at about age 88 or 89, to better show her Indian-like appearance; I think I may have been there (home from college) when that picture was snapped:


---
Edit 3:
Ah! These next two are more like what I had in mind for showing off "The Twins" (that's how my brother and I referred to our sisters, but there came a time when they *insisted* we use their names).

The date on this one is July 1963 -- that's when it was developed, not necessarily when it was taken. But, as the girls were born in January 1961, this date has to be fairly close to when it was taken. That may be the only time Dad got pictures developed in a timely manner. Still, are these not some cute, and happy, kids? Near to far: Gary, Karen, Sharon, Troy.


With this first/top one, as infants, I have to admit that to me they just look like babies (and almost all babies look identical to me); if I didn't already know they were my sisters, I'd not guess it. My sisters usually wore their hair long, but one year our aunt convinced them or Mom that a "Pixie cut" would be "so cute," so that's what's with the short hair in the outside photos. Sorry about my sister's rudeness in the center photo (girls!) -- you know, that is probably the *only* photo of Sharon in which her eyes both are open (instead, Karen's are closed)! Maybe this was one of those take-one-another's-place that twins like to do.

Speaking of twins trading places, they did that once in school, I think when they were in the second grade. As I recall the story, at the first break, the one dragged the other into the rest-room to insist they trade clothes and then go to their assigned classes, because the other's teacher was a right witch.

The World Was Younger Then -- Snowforts and Mortality

My brother and sisters and I made a number of snowforts over the years (we also once made a "rabbit warren" as our fort, and once an "ice cave"; and we also once set the back lot aflame to make a "prairie"); it think the fort in the accompanying photo, its remains, at any rate, may be the first. When I saw this photo the other day, the thought that came to me was, "The world was younger then;" and hence the title of this entry.


This photo was taken at "Dice Street," as we generally called the place to distinguish it from the other places we lived (if I recall correctly, the address was 20135 W Dice St). This was a one acre property out in the suburbs that our father had bought from the first friend he'd made after moving North, and for whom I am named. We lived there in two periods; the first from "whenever" until after the birth of my sisters (we moved back into the city before or around my fourth birthday in 1961), and again from when I was 6 until 11.

I think this photo may be from February or March of 1964; if so, I'd be 6 1/2 (that 1/2 is vitally important when you're that age!), my brother soon to turn 5, and my sisters recently turned 3. Yet, do those ages look right?

On the other hand, I don't think the photo can be from the winter of 64-65, when I'd have been 7 1/2. In my memory, that winter was snowier; more importantly, that's the winter I "discovered" my own mortality (and, thus, I'd not have been out in the cold air, unless this was taken just before that). And, were the photo from 65-66, I'd have been 8 1/2 and my sisters 5, which doesn't seem at all right.

So, the photo is probably from late winter/early spring of 1964, but may be from the next year; and we are seen sitting in the sad remains of our (very modest) snowfort, perhaps on the remains of our thrones. There didn't fall much snow that winter, so this fort never amounted to much. We had pretty much stripped the yard bare (as can be seen in the background) in rolling the snowballs of which we constructed it.

This picture is no exception to the general rule for pictures of us: there exist almost no photos of all four of us which do not reflect that Karen is "Gary's Twin" and Sharon is "Troy's Twin." That is, in all but the rarest of cases, Karen will be beside or in front of Gary, and Sharon will be beside or in front of me.

Ah, but those darling little girls were also very assertive of *their* ownership rights -- to Dad. In their minds, they jointly own him, and Gary and I had no rights to him without their express permission! And, budding little private property rights advocates they were, too: for, they discovered "the tragedy of the commons" all on their own. That is, they later realized that joint ownership of Dad caused for conflict when their interests diverged; so they "divided the assets" in a mutually agreeable manner: one claimed his head and the other his feet.

===
Even though we were born and raised in South Bend (Indiana), as was our mother, we apparently had a recognizably Southern accent in those days. Courtesy of Dad. One of my sisters has told me that when they were hospitalized for a tonsillectomy (need I mention that when we visited them, my brother and I were focused on the fact that they getting as much ice cream as they wanted!; I'd don't think I'd have been up for it, but I'd not be surprised if he had been willing to get in on such a sweet deal), a nurse asked them, “So, how long have you been up North?” and she, being a child, had no idea what she was being asked.

===
When I "discovered" my own mortality --

One winter afternoon when I was 7, I saw that Dad was pulling into the drive, and so I ran out to greet him (that is, jump all over him), as little kids do. After all, I hadn't seen him *all* day! But, the thing is, I ran out in jeans and tee shirt -- I mean, not only without putting on a coat, but also without putting on shoes.

I awoke in the middle of the night -- and woke the whole family -- unable to breathe. And I *knew* that I was dying. Now, I known about death for forever, and I understood that I, too, would die. But that knowledge had been conceptual, now it became visceral. I wasn't terrified, really; I just didn't want to leave right then.

In thrashing around in my discomfort, I managed to find a position in which I could finally get some oxygen -- with my head and upper body hanging over the side of the bed. So, that's how I was taken to the hospital; half lying on the car's back seat, half lying on the car's floor.

At the hospital, I was put in an oxygen tent (for the next three or four days), and was again able to breathe without standing on my head. The hospital's patient capacity was apparently on full, at least in the "children's ward;" I was initially placed in an alcove off a main corridor devoted either to adults in general or to just women (I don't recall seeing any men as patients).

The next day, I was better and rested, and able to pay some attention to the goings-on around me. Though, when you're only 7, there is only so much entertainment value to be extracted from watching old(er) women in hospital-gowns walk back and forth past the alcove in which one has been stowed. This day was the first time I heard someone (one of the patients to another) refer to me as "pretty" -- and I was outraged: "I'm not 'pretty!' I'm a boy!" And, as Gentle Reader can see from the photo, I'm not, and wasn't, pretty (yet I have been accused of it more than once; one of those mysteries of life, I guess).

I was later moved for a couple of days to the "children's ward." That was really boring, making me long for the alcove; for, the other kids were either too sick to care about anything outside their own discomfort, or they were "babies." That ward is where I *really* learned that friendly behavior does not indicate friend; I mean, I was also learning that from neighborhood kids, but here I learned it from an adult and the lesson really sunk in.

===
Speaking of snowforts and mortality, that "ice cave" I mentioned could have been the death of any number of us! Our *dogs* were smart enough to not want to go into it. The younger, larger one really put up a fight when we dragged her in with us. This was several years after the one in the photo, after we'd moved back into town; it was one of those winters with particularly heavy snow fall. After the snowplaws had been through, there was this too, too tempting pile of snow and ice ... and we burrowed tunnels into it. And, if it had collapsed, it surely would have killed someone.

But then, we used to jump off the roof! We were some wild kids! We weren't bratty, we were generally well-behaved and polite, we were just really serious out our playing.

'Bulverism' On Steroids

Determinism is 'Bulverism' Through A Looking Glass (and also on steriods). I say "through a looking glass" because it applies to all the determinist sees, himself included.

The "regular" 'Bulverist' asserts that "you're only saying that because you're [X]" (where '[X]' is some incidental fact, irrelevant to an argument, such as the sex or nationalist of the opponent). That is, the 'Bulverist' denies that his opponent has rational reasons for saying or believing the claim the 'Bulverist' denies, but rather that there exist merely causes which cause the opponent to say or believe what the 'Bulverist' denies. To put it another way, the 'Bulverist' is asserting that his opponent is unable to rationally comprehend truth, and thus to possess knowledge -- and he thereby dismisses the view he wishes to deny.

Nevertheless, the "regular" 'Bulverist' continues to hold that *he* is able (as are those who agree with him) to believe and say what he believes and says for reasons rather than merely due to causes. The "regular" 'Bulverist' continues to hold that *he* is able to rationally comprehend truth; he continues to hold that *he* is able to to possess knowledge.

Or, to put it another way, determinism is 'Bulverism' with that glaring logical inconsistency worked out. Determinism dismisses *all* possibility of anyone rationally comprehending truth and possessing knowledge.

Ilion's Minions

'BigFurHat,' the fluffy-headed Big Cheese at the 'iOwnTheWorld' blog, says (in the comments) that 'Ilioncentrism' is "a blog that gets 43 hits a day."

This, O My Minions, is great news, is it not? And, yet, I must confess to you, with heavy heart, that the news contains for me a dram of sadness. For, you are not commenting (if I may coin the word) 'miniously.'

