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Thursday, June 4, 2015

A fool for all seasons

William Vallicella, 'the Maverick Philosopher', is a fool. And his foolishness in rooted in his refusal to acknowledge -- indeed, even to critically examine the question (*) -- that we human beings can know that the Creator is; and that, in fact, we cannot *not* know that the Creator is.

Consider these recent pronouncements --

William Vallicella: The Decline of the Culture of Free Discussion and Debate
... And now we notice a very interesting and important point. To be a liberal in the old old sense (a paleo-liberal) is, first and foremost, to value toleration. Toleration is the touchstone of classical liberalism. (Morris Raphael Cohen) But why should we be tolerant of (some of) the beliefs and (some of) the behaviors of others? Because we cannot responsibly claim to know, with respect to certain topics, what is true and what ought to be done/left undone. Liberalism (in the good old sense!) requires toleration, and toleration requires fallibilism. But if we can go wrong, we can go right, and so fallibilism presupposes and thus entails the existence of objective truth. A good old liberal must be an absolutist about truth and hence cannot be a PC-whipped lefty.

Examples. Why tolerate atheists? Because we don't know that God exists. Why tolerate theists? Because we don't know that God does not exist. And so on through the entire range of Big Questions. But toleration has limits. ...
Now, aside from the fact that we *can* know that God is -- that in fact, we all do know it already -- the reason to tolerate God-deniers has nothing to do with knowledge or ignorance of the reality of God.

By Vallicella's rationale for tolerating them, should the majority of humanity come to accept the truth that we human beings can, and do, know that God is, it would then be “right” to cease to tolerate the God-deniers amongst us. You know, like they do to us whenever they get their filthy paws on the levers of governmental force. And the reason they *always* persecute us is precisely because their metaphysical commitments provide no reason to refrain from doing it.

William Vallicella: Does the Atheist Deny What the Theist Affirms?
So I am quite puzzled by Ryan's claim that the existence of God is contradicted by much of what we know to be true. I would like him to produce just one proposition that we know to be true that entails the nonexistence of God. The plain truth of the matter, as it seems to me, is that nothing we know to be true rules out the existence of God. I cheerfully concede that nothing we know to be true rules it in either. Pace the doctor angelicus, one cannot rigorously prove the existence of God. One can argue for the existence of God, but not prove the existence of God. By 'argue for the existence of God,' I mean give good arguments, plausibly-premised arguments free of formal and informal fallacy, arguments that render theistic belief reasonable. What I claim cannot be done, however, is provide rationally compelling arguments, arguments that will force every competent philosophical practioner to accept their conclusions on pain of being irrational if he does not.

2. Ryan also claims that there is no evidence for the God hypothesis. This strikes me as just plain false. There are all kinds of evidence. That it is not the sort of evidence Ryan and fellow atheists would accept does not show that it is not evidence. People have religious and mystical experiences of many different kinds. There is the 'bite of conscience' that intimates a Reality transcendent of the space-time world. Some experiences of beauty intimate the same. There are the dozens and dozens of arguments for the existence of God. Add it up and you have a cumulative case for theism.

The atheist will of course discount all of this. But so what? I will patiently discount all his discountings and show in great detail how none of them are rationally compelling. I will show how he fails to account for obvious facts (consciousness, self-consciouness, conscience, intentionality, purposiveness, etc.) if he assumes that all that exists is in the space-time world. I will expose and question all his assumptions. I will vigorously and rigorously drive him to dogmatism. Having had all his arguments neutralized, if not refuted, he will be left with nothing better than the dogmatic assertion of his position.
Look at this, the last paragraph especially: right there, the fool *has* proven that atheism is false -- which is to say, contrary to his continuous insistence that no one can either prove or disprove the reality of God, *he* has proven, right there, that God is.

But he refuses to see it, for he is a fool: he values something more than he values truth. And one of the things he values more that truth is "discussion and debate" (as in the title of the first linked post)


(*) his characterization of me as a "punk" is a manifestation of his refusal to reason about the matter, pure and simple.

5 comments:

Greg said...
This comment has been removed by the author.
Greg said...

I wonder if he isn't saying this from a liberal perspective--i.e. a classical liberal would argue that we must tolerate both theists and atheists because neither proposition can be definitively known or proven. It appears muddled though; it does seem that he is defending this position as his own at times. If so, is he self-identifying as liberal? How can God condemn people for unbelief if we can't truly know He is? And if God doesn't condemn people for unbelief (if universalism is true) why is it our mission to evangelize and go and make disciples?