As I told my esteemed college, the Big Fluffy-Headed Cheese, "without some feedback, there is only so much I can do to offer [My Minions] interesting essays and links to others’ thoughts."

The Introverts

I mean to write more about shyness or introversion, including drawing on my own experience and perspective, but for now I wish to draw Gentle Reader's attention to this article by John Rosemond: 'Fixing' Son's Shyness. I used to read Mr Rosemond's articles religiously when the local paper carried them (and I still bothered with the local paper); I'm delighted to have noticed recently that Jewish World Review has added him to their roster.

I want to strongly endorse Mr Rosemond's point: if your child is 'shy' or 'introverted' (or as I prefer to call it, 'reserved'), don't work yourself into a tizzy over it. If that is all that is "wrong" with him, then he'll be fine -- and, in fact, your attempts to "cure" him are more likely to turn it into a real problem than to ever "cure" it. In this regard, it's similar to stuttering: most stuttering is caused by self-conscious awareness of the fact that one *did* stutter. Well-meaning drawing of attention to the child's stuttering by his adults -- and that's exactly what "working with him" to "cure" the stuttering does -- serves only to make him even more self-conscious of his stuttering.

The proper response to these "problems" is almost always: "let it be, don't draw attention to it, it will cure itself."

===
When I was a kid, starting at perhaps ten, my father was convinced that he needed to help (make!) me get over my "shyness." One of his methods was to take me with him when he went downtown to pay the bills -- when we'd get to the places we were going, he'd give me the billing statement and the money and make me go in alone to do the transaction.

I gotta tell ya', this was most annoying!

Sure, having some one-on-one time with Dad (without "the kids" to hog him) is cool, but being made to do some silly task to "cure" you of something you know isn't a problem ("Da-ad! When I grow up and wanna pay bills, I'll pay bills!") is just annoying.

My "shyness" is/was made of multiple factors, including:
1) my basic personality;
2) I enjoyed the company of adults;
3) I enjoy the company of those I already know (why add more people to the mix when there is still so much more to be discovered about these?);
4) learned response; with a major lesson delivered when I "discovered" death (a story for another time).

===
In all those "personality profile tests" that educationists and some employers have required me to take over the years, I always "test out" as 'introverted.' I could have told them that the very first time had 'introverted' and 'extroverted' been explained to me.

As I mentioned above, I prefer the term 'reserved' to either 'shy' or 'introverted' (while 'introverted' is a technical and non-judgmental term, most people misunderstand the term as indicating "socially flawed"). Part of the reason I prefer 'reserved' is that I am reserving judgment as to how far to extend myself in this social setting until I studied it more, and understand it.

Tangentially, the educationist 'gospel' that children need to be imprisoned in public indoctrination centers, lest they miss out on "socialization," is such an utterly false (yet, oddly, self-serving) concept; this "socialization," as it is practiced today, actively harms your child. But, even if it were neutral, the concept is utterly flawed. FOR, children are truly socialized only in relation to adults -- and, after all, the goal of childhood is adulthood -- not in relation to other children. Everyone spends the majority of his life as a chronological adult; he needs, as a child, to learn adulthood, not childhood. He's already a child, and he has childhood down pat; he's a natural at it.

An interesting observation I have long noted is that in many social situations, it is actually we 'introverts' (who are in the minority) who "carry the ball" and keep the thing working. For instance, I can't tell you how many times in class-room or seminar situations, I -- the "introvert" -- have asked the question that helped make clear the point the instructor wished to make, or induced the instructor to better (or correctly!) explain a point, or got the instructor to slow down on some complicated or difficult matter, and so on.

When He's Good ...

When he's good, he's very good ... and when he's bad, he's an asshole.

Being Lydia McGrew

In the comments section -- I trust Gentle Reader to be able to see my point, within reading just a few comments, without me explicitly spelling it out.

It's too bad, really.

--
Incidentally, Mrs McGrew's point in the article ('Making a virtue out of necessity') is much the same as mine in objecting this.

Typing on Autopilot

I'm not a typist; I couldn't legibly type even a short sentence were I not constantly glancing at the keyboard. I spend more time looking at the keys (and at my moving fingers) than not.

And yet (for I do not quite type by the "hunt and peck" method, either), interesting results do constantly come from my fingers-on-autopilot, mostly having to do with substitution of similar morphemes or with the phonetic (in contrast to correct) spelling of a word.

For instance, regarding substitution of similar morphemes, I frequently type (and even more frequently when writing script, write) the letter ‘b’ when I intend ‘p’ and vice-verse. But I never “mix my p’s and q’s”, for ‘p’ and ‘q’ do not represent similar sounds.

An example of phonetic spelling on autopilot, and what prompted this post, is that I just a few minutes ago, once again, caught myself typing ‘ai’ for the word ‘I.’ You see, the written-word ‘I’ represents a diphthong, and the *proper* phonetic spelling for that sound is ‘ai’ -- all that business about long-i and short-i we were taught in grade school is a serious misrepresentation of English-language orthography. Sure, it’s the traditional way of teaching it, but it’s based on ignorance.

=== addendum:
On a note related to the ignorance-based nature of the common teaching of English orthography, many of the "rules" of English grammar we are taught are even more egregiously false, for they do not, in truth, apply to the English language.

For instance, the "rule" against the split infinitive doesn't actually apply to the English language. It's based on ignorance and on trying to force the English language into the grammar rules of the Latin language (damn those French since 1066!).

Lawrence Auster has (yet again) a recent post to express his loathing of the split infinitive: Against the split infinitive: the battle continues -- Mr Auster, you may lay down your arms! The war is over, and it was all a big misunderstanding! I know for a fact that either Auster himself or one of his minions reads my blog (would that make that person our dual minion?), and so I expect him, soon or late, to become or to be made aware of this little post.

English is not a Romance language, it is a Germanic language; as such, its rules are Germanic-based, not Latin-based. Thus the split infinitive is perfectly acceptable in English. It matters not a whit that the majority of our vocabulary is Romance-based; our grammar is Germanic.

Now, for sure, many people split the infinitive in an infelicitous manner; but that’s due to a general carelessness about how they speak (and think!), not about any violation of a non-existing rule of the language.

Another Day, Another ...

Another day, Another Man Put In His Place in the feminist dystopia of present-day America.

What do you think are the odds, Gentle Reader, that the shrews and harridans over there will gloat and shriek with glee that they can, with confidence, "bet his ex got the house and the kids too."

Strong Conservative Women

Strong Conservative Women ... and the weak man-things who enable them -- that's a joke, by the way: [WARNING! (especially for Gentlest Reader) This is one of those posts in which I'm pretty much compelled to use crude language.] as the women commenting in that thread are neither strong nor conservative. Rather, they're feminists, which is to say they're "liberals," who simply don't like to call themselves feminists and don't want to recognize and eliminate from their minds the control that "liberalism" has over them. They conflate their willfulness for having strong wills, and on the strength of their willfulness imagine themselves to be strong women -- small children are willful, but no one in his right mind imagines that to be a virtue, either of children or of supposed adults.

Most of the women in my family are, or were when they were alive, strong women (in my family, it's some of the younger ones, the ones marinated in feminism and "liberalism" all during their “education” who are weaklings, for all their willfulness). I *know* a strong woman when I see one, and these are not.

Gack! Pity the weak, PWed schlubbs who may have chosen to put up with such harridans and shrews.

===
First, consider the song itself: consider its sappy sentimentality; and especially, consider its horrendous message, which amounts to: "Oh! These things just chance to happen (to poor little angels who "don't deserve this," because of those "plans," you know?) ... and, oh, by the way, you all need to celebrate as Heroines Of The Ages all the vapid and selfish dips who manage to choose to not murder the poor little bastards they have chosen to cause to exist."

Again, I say: bullshit! On multiple levels: bullshit!

Gentle Reader may (or may not) have seen Chris Rock's act in which he mocks the mindset of persons who want to claim moral credit for doing what one is *supposed* to do (as see here, warning: language). Essentially the same mindset or attitude is at play in this song, as with those "baby daddies" Mr Rock is mocking, who want credit because "I take care of my kids." In this case, it's "Celebrate me: I don't murder my babies." To paraphrase Mr Rock: "You self-centered twit! You're supposed to not murder your babies!"

But, there is another, and more insidious, level of total wrongness about this song: it glamorizes getting yourself knocked up. If the reader is offended by the "ugly language" I am using to discuss the second-ugliest thing people commonly do to other people, than the reader can push off: I just don't give a damn about your tender sensibilities. Forcing a defenseless human being to enter this world as a bastard is an ugly and hateful thing to do, made worse only by murdering the child before its birth.

For a number of years now it has increasingly bothered me that seemingly every "Contemporary Christian" act has a number in its repertoire whinging about how "judgmental" Christians are toward the "fallen women" in our midst. I think there is a federal law requiring these numbers!

Would to God in Heaven that we -- the church and society as a whole -- were "judgmental" about this! The reason that so many of today's young (so-called) women, a majority of them in fact, are, to put not too fine a point on it, skanks is precisely because no one is willing to be "judgmental" about what used to be called "easy virtue;" no one is willing to state the blunt truth of the matter.

Feminists -- that is, the "liberal" identity-group grievance-mongers who target (initially) the female sex for subversion -- like to assert that in the bad old days before “liberalism” gave us all the freedom to do whatever we wish without consequence, it was the men who ostracized and shunned the "fallen women" in the community. In fact, it was not the men, but the women who dealt harshly with such a woman; rather, the men dealt with the boy or man who was the cause of her "fallen" state, and gave him to understand that he could either take up his responsibility to the bastard-child he'd caused or he could find himself another place in which to live. But, for about the past three generations, women in general have declined to negatively sanction the women and girls who opt for "easy virtue" -- for, women, in general, have fallen in a big way for "liberalism" and its grievance-mongering of totally invented grievances, and men, in general, have declined to insist that women return to the sanity of the real world. [In fact, rather than insist upon sanity, most men in America have followed the women into that insanity and have in the process feminized themselves -- most men these days aren't men: not only do they not understand the masculine virtues, but they fear and loathe such virtues.]

The "liberals" managed this moral subversion of most of the women in the nation by appealing initially to their vanity: "Oooo! You're so nurturing and compassionate (for, you are a woman! so much better than men), and wouldn't it be such an even more nurturing and compassionate thing (and so, an even more greater demonstration of your moral superiority!) to make those mean, old, nasty, judgmental men stop picking on these poor, poor, little angels who "turn up" pregnant. My God! It's bad enough that they use these poor dears to satisfy their beastly urges, but they to paint them as tramps, too! It's unspeakable!"

But, of course, it wasn't the men, but rather the women, who made the "poor dears" social outcasts and gossiped unmercifully about them. And, harsh as it was, it served a socially necessary purpose: it kept bastardy numbers low. For, very few women have the personal courage to act in ways they know will make them unwelcome in the society of other women.


In my initial comment in that thread, I'd indicated that I'd stopped listening to the song at the 24 second mark -- I've heard that song a hundred times, since everyone and her sister has a variation on the same theme. As soon as I heard "Poor little girl, scared half to death" I knew where that song was going. And it does.

Does Gentle Reader *really* not understand that when the typical self-centered dip-shit drama-queen with her mind permanently stuck on the "Junior High" setting ingests songs like this, which glamorize what we now call "teen pregnancy," she's going to think to herself, "Ooo! I can do that!"

===
And, because no post of this sort could possibly be complete without some well-deserved mockery of the willful refusal to reason, I'll now analyze, with a view toward placing them in the context of our disintegrating culture, some of the more amusing of the vituperation directed my way in that thread.

Do keep in mind, Gentle Reader, that in my comments above (which I hope they were both scathing and informative) and those which shall follow, the scorn I express is not directed at real women, not at intellectually and emotionally and spiritually mature women, but rather at girls-in-old-bodies whatever their precise calendar-ages: at the sort of flakey, selfish, self-centered, princess-complexed, "snowflake" drama-queens with their minds permanently stuck on the "Junior High" setting, and who just happen to comprise a majority of the female sex presently dwelling in the US of A.

First, of course, it wouldn't be fair to not quote what I'd written that became the excuse to demonstrate their Grrrl-Powrr:

Ilíon: Maybe it is a beautiful song [as the commenter previous had said], after all, but at the :24 mark I decided it’s not worth my time.

“Poor little girl scared half to death” - bullshit! more like “scheming little vamp who deliberately got herself knocked-up and now - after the deed is done - is finally thinking about the repercussions.”

Now, admittedly, this comment is blunt and is not at all "nice," in that pseudo-non-judgmental manner in which the "liberals" have trained most American women to think.

But then, I'm not at all "nice." I don't intend to be.

Tammy Cracker: Like I said, you’re a creep.
Anyone who says things like, “bullshit! more like “scheming little vamp who deliberately got herself knocked up” is a creep.

Your level of hatred for women is palpable.
I’m guessing you bully your wife or girlfriend the same way.
Creep.

Tammy (I'm not sure whether this is the same Tammy): Never mind.
I can spot a bitter divorcee a mile away.
I’m sure your ex’s parting words were, “Good riddance to bad rubbish, you creep!”.

Tammy Cracker: I bet his ex got the house and the kids too.
And he has to pay child support. LOL!
I can smell a bitter creep a mile away.

jclady: I would like to know why you have such a low opinion of women. Why do strong women pose a threat to you?

I quoted these (which aren't that amusing, I admit) for two main reasons:
1) they lead into some of the following sets, which are very amusing;
2) they demonstrate a stereotypically feminine vice with respect to reasoning; specifically, the *refusal* to reason, but rather to emote. And, also, "projection;" in this case, projecting their own freely-chosen irrationality onto me -- it *can't* be that I have reasons for what I said, it can only be that I speak out of anger or rage or fear (and from especially fear of "strong, independent women").
3) they evince the standard feminist hatred of men and utter disregard for the welfare of children -- gather in what these shrews are crowing about! It doesn't matter that they only imagine my "ex got the house and the kids too. And [that I have] to pay child support." What matters is the unadulterated bile -- these women despise men.

Tammy Cracker: HA! I knew it. Mr. creep got burned.
But of course, it’s ALL HER FAULT.

His wife(property) wouldn’t put up with his hate-filled bullshit, so she left. Probably for the safety of the kids too. ...

Let's see: this foolish shew "knows" that I've been romantically burned because ... well, because she and her sister shews have agreed to agree that I've been burned. I mean, really! Read the thread for yourself -- there is nothing there (or anywhere, for that matter) to rationally support the proposition that I have been romantically burned.

Shoot! Even the woman who *didn't* marry me didn't burn me. We were still pretty good friends in almost daily contact until she started getting serious about some other guy, and then again after one or the other "burned" the other until she started getting serious with yet another guy. Whom she married, and who (according to what she later told me, and I have no reason to doubt it) "burned" her. Now, if she had asked my opinion *before* she got involved with the second one, I'd have advised against, since while I didn't actually know the guy, I knew of him. But, sadly, women generally don't care about the opinions of men, and particularly about the opinions of the men who care most for their well-being, until it doesn't matter.

Snowball the Sourpuss: Maybe he moonlights as a pimp?

Tammy Cracker: Moonlights? That’s his full time job. heh heh.
He couldn’t get a woman unless he paid for her.

HCWAG: It’s interesting to me when I run into a guy who still believes in chattel. I makes you wonder all kinds of things. Mostly it makes you wonder what kind of woman it takes to burn a man this badly. ... You are probably the insecure lowly type of guy who has to console yourself by repeating “I’m a real man” to yourself at night. ...

Snowball the Sourpuss: Okay. Listen, dude, have a wonderfully cream filled life of donuts and porn. I’m outta here too.

BigFurHat (whom I presume to be biologically male): ... It’s almost as if you never got laid….. hehe

Tammy Cracker: Mr. Creep is a loser. And I’m guessing on his third or fourth wife, some burka-wearing type who bows to his glorious nothingness.
Either that, or he ordered a Russian bride. Pimps like to control their bitches.
Loser. Not a conservative.
Loser who has mommy issues.

Tammy Cracker: ... What do you get, like five or six hits a year from the former prostitutes that you hired? ...

This group of remarks is the most amusing ... I really could (and perhaps ought) write a whole post devoted to the attitude on display here.

The first, and most important, thing to notice is that while these people imagine that they're insulting me as being somehow worthless because they imagine I "can't get any," what they're really doing is showing that they think of themselves and/or one another as sluts. That's a pretty extreme claim, but bear with me.

Consider, first, what they imagine about me -- that I "can't get any," unless I pay for it. Therefore, they imagine, I have no worth. I, being male, can attain human worth only via the power of The Magical Pussy (I *told* you I need to use crude language) ... which *they* possess and withhold at will from me, even if only in their imaginations, because I'm so worthless anyway.