When he talks of "proof" vs. "good arguments" regarding the philosophical defense of God, he is largely engaging in useless semantics. Sure, by claiming that arguments for God can't compel rational assent he is signaling he only wishes to defend a lower burden, but analytically at some level the only supportable theistic arguments (and in fact the only supportable philosophical arguments of any kind) are those which compel rational assent in favor of your position and compel rejecting the rationality of the opposite position. By claiming your argument is better than your opponent's, you are saying reason* compels acceptance of your argument instead of your opponent's. You aren't saying it is merely pragmatically advantageous for an individual or society to believe in God, rather the unsaid assumption is an appeal to our rational faculties.

*Which is why I've come to believe nearly every philosophical argument for God relies on the argument from reason eventually. Regardless of how much evidence there is for one position over another, the atheist can coherently question it as valid or relevant--at least in his own mind. But once you show reason cannot be supported without God as its foundation, either naturalism or reason must go.

Ilíon said...

Greg, welcome to my little blog. And thank you for your comment.

Greg: "I wonder if he isn't saying this from a liberal perspective--i.e. a classical liberal would argue that we must tolerate both theists and atheists because neither proposition can be definitively known or proven. It appears muddled though; it does seem that he is defending this position as his own at times."

Yes. That is: he is both saying that "a classical liberal would argue that we must tolerate both theists and atheists because neither proposition can be definitively known or proven" AND he is saying that it is, indeed, true that "neither proposition can be definitively known or proven".

Greg: "If so, is he self-identifying as liberal?"

I expect he'd no more object to being called a "classical liberal" than I would. He calls himself a "conservative", as do I call myself. He calls me a punk, and I call him a fool ... and then I explain *why* I call him that.

Greg: "How can God condemn people for unbelief if we can't truly know He is?"

Vallicella's position on Romans 1:20 is that Paul is ... well, to out it in the vernacular, full of shit.

Greg: "And if God doesn't condemn people for unbelief (if universalism is true) why is it our mission to evangelize and go and make disciples?"

Good point; and it also applies to the position(s) of the Calvinists (or, at minumum, the "hyper-Calvinists").

Greg: "When he talks of "proof" vs. "good arguments" regarding the philosophical defense of God, he is largely engaging in useless semantics."

I would say he's engaging in equivocation, which is worse than "useless semantics", for it's false semantics.

Ilíon said...

Greg: "When he talks of "proof" vs. "good arguments" regarding the philosophical defense of God, he is largely engaging in useless semantics. Sure, by claiming that arguments for God can't compel rational assent he is signaling he only wishes to defend a lower burden, but analytically at some level the only supportable theistic arguments (and in fact the only supportable philosophical arguments of any kind) are those which compel rational assent in favor of your position and compel rejecting the rationality of the opposite position. By claiming your argument is better than your opponent's, you are saying reason* compels acceptance of your argument instead of your opponent's. You aren't saying it is merely pragmatically advantageous for an individual or society to believe in God, rather the unsaid assumption is an appeal to our rational faculties."

This brings up a matter I'd meant to comment upon in the OP.

When I say that he's engaging in equivocation, I mean with respect to the phrase 'rationally compelling' --

When he is talking about some person who denies the truth of the axiom and self-evident truth of the "law of identity" (or any other of the three basic/fundamental laws of logic), he has no problem stating the truth that reason compels one to assent to these truths, and that one who denies any of them is choosing to be irrational. That is, in a case like this, he has no difficulty at all in stating the truth that a person exercising his freedom to deny what reason compels him to affirm is an error in the person, not in the conclusion he denies.

But, when it comes to some other things, and certainly "the God question", he pulls out an entirely different definition of 'rational compelling', by which if *anyone* denies the conclusion of the act of reasoning in question, then the reasoning wasn't 'rational compelling' (however sound and valid it may be).

Greg: "*Which is why I've come to believe nearly every philosophical argument for God relies on the argument from reason eventually. Regardless of how much evidence there is for one position over another, the atheist can coherently question it as valid or relevant--at least in his own mind. But once you show reason cannot be supported without God as its foundation, either naturalism or reason must go."

Indeed: we can have reason, or we can have God-denial; but we can't have both.

Greg said...

Ilion,

"Equivocation" was the word I was looking for. Thank you! I try and read your blog and will comment from time to time. Keep up the good work.