Now, consider this from the other direction -- they, being female, and in possession of The Magical Pussy, which alone bestows worth upon male persons, have great worth and power (this echoes another common theme of feminism) *precisely* because they possess The Magical Pussy. That is, they have willfully fallen for the feminist lie that the power -- and worth -- of womankind lies in, and only in, sexual activity and orgasm. They have willfully fallen for the feminist lie that women can, and naturally do, dominate and control men via sex (it's also true that a lot of men choose to fall for that lie).

They have denominated their worth in terms of "putting out" and in their (imagined) ability to control men either by actually "putting out" or by implying that they will "put out" if a man jumps through the right hoops. What I'm getting at is that even if such women are physically virgins, in their minds/spirits they are sluts, for they reject and devalue chastity. And love. For, how can a man love a woman whom he knows views "making love" as simply an efficient tool for ruling over him?

When the first Superman movie was in the theaters, we went to see it. Sitting behind us were three youngish black women (who were loud and obnoxious as black-women-in-groups in public frequently are). At the scene where Superman surrendered his superpowers so that he could "make love" with Lois Lane, one of these women said, "Imagine giving up all that for a piece of tail!" Now, it's sad that this woman apparently saw herself as only "a piece of tail," and yet, was not her attitude more healthy -- that is, less self-delusional -- than the attitudes of junior-high-girls-in-old-bodies who imagine that they possess The Magical Pussy? Think of how much good would be done in America were Oprah to announce that there is no such thing!

And, of course, even aside from the issue of chastity and love, one of the big problems with denominating one's worth in terms of "putting out" is that nookie is just nookie. Think of the problem as systematic inflation due to a continuous influx of new "money."


Another amusing thing about this is that sluts really have no business looking down their noses at whores. The individuals in both groups have set their own worth in terms of "putting out" ... but the sluts are too stupid to get paid for it.

jclady: ... And to take things a step deeper, your screen name of “ilion” screams to me I LION. Self-esteem issues?

Two things:
1) What an ignorant, as in dunceville uneducated, personage. I wonder, would it make her head explode to mention Homer?
2) That worship of "self-esteem." Women (not *real* women, of course, but this sort of willfully immature girl-in-an-old-body) are all about "self-esteem." But self-respect? If they've even heard of that, the most positive response you'll get is a "Whateeveerr!"

Rightwingfeather (sex unknown to me): I have been following this thread and I am not sure I understand where you, ilion get off on calling the women on this site, “weak, immature, or bitter.”

Your comments show a lack of respect for women in general, but I think that they are more revealing of your psychological makeup than any conservative ideals you seem to think you embrace.

Look beyond your reflection in the mirror, you may be surprised at how others see you. You have been had by a woman and now you are an angry bitter soul. It is not becoming of you, you opinions, or your “blog.”

This one is amusing because:
1) I'm quite sure I have at no point expressed an opinion on whether those harridans and shrews are "bitter." And the "weak, immature" statement has a context, specifically to assert that they are the exact opposite of what they've asserted of themselves; to wit: "you can call yourselves “strong conservative women” all you want, but you’re weak, immature, “liberal” girls";
1a) I made reference to their willful irrationality, which is actually far worse than being "weak, immature, or bitter";
2) Once again, because I am a American man who *dares* to say something that a group of American women don't want to hear, I *obviously* "show a lack of respect for women in general" and have other psychological problems;
3) And, again, I "have been had by a woman and now [I am] an angry bitter soul" ... because, well, because the girls have decided that that is so.

Tammy (apparently not Tammy Cracker): Oh, and Mark Spitz is gay.
That should send Mr. Creep into convulsions.
They are identical twins.
In fact, maybe Mr. Creep IS Mark Spitz!!!!

The only shocker here is that it took them so long to get around to this irrational accusation. This is generally the first thing out of the mouths of such junior-high-girls (whether in young or old bodies) when a mere man dares to express opinions of which he has not been given express permission to hold, much less voice.

Tammy Cracker: OMG. I went to the link of LOSER CENTRAL.
No comments. ...

Snowball the Sourpuss: What do you want to bet scored more hits on his counter today then he has in that last 2 years.

Combined.

Rightwingfeather: @Snowball
I was thinkin the same thing.
Now he is off patting himself on the back (or something).

Tammy (apparently not Tammy Cracker): Don’t comment on his site.
You’ll be harrassed by him. I know.
Jim(you know who)went immediately to my email when I posted on his site.

DON”T POST THERE. He’s obviously a loser who wants attention.

Apparently, it takes too much effort to notice that there is no hit-counter on my blog.

Also, I ask you, Gentle Reader (you've been reading and commenting on my blog for some time), do you have even the faintest idea what this 'Tammy' character is talking about? I don't mean the risible assertion about getting harrassed by me if one posts on my blog, I mean the claim to have posted on my blog. Do you think 'Tammy' is that troll (who uses various male names) who periodically tries to insult me or my guests?

Highest Praise

The highest praise and compliment I can imagine one might pay a "liberal" is to say, "He has such a compassionate heart for the welfare of others that he'd give you the shirt off my back!"

Snakes on a Mathematical Plane

Snakes on a Mathematical Plane

It's a conundrum

The recent news of the (Palin-hating) Columbia professor recently arrested for an incestuous sexual relationship with "a young relative" above the age of 18 -- which is to say, his daughter, whom he apparently began to schtup after her 18th birthday -- (discussed here, among other places) is surely a vexing conundrum for the "liberal" "mind" (as well as for consistent libertarians, though not for exactly the dilemma examined here).

On the one hand, "What's wrong with you bible-thumpers that you can't stand to see others (who are your moral and intellectual betters, in any event) express their 'love' as they see fit?" -- This horn of the dilemma applies to consistent libertarians, as well as to "liberals," for both groups operate with essentially the same intentionally-busted moral compass. The point here being that neither group can stand on any moral ground more firm than "Eeeew!" by which to condemn the incestuous relationship.

On the other hand, on the "liberal" view of reality, there is a very dangerous "slippery slope" involved here – that is, while it is surely as "unjust" to refuse to redefine marriage so as to include incestuous relationships as it is to refuse to redefine marriage so as to include “same-sex couples” or multiples (for, since when is “love” limited to two?), nevertheless it must be admitted that redefining marriage so as to include incestuous relationships would eviscerate the entire estate tax (death tax) regime. I mean, OMG! what if rich white conservative old people married one or more of their children just before they died?

Who (in his right mind) wants to live to be 150?

In response to Jordan's post about a recent 'Science!' item, I said:

I *refuse* to live to be 150 unless I can also have a younger, or at minimum, a healthy, body.

I'm now 53; still in fairly good shape, yet in bad enough shape that I'd not care to spend the next 100 years declining from this "high" point.

In my view, one of the consolations of age (I mean, aside from the fact that I'm wiser and more knowledgable than when I was younger) is the sure knowledge that it will be over soon enough.

When I was a little kid and heard the adults say things like that, I simply could not begin to understand their point of view. Now I do.

You're supposed to pray for an asteroid

"... when the Communists show up to protest the Nazis, you're supposed to pray for an asteroid, not pick a favourite." -- on 'Small Dead Animals'

(h/t Kathy Shaidle )

A potpourri of Obamanation

A potpourri of Obamanation: Is Obama the Messiah?

(h/t: Matteo)

What is a lie?

This post is yet another installment in the series (who knew?) exploring honesty (and dishonesty) and the morality of lying. Previous posts are:
Truth and Honesty ... and Otherwise
Lying is not intrinsically immoral
Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II

For this post, we take as our text this recent post by Edward Feser: What counts as a lie?

... As typically defined by natural law theorists, a lie is willful speech or other communicative behavior contrary to one’s mind. That is to say, one lies when one wills to communicate the message that P when what one really thinks is not-P. But there are two crucial things to note about this definition. First, what counts as “communicating the message that P” depends in part on convention and circumstance, because the significance of words and communicative gestures is determined by convention and can vary with circumstances. Second, lying is not the same thing as deception. One can lie without deceiving someone, and one can deceive someone without lying. ...

Don't that just beat all?

Here, Mr Feser offers as definition of (the noun) 'lie' this description: "a lie is willful speech or other communicative behavior contrary to one’s mind." -- I mean, look at that: "... communicative behavior ..." I mean, of course I know that it has to be pure coincidence that "communicative behavior" is so similar to "communicative act," but still!

By the way, in lieu of the subject matter, "act" is much the better word to use than "behavior."

Now, this definition is still not very good, for it doesn't account for enough of the commonly-understood facts about lies [as see the Facts of which a definition of 'lying' must account section]. He seems, at least at first, to be no longer trying to restrict acts of lying to "speech and related behavior" [as see the section Feser's definition of 'lying'? section, where I had teased out his definition of 'lying' as: "deliberately doing the opposite of communicating (via speech and related behavior) what is on one's mind"]. I say "at first" because, continuing to read, it seems that Feser's understanding of the nature of lies continues mostly to restrict them to being instances of "speech and related behavior." That is, there is a great difference between acknowledging the fact that most, but not all, lies are communicated via verbal acts, and understanding the fact that lies are a particular class of communicative acts, rather than being a class of verbal acts.

The relationships between "communicative acts" and speech and lies are represented by this image -- All lies, but their natures, are "communicative acts," but not all acts of speech (or "verbal acts") are "communicative acts;" AND, not all lies are acts of speech.

[there is no telling when I will finish this post, as I am still working on the "Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II" post]

Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II

I've previously taken a stab at explaining the rationale which justifies the assertion that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." This post is the second part of a further explication of this reasoning (Part I is here), and especially in reference to Edward Feser's multiply-incoherent argument to the contrary.

Already, in Part I, I have successfully made the case that:
1) Mr Feser's argument to support the assertion that "lying is intrinsically immoral" falls apart in incoherence, for it contains (and relies upon) a self-contradiction;
2) The assertion that "lying is *not* intrinsically immoral" is rationally and logically supported by an examination/comprehension of the meaning of the English verb 'to lie'.

Therefore, I have already made a complete case justifying the belief in the truth of the assertion that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." Anything more is frosting, really.


You can't see what you won't look at

In the main thread, Mr Feser asserts in conclusion:

Finally, anyone who claims that it would not be even mildly immoral to lie to the murderer needs to provide some alternative account which both explains why lying is wrong in other cases but does not forbid it in the case at hand. And there are serious problems with such accounts. ...

In short, I would say that the natural law position that lying is intrinsically wrong has powerful arguments in its favor, and when rightly understood is not as counterintuitive as it might seem. ... Meanwhile, the alternative view has no good arguments in its favor, and is at best supported by culturally contingent and fallible intuitions. Thus, it poses no serious challenge to the natural law position. If there is a conflict between that position and our intuitions, it is the intuitions that have to go.

Well, Hell's Bells! After all, it's not as though Herr Doktor Professor is even willing to attend to such arguments, if they are made; or, when it gets down to it, even to allow them to be made in the first place.


Dude! That's the very thing at question

In the main thread, Mr Feser asserts:

Finally, anyone who claims that it would not be even mildly immoral to lie to the murderer needs to provide some alternative account which both explains why lying is wrong in other cases but does not forbid it in the case at hand. And there are serious problems with such accounts. For example, it is sometimes suggested that it is wrong to lie only when the person lied to has a right to know the truth, which the murderer at the door does not. One problem with this suggestion is that it fails to capture what is wrong with lying per se. For we can fail to respect someone’s right to know the truth even when we don’t lie - for example, when we simply keep silent when someone who has a right to certain information from us asks for it. The view would also have the absurd implication that we can freely tell falsehoods not only to murderers, but also to innocent people who happen not to have a right to know certain truths. For example, it would entail that when there are certain secrets that a government has a right to keep from its citizens (about sensitive military operations, say), the government may not only refrain from revealing them to the citizens, but even tell outright falsehoods instead. It would entail that parents could tell falsehoods to their children, rather than merely keeping silent, about matters they are too young to understand. It would entail that rather than merely keeping silent, we can tell falsehoods to other adults about private matters we have no obligation to inform them about. It would entail that God might tell us nothing but falsehoods, since we have no rights against Him - contrary to the Thomistic view (defended in the post just linked to) that God can only ever will what is good for us, despite His not being obligated to us in any way. (Which brings to mind a further consideration: If even God cannot lie - as St. Paul famously affirms in Titus 1:2 - then where do we get off thinking that we may sometimes do so? Job 13:7 indicates that it would be wrong to lie even for the purpose of defending God’s honor.)

Let's consider some of the logical fallacies (primarily question-begging) in just this short quotation --

"Finally, anyone who claims that it would not be even mildly immoral to lie to the murderer needs to provide some alternative account which both explains why lying is wrong in other cases but does not forbid it in the case at hand."

This is a non sequitur (probably related to the fact that he's extensively question-begging throughout the article), and it contains a subtle question-begging itself -- for, as a logical issue, it might be the case that no instance of lying is ever morally prohibited.

That lying is or is not intrinsically immoral is a wholly separate issue from distinguishing whether (and why) any specific instance of lying may be morally prohibited, or may be morally permissible ... or even may be morally requisite. -- There is, in this last statement, an oblique reference to a *major* incoherence in Feser's argument. I'll explain that in its own section.

"For example, it is sometimes suggested that it is wrong to lie only when the person lied to has a right to know the truth, which the murderer at the door does not."

Isn't it amazing, the reach of such a small word as 'only'?

Consider:

Matteo said:
I've never understood the problem here. Lying is withholding the truth from those who have a right to it. Murderers at the door and the Gestapo have no right to it, so no lying is involved.

Edward Feser said: Ilion, I know you can't read, as is evident from your remarks. But I thought Matteo could. I address that very dodge in the second to last paragraph of the post, Matteo, as you'll see if you go back and read it.

Now, in no wise has Matteo "suggested that it is wrong to lie *only* when the person lied to has a right to know the truth." Matteo's statement reflects the common misunderstanding that lying is inherently immoral (which view Feser is pushing), but he also understands that lying to the murderer at the door is not immoral (and may even be morally requisite) -- the problem starts, of course, with the fact that we use the single word, 'lie,' to denote all intentional miscommunication, coupled with the misunderstanding that a lie is always immoral.

So, to resolve that seeming discrepancy, Matteo "suggested that [an act of intentional miscommunication is a] lie only when the person [to whom the miscommunication is directed] has a right to know the truth." In effect, Matteo is "suggesting" that there must be some word other than 'lie' that properly denotes an act of intentional mis-communication when the person to whom it is directed *ought* intentionally to be deceived.

Now, Matteo's definition of 'lie' (as given in the above quote) is not false; it's just incomplete; and he is misunderstanding lies to be always immoral. BUT, he is saying something very different from the strawman Feser "suggests" is the position logically opposite his own.

Matteo's attempted solution to the seeming conundrum was not a "dodge" ... and Herr Doktor Professor did not address it.

"One problem with this suggestion is that it fails to capture what is wrong with lying per se. For we can fail to respect someone’s right to know the truth even when we don’t lie - for example, when we simply keep silent when someone who has a right to certain information from us asks for it."

This set of statements includes question-begging -- for, whether "lying per se" is wrong just happens to be the point at issue.



" Mmm"

Seriously, Dude: how big is your barn (just how much straw do you have)?



" Mmm"


Just wait until 'Dick To The Dawk' learns of this surprising development!

[more to come; this will be a long post, and may take a couple of days to complete]

Lying is not intrinsically immoral

I've previously taken a stab at explaining the rationale which justifies the assertion that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." This post will be a further explication, and especially in reference to Edward Feser's multiply-incoherent argument to the contrary.

(As a note of explanation --

I have used the "modernism and post-modernism" tag because Feser is essentially saying that anyone who disagrees with his argument is a post-modernist. Yes, he doesn't explicitly say that, but that is the meaning of denigrating opposing views as merely expressions of "consequentialism."

And I've used the "nihilism" tag because the practical result of Feser's argument, when its logical implications are drawn out and understood, is to assert that morality is self-contradictory -- which is to deny that morality is *real* This would also merit the "modernism and post-modernism" tag.)


A difficulty with the word 'lie'

In my previous post on this general topic, my starting point was the observation that we don't have a word in English meaning something like "to intentionally deceive another in accord with the dictates of morality." And that, that being the case, we have a very hard thinking cogently about the fact (or claim, if one prefers that word at this point) that not all lying, without possible exception, is immoral.

But, we don't have such a word; we have only the single word 'lie,' which is commonly (though incorrectly) understood to mean something like "to intentionally deceive another contrary the dictates of morality."

Now, lying is generally immoral, but, as I mean to show, it is not always immoral.

One problem here -- the reason most people automatically or uncritically assent to the proposition that a lie is inherently immoral -- is that most people are still explicitly thinking about the word 'lie' with an understanding that was appropriate when they were two or four years old. At the same time, in practice, most people live their daily lives using a more nuanced understanding of 'lie' (and 'deception'); it's just that they haven't yet articulated, or seen articulated, the nuances. And that's a major reason Mr Feser's incoherent argument seems so convincing if one doesn't make the effort to dig into it.

As a side note: in contrast to the concepts properly linked to the words 'lie' and 'lying,' the concepts linked to the words 'honesty' and 'dishonesty' always imply a moral judgment.


Definition of 'lie'?

This is how my 1965 edition of 'Webster's New World Dictionary of the American Language' defines the word 'lie': "v.i. 1. to make a statement or statements that one knows to be false, especially with intent to deceive. 2. to give a false impression. v.t. to bring, put, accomplish, etc. by lying: as, he lied himself into office. n. 1. a thing said or done in lying; falsehood. 2. anything that gives or is meant to give a false impression."

This is how my 1972 edition of '[the Merriam-Webster] Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary' defines the verb 'to lie': "v.i. 1. to make an untrue statement with intent to deceive. 2. to create a false or misleading impression ~ v.t. to affect by telling lies" and the noun 'lie': "n. 1a. an assertion of something known or believed by the speaker to be untrue with intent to deceive 1b. an untrue or inaccurate statement that may or may not be believed true by the speaker 2. something that misleads or deceives 3. a charge of lying"

This second definition lists the following verbs as synonyms, and differentiates them thusly: "Lie, Prevaricate, Equivocate, Palter, Fib mean to tell an untruth. 'Lie' is the direct term, imputing dishonesty; 'Prevaricate 'softens the bluntness of 'lie' by implying quibbling or confusing the issue; 'Equivocate' implies using words having more than one sense so as to seem to say one thing but intend another; 'Palter 'implies making unreliable statements of fact or intention or insincere promises; 'Fib' applies to a telling of an untruth that is trivial in substance or significance." And, of course, there are other synonyms, or related words, having to do with hiding truth or fostering false impressions; off the top of my head: dissemble, obfuscate.

Now, I'm certainly not going to claim that these are the final word on definitions -- for instance, the first definition doesn't account for the fact that if one makes a statement which one merely *believes* to be false, even if the statement is actually true, then one has lied -- but, these definitions mostly cover a proper usage of the word. Also, the second definition is better than the first.

Lying isn't about the state of one's knowledge, but rather concerns the state of one's belief and intention in performing a communicative act.

Notice: the above definitions (which I admit, or claim if one prefers that word, aren't complete) make no reference to whether the act of lying is immoral (the synonym list says that "Lie is the direct term, imputing dishonesty;" but 'impute' is not quite the same as 'imply'), but rather merely link lying to an intention to deceive or mislead. Notice, also, that these definitions do not limit either verb or noun to verbal acts, but rather include anything which is meant to give a false impression; that is, to deceive or mislead. [I'm making this point because Feser tries to draw a moral distinction between verbally made explicit deceptions (to which he wants to limit the applicability of the word 'lie' ... hmmm; even that's exactly the case, as he denies an intrinsic relationship between 'lie' and 'deceive'), and non-verbal or verbally made implicit deceptions.]

Does the word 'secretary' imply anything about the sex of secretaries? No, of course it doesn't. Yet, since most secretaries *are* women, one tends to think of secretaries as "she." In similar wise, most acts of deception *are* immoral, and so everyone tends to associate the word 'lie' with an immoral act. But, that particular association really doesn't hold.


Notice, too: I have actually already, in examining the "official" meaning or definition of the verb 'to lie' and noun 'lie,' made a full case that "lying is not intrinsically immoral." For, the verb merely denotes communicative acts intended to conceal some truth or other; for, it does not actually carry a moral judgment: it is descriptive, rather than prescriptive.


A better definition of 'lie'

Allow me to offer a better definition of 'lie/lying' than the above Webster's definitions -- The act of 'lying' is the deliberate making of claims/assertions that one believes to be false, especially when made with intent to deceive; OR any action performed with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

This (proposed) definition does not in any way contradict the above Webster's definitions. Rather, the Webster's definitions are incomplete, and this definition is more complete. Whether it is fully complete (it isn't) is a different question; what matters for this discussion is that it will help us to think more clearly about lying and deception.

Facts of which a definition of 'lying' must account
Now, we all know that lying has some sort of relationship to deception (Feser denies this, as I'll get into later). We know that one may lie to oneself, and one may lie to another; and one may lie even when one fails to deceive anyone. And, we know that one may lie by making a statement which one merely *believes* to be false, regardless of the objective truth of the statement. AND, we know (or, we ought to know) that one may make a statement, every word of which is literally true, and yet be "lying through one's teeth" -- this particular practice, by the way, is why Clinton was previously thought to be such a good (i.e. effective) liar. FURTHER, we *ought* to understand that an act of lying is not limited to the words we say, even if that is the most direct and most common means of lying.

Now, the above points are facts about what a lie is or what the act of lying is. Any proposed definition of the words ought to include or account for at least these points and certainly may not exclude any of them.

When we understand 'lying' as I have defined it here, we see my definition does cover all the above points and excludes none of them. Thus, though it is not a complete definition, it is a good one.

In understanding this definition, we see that we have a concise (and cogent) explanation for how it is that one may lie to oneself, just as one may lie to another; and that one may lie even when one fails utterly to deceive; and how it is that one may lie by making a statement which one merely *believes* to be false, even if the statement is objectively true. And, grasping this definition, we understand *why and how* it is that one may make a statement, every word of which is literally true, and yet lie; and we understand *why and how* it is that one may lie entirely non-verbally. Further, this definition also catches George Costanza's attempted dodge: "it's not a lie if you believe it."

Incompleteness of the above definition?
Consider:

Matteo said:
I've never understood the problem here. Lying is withholding the truth from those who have a right to it. Murderers at the door and the Gestapo have no right to it, so no lying is involved.

[The response to which, by the way, was not at all edifying.]

Now, Matteo's proffered definition of lying may be incomplete (it is), and it may reflect a misunderstanding (it does), but it is not wholly false; and it's a sight better than Feser's definition.

AND, isn't it obvious that in general withholding truth that one knows and which one has a duty to impart is lying? And, in case it's not obvious, at the bottom of this post I supplied both a real-life and a fictional illustration of the point.

As I've said, the definition of 'lying' I've offered above is good, or good enough for this discussion, but it's not complete. While my definition doesn't explicitly include a provision concerning the deliberate withholding of truth or information one has a duty to communicate, when one considers the definition carefully, one sees that that understanding is implicit in the definition; and so I am satisfied with it.


Feser's definition of 'lying'?

This is a bit tricky, because Mr Feser doesn't explicitly spell out his definition of 'lying' (or, if he has, it's in a comment in any of three or four threads, and I've missed it).

So, I'll try to piece together, as best I can, Feser's definition of 'lying' --

In the main thread: Of course, many find it counterintuitive to hold that there would be even a slight moral failing in telling such a lie. But the classical natural law theorist has given a reason for thinking there is. As Aquinas says, the basic trouble with lying is that it is a kind of perversity. It takes what has as its inherent, natural end the communication of what is really in one’s mind -- speech and related behavior -- and deliberately turns it to the opposite of that end.

This comment: If I answer the murderer by saying e.g. "I would be risking my own life by hiding a wanted man!" I have not spoken contrary to what is in my mind, which is what would be intrinsically immoral. It is true that he might be -- hopefully will be -- led to go away, but I did not lie to him, because I did not say something that is contrary to what I really think, which is what "lying" means (certainly it is what NL theorists mean by it). And one sign that I haven't lied is that the murderer could intelligbly say "Yeah, but you still haven't answered my question," which he could not intelligibly say if I had lied by saying "I have no idea where he is."

This comment: Natural law theorists typically distinguish lying and deception, because either can occur without the other. I can lie and know that you will not be deceived, and (as the example given earlier shows) I can deceive without lying. And it is only lying -- deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind -- that is claimed to be intrinsically wrong, while deception is wrong only depending on circumstances. That is why broad mental reservation, evasion, etc. can be OK in some circumstances, while lying never is.

This comment: The key difference is that lying involves acting directly and positively contrary to the natural end of one of our faculties, while deception does not. It's like the difference between contraception on the one hand and refraining from sex except during non-fertile periods on the other ...

According to Feser, 'lying' is deliberately doing the opposite of communicating (via speech and related behavior) what is on one's mind; it is "say[ing] something that is contrary to what [one] really think[s];" it is "deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind." Which is to say, 'lying' is an act of "deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind, or what one really thinks]," right?

Or, to put it another way, an act of lying, says Feser, is not an intent to deceive, but rather is solely an intent to communicate via speech (or "related behavior") that which one believes or knows to be false.

Now, wouldn't one reasonably consider an act of deception to be an act of deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind or what one really thinks]? Wouldn't one reasonably consider an act of evasion to be an act of deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind]? Wouldn't one reasonably consider an act of withholding information (whether or not one has a duty to reveal it) to be an act of deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind]? And so on?

If one has read and understood the entire essay in which Feser presents his argument, should not one see right here, in considering his "definition" of 'lying,' that his argument falls apart in incoherency? For, his primary claim is that all acts of lying are inherently immoral; and his secondary claim is that one rightfully may, in some circumstances, avoid the (always immoral) act of lying by engaging in deception, misdirection, evasion, equivocation, "broad mental reservation," distraction, remaining silent, and so on.

BUT, do not most of these proffered solutions to the dilemma actually fall within his definition of 'lying'? That is, is he not effectively saying that one may morally avoid lying (which is always immoral) by lying?

He'd accuse me of misrepresenting his position. But, I have not. He'd accuse me (and he has already) of engaging in question-begging ... when, in fact, his essay is full of question-begging and other logical fallacies. Seriously, one could fill pages exploring/pointing-out just the fallacies in that essay.


Suppose a mother asks her four children, "Who broke the lamp?" And, suppose one of them did it, and that all four know who did it. And, suppose that all four shrug their shoulders.

Have the children lied to their mother, have they attempted to deceive her? Of course they have! Yet, they haven't said a word.


Distinction between 'lying' and 'deceiving'?

At the time I noticed that Mr Feser had decided to make further dialog impossible (for, one cannot argue/discuss with an intellectually dishonest man), I had been composing a post, which has bearing upon what a lie is or is not, in response to something 'David' had written:

David said:
Kjetil Kringlebotten: I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ [...] Ilíon fails to make the crucial distinction between ‘lying’ and ‘deceit.’

Actually, Ilíon already explicitly made the parallel between killing/murder and moral-deceit/immoral-deceit. But he also made the (highly defensible) claim that both kinds of deceit are properly termed "lying" (when done intentionally, of course). The catch is that killing does not become murder by killing in a certain way; any particular action which kills someone could be at one time moral and the same action could be at another time murder - that is, the physical activity itself is not what determines the morality of the killing. However, this is the claim in the case of lying. It doesn't matter whom you deceive or why, only whether you use your tongue to do it. If you speak the lie, it's wrong. If you indicate the lie by signalling or arranging some objects, etc., then the same deception of the same person in the same situation is fine.

[and my un-posted response would have been]

Kjetil Kringlebotten: "I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ [...] Ilíon fails to make the crucial distinction between ‘lying’ and ‘deceit.’"

David: "Actually, Ilíon already explicitly made the parallel between killing/murder and moral-deceit/immoral-deceit. But he also made the (highly defensible) claim that both kinds of deceit are properly termed "lying" (when done intentionally, of course)."

Thank you for pointing that out. I had also linked to an essay on my little corner of the internet in which I seek to explore this distinction -- the essay itself is only a few weeks old, but I have been thinking about the issue for a very long time.

David: "The catch is that killing does not become murder by killing in a certain way; any particular action which kills someone could be at one time moral and the same action could be at another time murder - that is, the physical activity itself is not what determines the morality of the killing. However, this is the claim in the case of lying."

Great minds, and all that! I was going to make a very similar point -- killing another is not self-defense if accomplished by means of a knife but murder if accomplished by means of a gun and negligent homicide if accomplished by a shove off a cliff. Rather, it is the intent that distinguishes murder (unjustifiable homicide) from justifiable homicide.

Kjetil Kringlebotten: "I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ Killing is not always wrong, for example in self defense. Murder is always wrong. Same with deceit and lying. It's not always wrong to deceit someone (being silent, not telling everything, using sarcams, etc.), while it is wrong to lie."

David: "... that is, the physical activity itself is not what determines the morality of the killing. However, this is the claim in the case of lying. It doesn't matter whom you deceive or why, only whether you use your tongue to do it. If you speak the lie, it's wrong. If you indicate the lie by signalling or arranging some objects, etc., then the same deception of the same person in the same situation is fine."

[David is here addressing not just what Kjetil Kringlebotten has said, but also what Edward Feser has said.]

Yeppers.

It's a totally unsatisfactory position: most irrational. Further, the position treats (and depends upon treating) words as though they have inherent meaning; but they do not: all words, in all languages, are inherently and utterly meaningless. Words are symbols, which by convention stand for or represent something else, nothing more. [This is a whole other topic ... one which few people seem willing to grasp.]

The lie is not in the words one utters, but in the intent to deceive; the lie is not in the success of the deception, but wholly in the intent to deceive. Lying is, in fact, utterly independent of language and of words (whether spoken or written).

A 'deception' is the object or point of a lie, which is to bring about the inculcation in some mind (generally someone else's mind) of a belief that one believes, or has reason to believe, to be at variance with reality.

===
Amusing fallout
HERE is some amusing fallout of the distinction Mr Feser, et al., are seeking to draw between 'deception' and 'lying.'

Let's consider first how Mr Kringlebotten has expressed the distinction: "I would say that ‘lying’ is to ‘deceit’ what ‘murder’ is to ‘killing.’ Killing is not always wrong, for example in self defense. Murder is always wrong. Same with deceit and lying. It's not always wrong to deceit someone (being silent, not telling everything, using sarcams, etc.), while it is wrong to lie,"

SO: if lying is a subset of deception; that is, if lying is deception-which-is-immoral (*), whereas 'deception' covers more ground than 'lying,' then here is an amusing thing -- if one "lies" to another, yet fails the deceive him, then one hasn't lied at all! For, if 'lying' is a subset of 'deception,' then that which-fails-to-be-a-deception simply cannot be a lie.

My God! Everything since Eden has been one huge error (a "tragedy of errors"), and a rank injustice -- for, Adam's attempt to lie to God deceived no one, least of all God, and so it was no lie at all.

(*) however that is determined.


On the other hand, the distinction Mr Feser seeks to draw is more tricky, for his distinction denies any intrinsic relationship or connection between 'lying' and 'deception.'

here:
Natural law theorists typically distinguish lying and deception, because either can occur without the other. I can lie and know that you will not be deceived, and (as the example given earlier shows) I can deceive without lying. And it is only lying -- deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind -- that is claimed to be intrinsically wrong, while deception is wrong only depending on circumstances. That is why broad mental reservation, evasion, etc. can be OK in some circumstances, while lying never is.
--
here:
The key difference is that lying involves acting directly and positively contrary to the natural end of one of our faculties, while deception does not. It's like the difference between contraception on the one hand and refraining from sex except during non-fertile periods on the other ...

According to Mr Feser, the "key difference is that lying involves acting directly and positively contrary to the natural end of one of our faculties, while deception does not." Or, more simply, lying is "deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind." [One may notice that this distinction seems not to be all that clear; for: What is 'deception,' specifically, in contrast to 'lying,' such that deception is not intrinsically immoral?]

And, at the same time, while lying is not determined by result (hey, we agree on that!), it seemingly also is not determined by intent. For, if, as Feser asserts, one "can lie and know that [the other] will not be deceived," then one can hardly be said to have intended to deceive. Or, to get closer to the point, lying, says Feser, is not determined by an intent to deceive, but rather solely by an intent to speak that which one believes or knows to be false.


But, Mr Feser's distinction (see also his futher comments about "mental reservation" and use of ambiguous language as means to deceive while avoiding lying) leads us to the (seemingly) strange conclusion that Bill Clinton is not a serial liar. When Clinton told the entire nation, "I did not have sexual relations with that woman, Miss Lewinsky ...," he was attempting to deceive us, certainly, but he was not lying to us (see also, "It depends upon what the meaning of the word 'is' is ..."), for he was using ambiguous language and engaging in "mental reservation." He was, in fact, *not* "deliberately speaking contrary to [his] mind;" rather, he was deliberately speaking in such a way that he reasonably expected most people to misconstrue or misunderstand what he had said.

Now, perhaps it is the case, after all, that Clinton is not a liar, but is rather a very skillful truth-teller; but such a conclusion sure does seem highly counter-intuitive.

Problems with the above distinctions between 'lying' and 'deceiving'
In the comments to this essay, Michael Bauman asks:

Michael Bauman: "So now we're close to an earlier point: What if we called lies immoral and deceptions not, much like murder is immoral but killing is not."

Such a proposal is most like the distinction Kjetil Kringlebotten offered (as quoted above). And it may seem, on first glance, also to be consistent with the distinction that Edward Feser drew (such as his distinction is, as see above), though it isn't in fact.

Perhaps I misunderstand him, but I don't understand Mr Bauman to be offering this as the correct (or, at least, a working) distinction; rather, as such a distinction was offered in the threads at Feser's blog and the WWWW blog, I understand him to be asking if I have a critique for or against such a distinction.

Problems with Kjetil Kringlebotten's distinction
Taken at face value (and as per Kjetil Kringlebotten's offering), this distinction Mr Bauman asks about says that 'lying' and 'deceiving' (or, a 'lie' and a 'deception') are the same thing on the surface or in their externalities, but that there is some critical aspect (not explored in the distinction), whether of motivation or intent or something else entirely, which allows us properly to judge one act to be immoral and a similar act (identical except for the "something else") to be morally neutral or even morally positive. That sounds good, so far; especially as we all will naturally assume that that critical "something else" is intent.

To put it another way, just as 'murder' is a subset of 'killing' (or 'manslaughter'), this proposed distinction says that 'lying' is a subset of 'deceiving.'

Yet, this "subset theory" has a curious result: just as an attempted murder which fails to kill the target is not a homicide and therefore not a murder, so too, an attempting lying which fails to deceive the target audience is not a deception and therefore is not a lie. Though, perhaps, it only matters whether *someone,* and not necessarily the (entire) intended target, is deceived ... which leads to the curiosity that one single act may both be and not be a lie: for, it deceived Person A but did not deceive Person B.

Thus, if one accepts this distinction as valid, then one can't know whether a person (whether oneself or another) has *actually* lied unless one knows whether the attempted lie successfully deceived anyone. And, one is forced (by the logic of it) to assert that one single act may both be and not be a lie.

So, such a "subset theory" for distinguishing a 'lie' from a 'deception' has a curious logical implication of asserting that the morality or immorality of an act (or, if not all acts, then at least some acts, namely "lies" and lies) lies in, or is determined by, the result of the act, not in the act itself or the intention with which the act was performed. And, one is forced (by the logic of it) to assert that one single act may both be and not be immoral, simultaneously.

But, that is way past "curious;" that is absurd: the proposed distinction, though it sounded good and reasonable and sensible at first, is seen to be absurd when we critically examine it.

Problems with Edward Feser's distinction (and definition)
Mr Feser's proposed distinction acknowledges the truth that 'lying' and 'deceiving' (or, a 'lie' and a 'deception') are *not* the same thing -- and then it immediately wildly veers off into an opposite direction by asserting the absurdity that there is no intrinsic relationship between the two; to wit: "Natural law theorists typically distinguish lying and deception, because either can occur without the other. I can lie and know that you will not be deceived, and (as the example given earlier shows) I can deceive without lying."

Yet, at the same time (even as he acknowledges that they are different things), 'deception' seems to nestle within his definition of 'lying.'


Mr Feser defines 'lying' as deliberately doing the opposite of communicating (via speech and related behavior) what is on one's mind, or "say[ing] something that is contrary to what [one] really think[s]," or "deliberately speaking contrary to one's mind." Which is to say, he defines 'lying' as an act of "deliberately miscommunicating [what is on one's mind, or what one really thinks]."

Now, that definition is incomplete (but then, so is the one I offered, and so is the one from Webster's). But, is his definition even adequate? Does it not fail to capture a minimally robust understanding of the word's meaning? Does he not explicitly deny that some things which we know to be lies are lies (for instance, withholding information/truth which one has a duty to impart or divulge)?


Suppose a mother asks her four children, "Who broke the lamp?" And, suppose one of them did it, and that all four know who did it. And, suppose that all four shrug their shoulders.

Have the children lied to their mother? Of course they have! Yet, they haven't said a word. They have attempted to deceive their mother (knowing full well that she will not be deceived by their answer!) by means of several of the strategies Mr Feser says may sometimes permit one to morally deceive without lying.

On what grounds do we say that the children have lied to their mother and have attempted to deceive her? On the grounds that they non-verbally told her that they didn't know the answer to her question.

Is the lie the children told their mother morally permissible? No, it is not.

On what grounds do we say that the lie is not morally permissible? On the grounds that they have a duty to truthfully answer their mother's question. But, Mr Feser explicitly denies that such a duty is relevant to the question of whether a lie is permissible.


The correct distinction between 'lying' and 'deceiving'
A 'lie' and a 'deception' (or, the acts or states of 'lying' or 'deceiving') are indeed two different things, but they're also intrinsically related one to the other. So, on just this dual-point alone, both Mr Kringlebotten's and Mr Feser's distinctions are false; it's not merely that their distinctions are incomplete, it's that both are false in at least one important way.

A 'lie' (noun) is a deliberately made claim or assertion, believed by its speaker to be false, especially when made with intent to deceive; OR any action [whether verbal or non-verbal] performed with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief (whether in one's own mind or another's) that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

'To lie' (verb, intransitive) is to deliberately make a claim or asserton, believing it to be false, especially when making it with intent to deceive; OR to perform an act with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief (whether in one's own mind or another's) that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

A 'deception' (noun) is the object or intended result of a lie; the intentional reinforcement or inculcation in some mind (generally someone else's mind) of a belief that one believes, or has reason to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false, or at variance with reality.

'To deceive' (verb) is to intentionally reinforce or inculcate in some mind (generally someone else's mind) a belief that one believes, or has reason to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false, or at variance with reality.

To misunderstand or be ignorant of some truth, or to have some false belief, is not ipso facto to be deceived -- one can be deceived only if one's false belief is the result of someone's intention that one believe falsely.

Notice: 'to lie' denotes action performed with the intent of asserting a falsehood or of deceiving another, but 'to deceive' denotes only a successful act of deception -- (generally) a lie is the means of deceiving. So, yes, [quoting Feser] one "can lie and know that [the other] will not be deceived;" but, contrary to his further claim, one *cannot* "deceive without lying."

Notice also: these distinctions do not address moral questions. That's because it's not the case that lying is to deceiving as murder is to killing. Rather, it's that lying is to communicating as non-negligent homicide is to interpersonal-interaction; and deceiving is to communicating as successfully committing a non-negligent homicide is to interpersonal-interaction. Not all non-negligent homicides are murders -- when dealing with a homicide, the first question is not, "was it murder?" but rather, "was it intentional?"


Summary to this point

As this post is already huge, I'm going to have to continue with a second post. I'll summarize what we have so far --

1) The verb 'to lie' is the "generic" or "high-level" word to denote communicative acts intended to mislead, confuse, misinform, deceive, and so on. The verb merely denotes communicative acts intended to conceal some truth (or purported truth) or other, generally by means of fostering an alternate belief that an untruth (or purported untruth) is the actual case.

While such acts as truth-concealing, misleading, confusing, misinforming, deceiving, and so forth are generally, or at least frequently, immoral, they are not always immoral (and to this Feser agrees).

Now, since acts of this nature are precisely what 'to lie' denotes, and since such acts are not intrinsically immoral, it *cannot* be the case that lying is intrinsically immoral. For, to claim that lying is intrinsically immoral, while asserting that the sorts of acts which constitue lying are not necessarily immoral, is to assert that lying both is and is not intrinsically immoral.

ERGO, Mr Feser is in error (and is incoherent, to boot) when he asserts that "lying intrinsically immoral." He did not claim that lying is generally immoral (and who could disagree?). Rather, he claims that without exception lying is immoral, while also claiming that the sorts of acts which constitue lying are not necessarily immoral.

2) I examined two dictionary definitions of verb 'to lie' and the noun 'lie;' and I offered what I think is a better (because more complete) definition of the verb, and which is consistent with the dictionary definitions -- The act of 'lying' is the deliberate making of claims/assertions that one believes to be false, especially when made with intent to deceive; OR any action performed with the intent of creating or sustaining a belief that one believes, or has ground to believe, or reasonably *ought* to believe, to be false.

3) I have shown that Mr Feser's definition of the verb 'to lie' is not just incomplete, but is wholly inadequate -- and also incoherent. For he also explicitly asserts that certain sorts of communicative acts (such as truth-concealing, misleading, confusing, misinforming, deceiving) which clearly fall within the ambit of his definition of 'lying' are not examples of lying.

4) I have examined (and shown inadequate or false) the distinction Mr Feser draws between 'lying' and 'deception;' and have offered a correct distinction.


Lying is not intrinsically immoral, Part II